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IT WASN'T AN ACCIDENT: THE TRIBAL
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STORY
WILLIAM WOOD*

In its latest pronouncement on the subject, the Supreme Court suggested in
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies that tribal
sovereign immunity is an accidental doctrine that developed with little
analysis or reasoning. The Court, however, overlooked important history,
context, and (some of its own) precedent which shows that the doctrine arose
quite intentionally through relationships negotiated across centuries between
the United States and the Indian nations involved in the foundational tribal
immunity cases. Indeed, the doctrine's origins and the principles underlying it
date back as far as those for the federal, state, and foreign governments'
immunities, and, historically, the reasoning and justifications for these
doctrines are the same. Although the Kiowa Court upheld tribalimmunity, it
did so grudgingly and only after disparagingits own precedent, misconstruing
the doctrine's origins, questioning whether to perpetuate it, and inviting
Congress to abrogate it. In the wake of Kiowa, other courts have seized upon
the Supreme Court's marginalizationof tribal immunity to limit the doctrine's
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scope in cases where they do the job Kiowa said was for Congress and weigh
the competing policy interests at stake. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these courts
use Kiowa's discrediting of tribal sovereign immunity's legitimacy to tip the
balance against tribal immunity. This article tells the real story of tribal
sovereign immunity, providing doctrinal perspective and historical clarity in
order to correct the misunderstandings about tribal immunity's origins,
development, and purposes.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article tells the story of the tribal sovereign immunity
doctrine. Parts of the story have been told elsewhere, but no one has

yet told the full account and put tribal sovereign immunity in its
proper historical and doctrinal context. Tribal immunity did not
develop by accident, as the Supreme Court and others suggest, but
was the intentional result of relationships negotiated across centuries
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between the United States and the tribal nations' involved in the
foundational tribal immunity cases:
the Cherokee, Chickasaw,
Choctaw, and Muscogee (Creek) Nations.
Together with the
Seminole Nation, these tribal nations comprised the "Five Civilized
Tribes." The Five Tribes2 were so described-by both the general
public and the courts in the tribal immunity cases-because they all
had established constitutional government structures similar to the
federal and state governments and, to varying degrees across and
within the tribes, adopted Western-looking economic, educational,
political, and social institutions. Although the tribal sovereign
immunity story is intertwined with these nations' legal and political
histories, courts and scholars have overlooked their role in the tribal
immunity doctrine's development and mistakenly assumed that it
came about accidentally.
In Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.,' the
Supreme Court held that tribal sovereign immunity barred a lawsuit
against the Kiowa Tribe for breach of contract involving a business
located outside of Indian country (i.e., off-reservation).' Though it
upheld tribal immunity, the Court said the doctrine arose "almost by
accident"5 and had been adopted "with little analysis" and "without
extensive reasoning" in its earlier cases.6 But the Kiowa Court
1. This Article uses the terms "tribe" and "nation" (along with "tribal nation")
interchangeably throughout, in part because the courts in the cases discussed use the
terms interchangeably to describe the indigenous political entities whose immunity
was at issue and because "Indian tribe" is the legally operative term in U.S. common
law and most federal legislation.
2. See Stacy L. Leeds, Defeat or Mixed Blessing? Tribal Sovereignty and the State of
Sequoyah, 43 TULSA L. REv. 5, 5 n.2 (2007) (using "Five Tribes" to refer to the
Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Muscogee (Creek), and Seminole Nations).
3. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
4. Id. at 753. The Kiowa litigation arose after the tribe defaulted on a
promissory note for the purchase of stock in an aircraft repair and maintenance
business. Id. It is unclear whether the note was executed at Carnegie, Oklahoma, on
the tribe's trust lands, or at Oklahoma City, outside of the tribe's trust lands and
where payments were due under the note. Id. at 753-54. The beneficiary of the note
sued the tribe in Oklahoma state court, where the tribe unsuccessfully moved to
dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. Id. at 754. After the Oklahoma Supreme
Court declined to review the state appeals court's holding that tribes could be sued
in state court for breaches of contract involving off-reservation commercial conduct,
the tribe petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. Id.
Though "off-reservation" and "on-reservation" are the more common terms (and
therefore used in this Article), the more appropriate distinction is between land that
is "Indian country" and land that is not. "Indian country" includes reservations,
"dependent Indian communities," and allotments, see 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2006),
and whether land is Indian country determines what governments' laws do and do
not apply there. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 527
(1998) ("Although [the statute] by its terms relates only to... criminal
jurisdiction, .. . it also generally applies to questions of civil jurisdiction .....
5. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756.
6. Id. at 753, 757.
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ignored some of the foundational tribal sovereign immunity cases,
including cases cited in its own precedent, which all involve one of
the Five Tribes and make clear that the doctrine did not develop by
accident. 7 These cases, moreover, used the same reasoning and
analysis-to the extent there was any-found in early and
contemporaneous Supreme Court jurisprudence on federal, state,
and foreign sovereign immunity, suggesting that Kiowa's critique of
tribal immunity for lacking analysis and reasoning was also misplaced.
The early cases for tribes and other governments alike gave two
basic reasons for recognizing sovereign immunity: sovereigns have
immunity because they are sovereign, and sovereign immunity
protects the government treasury.8 The Kiowa Court, however, stated
that the reason for tribal immunity was to protect tribes from state
encroachments and safeguard tribal self-governance. 9
After
mischaracterizing the history of and reasons for the doctrine, the
Court suggested it should be abrogated."l The dissent said that the
Court should limit immunity to tribes' on-reservation activities," but
the majority grudgingly upheld the doctrine and its off-reservation
and "commercial" scope. 2 Though the Court deferred to Congress
on whether and how to limit tribal immunity, it not so subtly invited
Congress to take action."
Why does it matter that the Court in Kiowa undermined tribal
immunity's legitimacy by discrediting its origins since it upheld the
7. See infra notes 417-421 and accompanying text.
8. See infraParts II, III.D.
9. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 764 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 760 (majority opinion). "Commercial" is in quotation marks to point
out the somewhat artificial and fuzzy line between "governmental" and "commercial"
activities, particularly for tribal governments that-largely due to reservation
economic conditions and other obstacles to raising tax revenues-are forced to rely
on economic enterprises to generate income to fund services for tribal citizens and
reservation residents. See Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. State, 242 P.3d
1099, 1107 (Colo. 2010) (en banc) (citing Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuitof Tribal
Economic Development as a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 759
(2004) [hereinafter Fletcher, Pursuit]);see also Kristen A. Carpenter & Ray Halbritter,
Beyond the Ethnic Umbrella and the Buffalo: Some Thoughts on American Indian Tribes and
Gaming, 5 GAMING L. REV. 311, 315-16 (2001) (discussing the construction of "a
seductive and false dichotomy between tribes acting traditionally and commercially"
in court opinions and legal scholarship). Throughout the remainder of the Article,
the words governmental and commercial appear without quotations, though with the
aforementioned caveat.
13. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758-60 (noting Congress's power to abrogate tribal
immunity, as well as Congress's affirmations of and rare limitations on the doctrine,
and stating that Congress was better positioned to address the policy concerns raised
by the Court); see also Ann Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court's
Divestment and Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty, 18 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 147, 180 (2000)
("[T] he Court actually entreated Congress to abrogate tribal immunity .. ").
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doctrine anyway? In addition to raising questions about the respect
accorded to tribes and tribal sovereignty in the federal system, the
Court's sowing doubt about tribal immunity's pedigree has allowed
lower federal courts and state supreme courts to carve out exceptions
to the doctrine by relying on Kiowa's mischaracterizations of it. 4
These courts invoke Kiowa to make their own policy judgments about
whether immunity should apply-and to tip the balance against
upholding immunity-even though the Kiowa Court said those
judgments are for Congress and that "[a]s a matter of federal law, an
Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the
suit or the tribe has waived its immunity."15
Even courts that follow Kiowa's "only where" mandate and
reluctantly uphold immunity have been asking the Supreme Court to
reconsider its deference to Congress and to limit sovereign immunity
on its own.16 The Court seemed to respond to these overtures when
it granted certiorari in a tribal sovereign immunity case in 2010, but
the case was remanded during briefing and before oral argument.1 7
A case involving similar facts and the same issues is currently making
its way through the courts,'" and the Supreme Court in its October
2013 term will hear a case in which Michigan is asking the Court to
decide "[w]hether tribal sovereign immunity bars a state from suing
in federal court to enjoin a tribe from violating [the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act] outside of Indian lands." 9 And tribal immunity cases
are constantly argued in federal and state courts.
Understanding the history of tribal sovereign immunity is
important for these courts, and for the Supreme Court and Congress
should either take up the issue again. This Article focuses on that
history but does not offer a normative defense of sovereign immunity,
tribal or otherwise. Tribal immunity is subject to many of the same

14.
15.
16.
17.
Nation

See cases discussed infraPart I.A.
Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 754 (emphasis added).
See infra Part I.A.
See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text (discussing Oneida Indian
v. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 704

(2011) (per curiam)).

18. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Seneca Cnty., 890 F. Supp. 2d 240 (W.D.N.Y. 2012);
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Federal CourtHolds Cayuga Indian Nation Immune From Seneca County
Po" TaxForeclosurSui TURTLETAL-K (Aug. 22, 2012), http://turtietalk.wordpress.com

/20 /08/22/federal-court-holds-cayuga-indian-nation-immune-from-seneca-countyproperty-tax-foreclosure-suit (noting that the issue in Cayuga Indian Nation is the
same one that the Supreme Court addressed in Oneida).
19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 133 S.
Ct. 2850 (2013) (No. 12-515), 2012 WL 5353883. The other question presented is
"[w] hether a federal court has jurisdiction to enjoin activity that violates [the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act] but takes place outside of Indian lands. Id.
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criticisms as other governmental immunities, 2° although the
normative defenses for tribal sovereign immunity are arguably
stronger than those for other governments. 2' But tribal immunity
should not be limited based on the mistaken assumption that it arose
accidentally or without analytical foundation, and thus courts and
scholars need to be clear about the doctrine's history. This Article
aims to offer that clarity.
This Article begins by examining the Kiowa Court's discussion of
tribal sovereign immunity and analyzing cases from lower federal
courts and state supreme courts that have seized on Kiowa's
delegitimization of the doctrine, either to carve out exceptions to it
or to call on the Supreme Court or Congress to limit it. Part II
provides an overview of the general sovereign immunity doctrine and
its development in cases involving foreign, federal, and state
sovereign immunity in order to situate the tribal immunity story in
the context of other sovereigns' immunities. Part III tells the story of
the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine, tracing it back to the preconstitutional principles the Supreme Court applied in its early
federal Indian law cases, then through a series of nineteenth and
early-twentieth century cases involving the Cherokee, Choctaw,
Creek, and Chickasaw Nations and into the Court's modern era. This
Part focuses on the particular legal and political histories of these
tribes and the role they played in shaping the tribal immunity
doctrine's trajectory. Part IV revisits the Kiowa decision, questioning
the Court's treatment of tribal sovereign immunity in light of the
doctrine's history and the histories of the foreign, federal, and state
20. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201,1216-23
(2001) (criticizing the standard justifications for sovereign immunity-safeguarding the
treasury, protecting elected officials from unelected bureaucrats, promoting
separation of powers, and the lack of constitutional or legal authority for suits against
the government-as unpersuasive and inadequate); Katherine J. Florey, Indian
Country's Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51
B.C. L. REv. 595, 600 (2010) [hereinafter Florey, Borders] (comparing justifications
for and criticisms of tribal immunity to those for other sovereigns' immunities).
21. See Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 ARiz. ST. L.J. 137,
154 (2004) (observing that the policy justifications for tribal immunity are stronger
than those for state sovereign immunity); id. at 166 (noting that "[s]tandard policy
arguments for sovereign immunity-such as fiscal concerns or governmental
'dignity'-are more likely" to justify tribal sovereign immunity"); see also Katherine
Florey, Sovereign Immunity's Penumbras: Common Law, "Accident," and Policy in the
Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 765, 826 (2008)
[hereinafter Florey, Penumbras] (suggesting there are "strong and unique policy
justifications.., for a vigorous doctrine of tribal immunity"); Angela R. Riley, Good
(Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1049, 1109 (2007) (noting that tribes
historically "have struggled with financial solvency and have long existed on tiny
budgets," and that "Indian nations have relied heavily on the sovereign immunity
defense to protect tribal communities").

2013]

IT WASN'T AN ACCIDENT

1593

immunity doctrines examined in the body of the Article. Part IV also
offers some concluding observations regarding the Court's
statements on tribal immunity in the context of its broader sovereign
immunity and federal Indian law jurisprudence, as well as normative
and policy questions that discussions on limiting or abrogating tribal
immunity raise.
I.

KIOWA'S (MIS) CHARACTERIZATION(S) OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY

The Court in Kiowa held, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, that
Indian tribes "enjoy immunity from suits on contracts, whether those
contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and whether
they were made on or outside a reservation."2 2 It deferred to
Congress, which the Court noted had restricted tribal immunity in a
few specific circumstances but has mostly left it unaltered, on whether
to confine immunity to on-reservation or governmental activities or
otherwise limit its scope. But the Court-which knew Congress was
considering tribal immunity legislation at the time-also signaled its
desire that Congress change the doctrine, stating that "[t]here are
reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating" it and suggesting "a
need to abrogate tribal immunity, at least as an overarching rule."24
As part of its pitch to Congress, the Court criticized the tribal
sovereign immunity doctrine as having "developed almost by
accident"2 5 in Turner v. United States6 and been reiterated in
subsequent cases "with little analysis"2 7 and "without extensive
reasoning."2 The Kiowa Court described Turner as "a slender reed
for supporting the principle of tribal sovereign immunity,"29 because
the Court there gave alternative grounds for dismissing the case."0
But Kiowa misunderstood the history around Turner and therefore its
importance. Moreover, Turner is neither the first tribal sovereign
22. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998).
23. Id. at 758-60.
24. Id. at 758; see also Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal
Sovereign Immunity Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a
Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REv. 661, 711 (2002)
(noting that Congress was "actively considering changes in the law of tribal
immunity" at the time Kiowa was decided and the justices' awareness of this fact).
25. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756; see also id. at 763 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concurring
with the majority on this point).
26. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
27. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757.
28. Id. at 753; see also id. at 757 (stating that the Turner Court assumed tribal
immunity for the sake of argument rather than as a "reasoned statement of doctrine").
29. Id. at 757.
30. Id. Turneris discussed infrain Part III.E, notes 360-362 and accompanying text.
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immunity case nor the sole basis for the tribal immunity doctrine, as
the Kiowa Court suggested.3 1
The Eighth Circuit, relying on principles of the United States'
Indian policy that predate the Constitution and the Supreme Court's
then-developing state sovereign immunity jurisprudence, had already
recognized the immunity of the Creek Nation and its officials in
1908,32 as well as the immunity of the Choctaw Nation and its officials
in 1895." The Supreme Court cited these two Eighth Circuit cases in
1940 when it first expressly recognized a tribal sovereign immunity
doctrine in United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 34 ("USF&G'),
but the Kiowa Court conveniently ignored them-even though they
are cited alongside Turner in (the same footnote of) USF&G for the
proposition that "Indian Nations are exempt from suit without
Congressional authorization." 5 The Kiowa Court also ignored an
1850 Supreme Court case that applied sovereign immunity principles
to uphold dismissal of a suit against the Principal Chief of the
Cherokee Nation, 6 as well as several U.S. district court decisions from
the late 1800s that recognized the Cherokee Nation's immunity. 7
Because it turned a blind eye to these foundational cases, the Court
overlooked and failed to appreciate the histories of the tribes
involved in them and their roles in shaping the tribal immunity
doctrine.
Understood in their proper historical and doctrinal
context, these cases show that tribal immunity did not come about by
accident but was the intentional byproduct of relationships
negotiated across centuries between the United States and the Five
Tribes and other Indian nations. This context also undermines
Kiowa's criticism that tribal immunity was adopted "with little
31. See Seielstad, supra note 24, at 693-94 (discussing Kiowa's treatment of Turner
and federal court decisions predating Turner, and arguing that the federal
government "long recognized and respected" tribal sovereign immunity before
Turner); see also Struve, supra note 21, at 154 (noting that the Supreme Court applied

tribal sovereign immunity principles in a case seventy years before Turner).

32. Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304, 308-09 (8th Cir. 1908) (citing Thebo v.
Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1895)); see also infra notes 359, 419 and

accompanying text.

33. Thebo, 66 F. 372 at 374-76.
34. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
35. Id. at 512 n.11 (citing Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919);

Adams, 165 F. at 308; Thebo, 66 F. at 372).

36. Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. 362, 374 (1850).
37. See Chadick v. Duncan, No. 15,317, slip op. at 77 (App. D.C. Mar. 3, 1894)
(copy available at the Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., Record Group No. 376, Case
File No. 314); see also Oral Argument for R. Ross Perry as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendants, at 70-71, Chadick, No. 15,317 [hereinafter Perry Argument] (discussing

three district court cases, one from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma and two from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Arkansas, upholding the immunity of the Cherokee Nation).
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analysis" and "without extensive reasoning,""
because the
foundational Five Tribes immunity cases (which Kiowa ignored) used
the same reasoning and analysis found in early and contemporaneous
Supreme Court cases on federal, state, and foreign immunity to
uphold tribal immunity.39
Kiowa's criticism also ignored that the Court's early sovereign
immunity jurisprudence generally (i.e., for non-tribal and tribal
governments alike) developed with little analysis or reasoning,4" and
that justifications were offered only after the fact to explain the
doctrine's existence. 4' To the extent the Court's early cases gave
reasons for sovereign immunity, they were that sovereigns had
sovereign immunity because they were sovereign (and it was above a
sovereign's dignity to be sued by an individual), and that sovereign
immunity protected the government treasury. The early tribal
immunity cases give the exact same reasons.4 2 The Kiowa Court,
however, not only ignored these cases but also suggested for the first
time that the reason for tribal immunity was to protect tribes "from
encroachment by states" and "safeguard tribal self-governance."4 3
Based on this mischaracterization of the justifications for tribal
immunity, the claim that the doctrine developed accidentally and
without reasoning or analysis, and a concern for persons (particularly
38. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 753, 757 (1998).
39. See infra Part II (comparing the reasoning and analysis in the foundational
state, federal, and foreign immunity cases with the reasoning and analysis in the early
tribal sovereign immunity cases).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882) (noting that federal
sovereign immunity is treated as an established doctrine despite having never been
discussed or justified); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821)
(stating the "universally received opinion" that no suit can be commenced against
the United States); see also Florey, Penumbras,supra note 21, at 768 (questioning the
Supreme Court's treatment of state and federal immunity as "an idea that has always
been somehow vaguely in the air").
41. Early scholars attributed the survival of the doctrine in the United States to
"the financial instability of the infant American states rather than to the stability of
the doctrine's theoretical foundations." Walter Gellhorn & C. Newton Schenck, Tort
Actions Against the FederalGovernment, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 722, 722 (1947); see alsoJohn
E. H. Sherry, The Myth that the King Can Do No Wrong: A Comparative Study of the
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in the United States and New York Court of Claims, 22 ADMIN.
L. REv. 39, 44 (1970) (agreeing with Gellhorn and Schenck that the doctrine was
based more in the financial instability of the states following the Revolutionary War
than on its theoretical underpinnings). Other justifications came over time. See, e.g.,
Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 1216-23 (discussing six conventional justifications for
sovereign immunity); Florey, Penumbras, supra note 21, at 784-96 (discussing
justifications for sovereign immunity offered by courts and scholars).
42. See infra Parts II.D, III.D.
43. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758 ("At one time, the doctrine of tribal immunity from
suit might have been thought necessary to protect nascent tribal governments from
encroachments by States. In our interdependent and mobile society, however, tribal
immunity extends beyond what is needed to safeguard tribal self-governance.").
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tort victims) potentially caught off guard by tribal immunity,' the
Court questioned "the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine" and
suggested that it should be abrogated, "at least as an overarching
rule."4 5 The majority grudgingly upheld the doctrine, including its
off-reservation and commercial scope, and left to Congress the policy
decisions of whether and how to limit tribal immunity.46 Justice
Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg dissented. Reiterating the claims that
the tribal immunity doctrine arose by accident, developed with little
analysis, and is unjust,47 they argued that the Court should limit tribal
immunity to on-reservation activities with a "meaningful nexus" to a
tribe's "sovereign functions.""
The dissent also argued, based on a three-way comparison with
federal, foreign, and state immunity, that the tribal immunity
doctrine is "anomalous": viz-a-viz federal immunity because the
federal government has waived its immunity for certain tort claims
and claims arising from its commercial activities, viz-a-viz foreign
nations' immunity because they do not have immunity for their
extraterritorial commercial activities, and viz-a-viz states because
tribes cannot be sued in state courts but sister states can.4" But this
comparison is a straw man. The federal government waived its own
immunity and limited these waivers to its own courts, just as many
tribes have done.5" It has not abrogated-indeed the Court has
questioned whether Congress can abrogate-states' immunity for
their commercial activities.5'
Foreign nations no longer enjoy
immunity for their extraterritorial commercial activities because
Congress abrogated it in the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities
44. The Court stated that immunity can "harm those who are unaware that they
are dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal immunity, or who have no choice
in the matter, [such] as... tort victims." Id. at 758.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 758-60 (deferring to Congress on whether to make
governmental/commercial or on-/off-reservation distinctions for tribal immunity
and pointing to Congress's ability to weigh competing policy concerns and address
the issue through comprehensive legislation).
47. Id. at 761, 763, 766 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion's
statements that the doctrine "developed almost by accident" and had been applied
"with little analysis," and arguing that the doctrine is unjust, "especially so with
respect to tort victims").
48. Id. at 764.
49. Id. at 765 (citing Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a) (2), 1491 (2006); Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674; Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976,28 U.S.C § 1605(a) (2); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)).
50. See, e.g., Struve, supra note 21, at 157-60 (discussing tribal waivers for civil
rights, tort, and contract actions in tribal courts).
51. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 684-86 (1999) (declining to limit state sovereign immunity to non-commercial
activities and suggesting that Congress lacks authority to do so).
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Act. 2 Congress has limited tribal immunity in a few instances but has
not enacted a general abrogation of tribes' commercial immunity.53
And Indian tribes are immune from suit in state courts because they
were not parties to the Constitution and did not (impliedly) consent
to be sued by (sister) states.54
Understanding the common origins of the different sovereigns'
immunities in the public international common law sovereign
immunity doctrine-and
how deviations from its broad
extraterritorial and absolute scope resulted in the various
immunities' contours that exist today--helps explain that tribal
immunity is not as anomalous as the Kiowa dissent makes it seem. It
also suggests that the dissenters wrongly criticized the majority for
extending tribal sovereign immunity to off-reservation activities and,
according to Justice Stevens, for creating new law instead of following
precedent.5 5 All sovereign immunity doctrines and their contours are
judicial creations.56 However, they all derive from a (default)
common law doctrine that was extraterritorial and absolute in scope57
and applied to all types of legal actions, no matter the relief sought. 8
52. 28 U.S.C § 1605(a) (2) (2006).
53. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758-59 (noting Congressional restrictions on tribal
immunity "in limited circumstances" and listing examples, while also pointing to
Congress's general policy of leaving it unaltered). In addition to the more recent
examples listed in Kiowa (the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d) (7) (A) (ii), and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450f(c) (3)), some early examples of Congress's limiting or
abrogating tribal immunity include nineteenth legislation authorizing a lawsuit by
the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians against the Cherokee Nation and the United
States, see infra note 334 and accompanying text, and 1908 legislation authorizing
suits against the Creek Nation and other tribes in the Court of Claims. See infra note
362 and accompanying text.
54. See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (explaining
that Indian tribes and foreign nations, because they were not parties to the
Constitution, did not implicitly surrender their immunity from suits by states). The
court in Nevada v. Hall, which held that states can sue other states because they
impliedly agreed to it in the Constitution, also recognized that the states had
immunity against each other before the Constitution was ratified. 440 U.S. at 417.
Even though tribes did not cede any of their authority in the Constitution, tribal
immunity is subject to a general congressional power to abrogate it, but state
immunity is not. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (holding that
Congress generally lacks the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
55. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 764 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's
precedent limited tribal sovereign immunity to on-reservation activities and that the
majority was performing a legislative function by applying tribal immunity offreservation). The issue of whether courts are following precedent or making new law
when applying immunity to tribes' and other governments' extraterritorial and
commercial activities is discussed infra note 432 and accompanying text.
56. See Florey, Penumbras, supra note 21, at 767 (advancing the proposition that
the judiciary has continued to reinvent the sovereign immunity doctrine and that
courts have failed to acknowledge their role in its creation and development).
57. See infra notes 125-127, 135-138 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 167, 194, 197 and accompanying text.
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History and logic suggest this common law doctrine is the baseline
against which to measure the scope of tribal immunity. 59 Before
discussing the common law sovereign immunity doctrine and the
contexts in which tribal and other governmental immunities
developed, the next section examines what has happened in the wake
of Kiowa.
A.

The Consequences ofKiowa

One obvious consequence of the Kiowa Court's undermining the
legitimacy of tribal sovereign immunity is that the Court refused to
recognize tribal sovereigns' dignity as a reason for upholding the
doctrine, even though dignity was historically and has been revived as
a, if not the, principal basis for sovereign immunity-particularly for
the states.6" The Court's refusal to similarly embrace dignity as a
reason for tribal immunity raises questions about the respect
accorded to tribal governments in the U.S. federal system and the
Court's regard for tribal sovereignty.6'

59. See Greene v. Mt. Adams Furniture (In re Greene), 980 F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir.
1992) ("Since only Congress can limit the scope of tribal immunity, and it has not
done so, the tribes retain the immunity sovereigns enjoyed at common law, including
its extra-territorial component.'); id. at 595 (" T] he scope of tribal immunity has to
be measured at the common law as it existed at some earlier time, rather than
adopting present limits on sovereign immunity accepted by the states for their own
purposes.") (footnote omitted); see also Seielstad, supra note 24, at 712 (discussing
the federal government's position in Kiowa oral argument that "the common law
default rule with respect to tribes is also absolute immunity unless Congress
articulates a different standard.").
60. See Scott Dodson, Dignity: The New Frontierof State Sovereignty, 56 OKLA. L. REV.
777, 803-04 (2003); Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury:
Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1943
(2003) (discussing the Court's revival of states' dignitary interests as a basis for their
sovereign immunity); Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal
Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 11 (2003) (noting the Court's increased reliance on state
dignity in recent decades); see also infra note 188-189 and accompanying text
(discussing the ascendancy of the dignity rationale in the Court's recent state
immunity jurisprudence).
61. See Tweedy, supra note 13, at 179 (contrasting the Supreme Court's position
that tribal sovereign immunity is a special right with the traditional view that
sovereign immunity is a necessary component of governmental status); see also FRANK
POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE CONSTITUTION 56
(2009) (noting that the "issue of respect and governmental parity harks back to ...
the ability of... society to accurately perceive and honor tribal governance and
performance"); id. at 312 (citing Resnik & Suk, supra note 60, at 1923 n.8) (stating
that the "'invigoration' of state sovereignty has been accompanied by a diminishment
of tribal sovereignty"); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Membership and Indian
Nationhood,37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2012) ("Unless the American Constitution
is amended dramatically.... Indian tribes will be unsuccessful in asserting the
'dignity' of a constitutional sovereign before the Supreme Court ..
" (footnote
omitted)).
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Beyond these questions concerning how the Supreme Court views
tribes, its grudging acceptance and attempted delegitimization of the
tribal immunity doctrine have prompted lower federal courts and
state supreme courts to seize upon Kiowa to further undermine the
doctrine. Some of these courts have carved out exceptions to the
doctrine, making their own policy judgments about whether
immunity should apply despite the Kiowa Court's statements that
those judgments are for Congress and "an Indian tribe is subject to
suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived
its immunity."6 2 Even courts that follow Kiowa's "only where"
mandate and uphold the doctrine complain that they are hamstrung
and ask the Court to revisit its decision in Kiowa and limit tribal
immunity.
In TTEA v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo,63 for example, the Fifth Circuit,
after noting that Kiowa "recogniz[ed] 'reasons to doubt the wisdom
of perpetuating the [tribal immunity] doctrine"' and distinguishing
Kiowa as an action for damages,' found that tribal sovereign
immunity did not bar an action seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief against the tribe.6" Although declaratory and injunctive relief is
available in suits against individual government officials, sovereign
immunity generally bars actions-regardless of the relief soughtagainst the government itself.66 But the Fifth Circuit, citing a
Supreme Court case allowing suits against individual tribal officials
(and another involving suits against individual tribal members) 67 and
noting that state immunity does not preclude declaratory or
62. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998)
(emphasis added).
63. 181 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 1999).
64. Id. at 680 (quoting Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758).
65. Id. at 680-81. The court ultimately dismissed TTEA's claim against the tribe
for failure to state a claim because there was no federal question. See id. at 683
(finding that because the tribe could not have sued TTEA for declaratory relief
under the statute at issue, which was meant to benefit tribes, TTEA could not sue the
tribe).
66. E.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); see also Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949) (prospective relief against
federal officials); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1907) (relief against state
officials). Most courts apply this general rule to tribes. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 514 (1991) (discussing Ex Parte Young
liability for tribal officials); Miller v. Wright, 705 F.3d 919, 928 (9th Cir. 2013)
(applying the Ex Parte Young rule in the tribal government context); Vann v. U.S.
Dep't of Interior, 701 F.3d 927, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that the Ex Parte Young
doctrine applies to Indian tribes).
67. TTEA, 181 F.3d at 680 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59
(1978); Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 171 (1977)). Like citizens of
other governments, individual tribal citizens do not share in the tribal government's
immunity. See, e.g., Puyallup, 433 U.S. at 171-72 (explaining that sovereign immunity
does not extend to individual tribal members).
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injunctive relief against state officials,68 leapt to the conclusion that
tribal sovereign immunity did not preclude declaratory or injunctive
relief against the tribe itself.69 A later Fifth Circuit court relied on
TTEA to overturn a district court decision upholding tribal immunity
against claims for equitable relief7 y
While other courts have refused to follow the Fifth Circuit,7 ' its
opinions are noteworthy because they are predicated on a
delegitimization of tribal sovereign immunity. Though it does not
explicitly invoke Kiowa's "almost by accident" language, TTEA begins
its discussion of immunity by noting that Kiowa questioned the
wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine. 2 The Fifth Circuit opinions
also assume (and rule based on this assumption) that tribal sovereign
immunity does not have the same common law scope as other
immunity doctrines.
Other courts have relied more explicitly on Kiowa's suggestion that
the tribal immunity doctrine is accidental when holding that tribal
immunity did not bar lawsuits that otherwise would be dismissed
under the common law default immunity rule or under the Kiowa
Court's "only where" rule.73 A federal district court in California, for
68.

TTEA, 181 F.3d at 680.

69. Id. at 680-81. The court based this conclusion on the argument that tribal
sovereign immunity should not extend beyond the confines of state sovereign
immunity, but it failed to acknowledge that state immunity bars injunctive and
declaratory actions against states themselves. See supra note 66 and accompanying
text (discussing state immunity principles). The court also pointed to Justice
Stevens' concurring opinion in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe "suggest[ing] that tribal sovereign immunity might not extend 'to claims
for prospective equitable relief against a tribe."' Id. (quoting Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498
U.S. at 515 (Stevens, J., concurring)). But see Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe
v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 969 F.2d 943, 948 n.5 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that Justice
Stevens alone expressed this view, which "was implicitly rejected in the majority
opinion").
70. Comstock Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Ala. & Coushatta Indian Tribes, 261 F.3d 567,
571-72 (5th Cir. 2001).
71. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 928 (7th Cir. 2008)
("Tribal sovereign immunity... extends to suits for injunctive or declaratory
relief."); Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 969 F.2d at 948 (holding the tribe
immune from injunctive relief action); Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala Band of Mission
Indians, 940 F.2d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that tribal immunity "extends to
suits for declaratory and injunctive relief"); Matheson v. Gregoire, 161 P.3d 486, 491
(Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (expressly rejecting the Fifth Circuit rule applied in 7TEA and
Comstock). But see New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 523 F. Supp. 2d 185, 299
n.74 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (following the Fifth Circuit and distinguishing Kiowa by noting
that it addressed sovereign immunity from damages actions and not from injunctive
relief), vacated on othergrounds, 686 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2012).
72. TTEA, 181 F.3d at 680,
73. This Article does not argue that, and it is impossible to know whether, these
cases would have come out differently if Kiowa's reasoning were different. But it is
clear that their use of Kiowa helps them arrive at their result: they abrogate
immunity based on a balancing of the issues (one of which is tribal immunity's
doctrinal pedigree) at play. The cases certainly would have been dismissed under
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example, took Kiowa beyond its own language, citing it to claim that
the doctrine's "development was purely accidentaland ... a creation of
the judiciary."74 The court relied on Kiowa to say that the doctrine
has a "weak foundation" and exists only through "systematic
regurgitation of an accidental doctrine."75
Like the Fifth Circuit, the court distinguished Kiowa as involving
liability for breach of contract damages and found the question of
immunity for non-contractual activity to be "left open."7 6 Stating that
the Kiowa holding's "ambiguous reach" did not "extend the doctrine.
. . to all non-contractual off-reservation conduct,"77 the court held

that tribal immunity did not bar the enforcement of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) against a tribally-owned hotel located
outside of the tribe's reservation.7" The court did, however, limit its
the "only where" rule, as neither the tribes nor Congress expressly authorized the
suits. And a more favorable description of tribal immunity from the Supreme
Court-really, just an understanding of its historical and doctrinal context-would
complicate these courts' efforts to mask their normative policymaking by
marginalizing the doctrine's pedigree.
74. Hollynn D'Lil v. Cher-Ae Heights Indian Cmty., No. 01-1638 TEH, 2002 WL
33942761, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2002) (emphasis added). But see Florey,
Penumbras, supra note 21, at 767 (stating that all sovereign immunity doctrines are
judicially created).
75. Hollynn D'Lil, 2002 WL 33942761, at *5 (footnote omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S.
751 (1998); Theresa R. Wilson, Nations Within a Nation: The Evolution of Tribal
Immunity, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 99, 125 (2000)). Though the court cited Kiowa to
argue that the tribal immunity doctrine arose accidentally and is overly broad in
scope, see Hollynn D'Lil. 2002 WL 33942761, at *5-6 (citing Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758;
Wilson, supra, at 125); the court cautioned that the history and scope of tribal
immunity
should not be taken as justification[s] for discounting the legitimate interest
of the tribes in maintaining their rights to self-determination and selfgovernance. Any limits placed on tribal sovereign immunity must be
grounded in the fundamental nature of the tribes as sovereigns within this
nation, and not, for example, as a need-based remedy granted temporarily
until a certain level of prosperity is reached.
Id. at *5 n.6.
76. Id. at *7.
77. Id. at *8. The court found this ambiguity in language in Justice Stevens'
dissent, which the court maintained is Kiowa's "only explicit reference ... to noncontractual activity," where he discusses tort victims and states that "'nothing in the
Court's reasoninglimits the rule to lawsuits arising out of voluntary contractualrelationship."'
Id. at *6 (quoting Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 766 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). The court then
queried whether Justice Stevens' statement should "be taken as a definitive
interpretation of the majority decision, or should it be seen as a warning call." Id.
78. Id. This case and others involving the application of the ADA against tribes
raise overlapping issues of sovereign immunity, whether federal laws that are silent
with respect to tribes apply to them, and whether those statutes grant a private right
of action (such that there is a claim against which to assert immunity). Cf Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 69 (1978) (concluding that a private right of
action for declaratory or injunctive relief does not exist under the Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1976)); COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 132, 289-90, 636-37 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2005) (discussing case law). The
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ruling to situations where a federal civil rights statute is directly
implicated, and emphasized that it did not address whether tribal
79
immunity applies to off-reservation activity generally.
The California Supreme Court similarly limited its opinion holding
that the state's interest in regulating its electoral process justified an
exception to the tribal immunity doctrine.8 0 Citing Kiowa's claim that
tribal immunity "developed 'almost by accident,"'8 1 and twice noting
that Kiowa "doubt[ed] 'the wisdom of perpetuating the
doctrine,' 82 the court declared that the Supreme Court "has grown
increasingly critical of its continued application." 3 It relied on these
court found that the ADA applied to the tribe's hotel because it was a commercial
establishment open to the public and that the plaintiff could bring a private action to
enforce the statute because the hotel was off-reservation. Hollynn D'Lil 2002 WL
33942761, at *5. The Eleventh Circuit, by contrast, held that although the ADA
applied to a tribe's restaurant and casino as commercial operations open to the
public, the statute did not abrogate tribal immunity and provide for a private right of
action against an on-reservation casino. Fla. Paraplegic Ass'n v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians, 166 F.3d 1126, 1129-30 (11th Cir. 1999). The district court distinguished
the Eleventh Circuit case on the basis that the tribal enterprise there was located on
the reservation. Hollynn D'Lil 2002 WL 33942761, at *8.
79. HollynnD'Li4 2002 WL 33942761, at *8 n.19.
80. See Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 148 P.3d 1126,
1140 (Cal. 2006) (stating that its "abrogation of... immunity.., under these facts is
narrow and carefully circumscribed" and applied only where California sues a tribe
for violations of state fair political practice laws). The court found that this interest
was protected under the U.S. Constitution, id., but the dissent disagreed with and
criticized the majority's reliance on the Tenth Amendment and Guarantee Clause as
the bases for finding a state interest strong enough to trump tribal immunity. See id.
at 1142-44 (Moreno,J., dissenting) (arguing that neither the Tenth Amendment nor
the Guarantee Clause authorized the states to limit tribal sovereign immunity). A
California appeals court, distinguishing Agua Caliente, recently held that the state's
interest in enforcing its consumer protection laws did not justify abrogating tribal
immunity. See Ameriloan v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 580-83 (Ct. App.
2009) (noting that the Agua Caliente court was careful to limit its holding). The
lower court, however, had relied on Agua Caliente to find that immunity did not bar
the action. Id. at 580.
81. Agua Caliente, 148 P.3d at 1130 ("Tribal sovereign immunity was a concept
developed 'almost by accident' in Tuner.... [where] the high court made a
'passing reference to immunity' .... [and] was elevated from dictum to holding in
SF&G] .... " (quoting Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 761)); see also id. ("The FPPC contends
that the origins and application of the doctrine indicate that we should not extend it
to a case involving the state's constitutional authority to regulate its elections or state
legislative processes.").
82. Id. at 1133 (quoting Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758).
83. Id. at 1135 ("[ln light of Kiowa... and its progeny, the United States
Supreme Court, while consistently affirming the [tribal] sovereign immunity
doctrine, has grown increasingly critical of its continued application in light of the
changed status of Indian tribes as viable economic and political nations."). It is
unclear what progeny of Kiowa the court is referencing, as it does not cite any postKiowa tribal immunity case. It is also unclear whether the court is suggesting that all
Indian tribes are economically and politically viable (or what concept of viability it is
using). If so, the court is wrong. See, e.g., Riley, supranote 21, at 1109 (stressing that
the vast majority of tribes face financial hardship). The court may also be suggesting
that tribal immunity is supposed to disappear once tribes do become economically
and/or politically viable. But this suggestion ignores that the doctrine arose in cases
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and Kiowa's other "observations" about tribal immunity to depart
from admittedly well-established doctrine. 84 The dissent criticized the
majority for "carv[ing] out an exception" to and "unjustifiably
circumvent[ing]" well-established rules and principles,8" arguing that
while California's enforcement of its laws was "a highly desirable
objective,"

86

"restrictions on tribal sovereign immunity are the sole

province of Congress." 7
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has carved out an exception to the
tribal immunity doctrine for negligence actions brought under state
dram shop laws.88 After stating that Kiowa stripped the Supreme
Court's earlier tribal immunity precedents "of their authoritative
value" and "discredited [those cases] as authority for the doctrine,"89
the court distinguished Kiowa as involving a contract action and held
that tribal immunity did not bar a negligence action against a tribal
casino for dram shop liability.90
Whereas the majority felt
involving tribes that were economically and politically viable (perhaps more so than
any tribes today), see infra Part III.C-E, and that state and foreign governments that
are or become economically and politically viable are not thereby deprived of
immunity. See Hollynn D'Lil, 2002 WL 33942761, at *5 n.6 (noting that tribal
sovereign immunity is not a "need-based remedy granted temporarily until a certain
level of prosperity is reached"); see also Tweedy, supra note 13, at 179 (arguing that
sufficient tax revenue should not serve as a basis for outgrowing sovereign
immunity).
84. The other observation the court attributed to Kiowa was that "tribal sovereign
immunity has historically been applied as a matter of federal law, not constitutional
law." Agua Caliente, 148 P.3d at 1133 (citing Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756). The court also
noted Justice Stevens' statement that he would not apply the doctrine to offreservation conduct, as well as his calling the tribal immunity doctrine "anomalous"
and "unjust and unfair." Id. at 1134-35 (citing Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 765-66 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
85. Id. at 1140 (MorenoJ., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1141.
88. Bittle v. Bahe, 192 P.3d 810, 827-28 (Okla. 2008).
89. Id. at 820.
90. Id. at 827. The court said the case before it was different from Kiowa and
other Supreme Court cases recognizing tribal immunity because it did not involve a
contract or interfere with the Tribe's right to self-governance. Id. at 821. But see
Tribal Smokeshop, Inc. v. Ala.-Coushatta Tribes, 72 F. Supp. 2d 717, 719 (E.D. Tex.
1999) (citing Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67, 68 (8th Cir. 1974); Elliott v.
Capital Int'l Bank & Trust, Ltd., 870 F. Supp. 733, 735 (E.D. Tex. 1994)) (stating that
"[n]othing in Kiowa could be construed to limit sovereign immunity to contractual
claims," rejecting the argument that immunity does not preclude torts, and noting
other authority applying sovereign immunity to tort claims against tribes). The
court's opinion also evidences a misunderstanding of the tribal sovereign immunity
doctrine, which it says "tests... state action for interference with the right to.. . selfgovernance." Bittle, 192 P.3d at 817 (citation omitted). But the court confuses the
"tradition of sovereignty" language in Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983), a case
involving whether state regulation of on-reservation alcohol sales by individual
Indians infringed on tribal self-government, with what it calls the "tradition of
sovereign immunity," see Bittle, 192 P.3d at 816, 827, and states (incorrectly) that "Rice
v. Rehner concluded that the Indians there had no tribal immunity from state
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unconstrained in the absence of Supreme Court authority expressly
upholding tribal immunity against dram shop liability,9 the
92
dissenting judges said current law bound them to uphold immunity.
And they signaled that the law perhaps should be changed, either by
93
Congress or the Supreme Court.
Even courts that uphold tribal immunity invoke Kiowa's
delegitimization of the doctrine and "almost by accident" language to
suggest not only that Congress should change the law, but also that
the Supreme Court should reconsider its deference to Congress. In a
recent dram shop case against a tribal casino, the Eleventh Circuit
noted Kiowa's "accident" language and doubts about continuing the
doctrine,94 but it twice emphasized what it found to be Kiowa's plain
language allowing suits against tribes "'only where Congress has
authorized the suit or the tribe has waived immunity.'

9 5

The court

stated that the doctrine "remains the law of the land until Congress or
the Supreme Court tells us otherwise."96 The Ninth Circuit, dismissing a
negligence case brought against a tribal corporation operating the
tribe's casino, suggested that tribal entities "competing in the
economic mainstream" should not enjoy immunity but said that the
alcoholic beverage law." Id. at 819. Rice v. Rehner, however, did not involve tribal
immunity from suit. See Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 685 F.3d 1224, 1230
(lth Cir. 2012) (noting that tribal sovereign immunity was not an issue in Rehner
because "there was no tradition of tribal self-governance in liquor transactions").
The Indians there were individual tribal citizens who, like citizens of other
governments, do not have sovereign immunity. See, e.g.,
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't
of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1977) (noting that individual tribal members do not
have sovereign immunity).
91. See Bittle, 192 P.3d at 821 ("[W]e have found no authoritative decision
supporting the doctrine of tribal immunity from suit by a nonmember alleging
violation of state alcoholic beverage laws.").
92. Id. at 828-29 (Kauger, J., dissenting). The dissent cited other state courts
that had refused to take the "great leap ofjurisprudence" the majority did. See id. at
833-34 (citing Filer v. Tohono O'Odham Nation Gaming Enter., 129 P.3d 78 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2006); Holguin v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, 954 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App. 1997);
Foxworthy v. Puyallup Tribe of Indians Assoc., 169 P.3d 53 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)).
93. See Bittle, 192 P.3d at 829 (Kauger, J., dissenting) (arguing that immunity
should not bar dram shop liability as a matter of public policy, but that dram shop
actions cannot be brought against tribes "unless Congress or the United States
Supreme Court makes a change in current law").
94. Furry, 685 F.3d at 1229.
95. Id. at 1236 (quoting Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751,
754 (1998)); see also id. at 1229 ("[T]he Court could not have been clearer about
placing the ball in Congress's court going forward .. ").
96. Id. at 1237 (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit noted in particular the
Kiowa majority's finding that there are "reasons to doubt... perpetuating the
doctrine" and the dissent's description of tribal immunity as "unjust." Id. at 1229.
The court also emphasized that "[t]he doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity may
well be anachronistic and overbroad in its application, especially when applied to
shield from suit... Indian tribes[']... commercial activities ... that have obvious

and substantial impacts on non-tribal parties. But it remains the law of the land until
Congress or the Supreme Court tells us otherwise." Id. at 1237.
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Supreme Court and Congress maintain otherwise9 7 However, the
judge who authored the opinion wrote a separate concurrence
expressing his desire that the Supreme
Court limit sovereign
98
immunity for tribal gaming operations.
In 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case where the
Second Circuit upheld tribal immunity while noting Kiowa's "almost
by accident" language and statement on the "wisdom of
perpetuating" the doctrine.9 9 The court said that its result-that
immunity barred county foreclosure actions against tribal land for
failure to pay taxes that the Supreme Court had previously
determined were lawfully due-was reminiscent of a nursery rhyme"' °
and suggested that the counties look to Congress for help.' Judges
Cabranes' and Hall's concurrence also complained that the "decision
defies common sense" and suggested that the Supreme Court should
change the doctrine." 2
A month before the scheduled oral argument, the Supreme Court
remanded the case after the tribe enacted a law waiving its immunity
against enforcement of the tax liens at issue.0 3 Tribal advocates were
relieved that the Court passed on what many thought was "a prime
opportunity for the Court to revisit its precedent and to carve out a
significant exception to the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity."104
97. See Cook v. Avi Casino Enters., 548 F.3d 718, 725 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that
the petitioner's arguments against recognizing immunity for tribal business entities
"are not without some insight" but were foreclosed by Kiowa and other precedent).
98. Id. at 728 (Gould, J., concurring). Judge Gould said that, alternatively, he
would like Congress to pass legislation limiting the immunity of "tribal entities
involved in ubiquitous commercial gaming activities across the United States" or for
the tribe to waive its immunity against actions for casino employee negligence. Id.
99. Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir, 2010),
vacated, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (per curiam).
100. See id. at 159 ("To be sure the result is reminiscent of words of the nursery
rhyme: Mother, may I go out to swim? Yes, my darling daughter; Hang your clothes
on a hickory limb, And don't go near the water.").
101. See id. ("We are left then with the rule stated in Kiowa: 'As a matter of federal
law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or
the tribe has waived its immunity."' (quoting Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998))); id. at 160 (pointing to Congress as the ultimate
recourse). The court also noted that unlike the doctrine of sovereign authority over
land, the doctrine of tribal immunity from suit has not significantly evolved in the
Supreme Court. Id. at 159 (citations omitted). But see Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 148 P.3d 1126, 1135 (Cal. 2006) (citing the
Supreme Court's placing limitations on tribal jurisdiction in other contexts as a
reason to depart from established tribal sovereign immunity doctrine).
102. Oneida, 605 F.3d at 163-64 (Cabranes, J., concurring) (arguing that the
Supreme Court should reconsider Kiowa because the result in Oneida was "so
anomalous" and "defie [d] common sense").
103. Oneida, 131 S. Ct. at 704.
104. Tribal Supreme Court Project Memorandum: Update of Recent Cases, NATIvE AM.
RTs. FUND 1 (Jan. 10, 2010), sct.narf.org/updatememos/2011/01-10-11.pdf; see also
Supreme Court Vacates and Remands Madison County v. Oneida Nation of New York,
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However, a case with similar facts that presents the same issues is
currently making its way through the courts, 105 and the Supreme
Court, in its October 2013 term, is scheduled to hear a case in which
one of the questions presented for review was "[w]hether tribal
sovereign immunity bars a state from suing in federal court to enjoin
a tribe from violating [the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act] outside of
Indian lands."0! 6 With tribal sovereign immunity cases accounting for
a substantial percentage of petitions for certiorari filed in federal
Indian law cases every year,'0 7 and the Court granting cert in a
disproportionately high number of those cases (particularly when the
petitioners are opposing tribal interests),108 observers of Indian law
and the Supreme Court are closely watching tribal sovereign
immunity jurisprudence.0 9
B. The Post-KiowaJurisprudentialTrend
Kiowa has been cited as binding authority in over four hundred
cases." 0 Although most courts follow the Supreme Court's seemingly
(Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.mtwytlc.org
/component/content/article/113-indian-organizations/763
(referring to the order
vacating the case as "a very positive development").
105. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Seneca Cnty., 890 F. Supp. 2d 240 (W.D.N.Y 2012);
see Fletcher, supra note 18 (noting that the issue in Cayuga Indian Nation is the same
one that the Supreme Court addressed in Oneida).
106. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19, at i.
107. See, e.g., Tribal Supreme Court Project Memorandum: Update of Recent Cases,
NATIVE AM. RTs. FUND 1 (Jul. 13, 2012), http://sct.narf.org/updatememos/2012/0713-12.pdf (noting that on average since 2001, the Supreme Court has received
twenty-six petitions in Indian law cases each year); id. at 2 (noting that five of the
twenty-seven Indian law cert petitions filed in the Court's 2011 term raised the issue
of tribal sovereign immunity).
108. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Spitless: The Certiorari Process as
BarriertoJusticeforIndian Tribes, 51 ARiz. L. REv. 933, 935 (2009); see also Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Interests Win-Loss Rates in the 21st Century-Trend Downward
for TribalInterests?, TURTLE TALK (July 26, 2013), http://turtletalk.wordpress.com
/2013/07/26/tribal-interests-win-loss-rates-in-the-21st-century-trend-downward-for-tribal
MONT. WYO. TRIBAL LEADERS COUNCIL

-interests (comparing data on grants of certiorari for cases where tribal interests

prevailed in federal appeals courts with those for cases where tribal interests lost in
appeals courts).
109. See Tribal Supreme Court Project, supra note 107, at 1 (noting that the NARF
Supreme Court Project will continue to closely monitor cert petitions that raise the
question of tribal sovereign immunity); see also Kiera Flynn, Petition of the Day:
Malaterre v. Amerind Risk Management Corp., SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 17, 2011, 7:05 PM),

http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/10/petition-of-the-day-193/ (discussing Malaterre
v. Amerind Risk Mgmt. Corp., 633 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2011), cert denied, 132 S. Ct.
1094 (2012) (a tribal sovereign immunity case, as the SCOTUSblog petition of the
day); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A CVSG for Malaterre v. Amerind?, TURTLE TALK (Jan.
10,
2012),
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2012/01/1 0/a-cvsg-for-malaterre-vamerind (noting that tribal immunity-related petitions attract significant interest).
110. This number is calculated from a "Citing References" search of Kiowa on
Westlaw, counting the number of "Positive Cases" listed in the "Examined,"
"Discussed," and "Cited" categories.
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clear directive that Indian tribes are subject to suit "only where
Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its
immunity," many courts have asked the Supreme Court to change the
doctrine, and some have created their own exceptions to it. Perhaps
the boldest rebuke of tribal sovereign immunity came from a small
claims court judge in Iowa who concluded that the tribe was "not a
'sovereign' as that word is commonly defined"111 and invoked Dred
precedent on tribal immunity, stare
Scott to evade Supreme 1 Court
2
notwithstanding.
decisis
Other courts are not as blatant in their disregard for binding
Supreme Court precedent, or as blunt about their dislike of tribal
immunity. But some of the same themes in the Iowa judge's ruling,
particularly those about immunity's unfairness to tort victims and
application to tribal casinos, show up in Kiowa and the other opinions
Invoking these themes alongside Kiowa's
discussed above. 11 3
questioning of the doctrine's pedigree, three federal circuit courts
have suggested that the Supreme Court should reconsider its
deference to Congress and limit or abrogate tribal immunity," 4 and a
federal appeals court, a federal district court, and two state supreme
courts have carved out their own exceptions to the doctrine." 5
11. Janss v. Sac & Fox Tribe, No. SCSC011994, slip op. at 4 (Iowa Dist. Ct. for
Tama Cnty., Magis. Div., Apr. 20, 2011), availableat http://westbankmembers.com
The judge found that the tribe was not a
/news/Iowa%20Court%2OCase.pdf.
sovereign because, among other reasons, it did not have "established borders which
are strictly controlled[;] ... coinage or currency of its own; . . . a postal system; ...
[or a] military force to maintain the integrity of its borders." Id. at 3-4. The judge
also rejected the tribe's argument that the plaintiff should have gone through the
tribe's court system, agreeing with the plaintiff that he would not get a fair hearing
there. Id. at 2.
112. Id. at 5.
113. Compare id. at 4 (discussing casino patron tort claims and hypotheticals
involving off-reservation tort victims), with Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc.,
523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998) (discussing tribal casinos and raising concerns about tort
victims), Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 685 F.3d 1224, 1229, 1237 (11th Cir.
2012) (questioning application of tribal immunity in casino tort claims context), and
Cook v. Avi Casino Enters., Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 728 (9th Cir. 2008) (Gould, J.,
concurring) (same).
114. The Second Circuit did so in Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 605 F.3d
149, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2010), discussed supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text; the
Ninth Circuit in Cook, 548 F.3d at 725, discussed supra notes 97-98 and
accompanying text; and the Eleventh Circuit in Furry, 685 F.3d at 1237, discussed
supranotes 94-96 and accompanying text.
115. See Comstock, 261 F.3d at 571-72 (finding that tribal sovereign immunity did
not apply against a claim for equitable relief against a tribe); TTEA v. Ysleta del Sur
Pueblo, 181 F.3d 676, 680-81 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that tribal immunity did not
bar an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against a tribe); Hollynn D'Lil v.
Cher-Ae Heights Indian Cmty., No. 01-1638 TEH, 2002 WL 33942761, at *7-8 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 11, 2002) (creating an exception for the enforcement of federal civil rights
statutes against off-reservation commercial enterprises); Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 148 P.3d 1126, 1140 (Cal. 2006) (finding
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While courts create these exceptions by distinguishing Kiowabased on the type of suit (tort versus contract) or relief sought
(prospective versus damages), the activity at issue (commercial versus
governmental, or something unique like contributions to state
elections), geography (off-reservation versus on-reservation), or a
combination of these factors, they also rely on Kiowa's misreading of
tribal immunity's history." 6 Indeed, their ignorance of this history is
what leads (or enables) the courts to create the "exception": they put
the burden on the tribe to show that the Supreme Court or Congress
has explicitly recognized immunity in that particular context, and
then find that immunity does not apply absent such affirmative
recognition." 7 Such burden-flipping is inconsistent not only with
general common law rule, but also with the test used to determine
whether the federal, state, and foreign governments have
immunity. 8 It also contravenes the Kiowa Court's instruction that
immunity applies absent congressional abrogation or tribal waiver." 9
To date, tribes have been hesitant to petition for certiorari in the
cases where courts limited their immunity. 2 ' This is understandable
exception for the enforcement of state election campaign finance laws); Bittle v.
Bahe, 192 P.3d 810, 827-28 (Okla. 2008) (carving out an exception for state law
dram shop actions against tribal casinos).
116. See 7TEA, 181 F.3d at 680 (distinguishing between actions seeking damages
and prospective relief and suggesting Kiowa applies only to the former); Hollyn D'Lil,
2002 WL 33942761, at *7-8 (distinguishing Kiowa as addressing only immunity for
suits on contracts, and drawing a distinction between on-reservation and offreservation commercial activities); Agua Caliente, 148 P.3d at 1135 (finding that
Kiowa's holding did not apply to a lawsuit to enforce state election laws); Bittle, 192
P.3d at 821 (distinguishing Kiowa because the case before it did not involve a
contract).
117. SeeAgua Caliente, 148 P.3d at 1138 (abrogating tribal immunity in the absence
of Supreme Court authority explicitly holding that tribal sovereign immunity did not
bar actions to enforce state campaign finance laws); Bittle, 192 P.3d at 821-23
(finding no case law explicitly recognizing tribal immunity from a suit by a
nonmember alleging a violation of state alcoholic beverage laws, then holding the
tribe lacked immunity); see also New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d 133,
155 (2nd Cir. 2012) (concluding that the tribe lacked immunity after finding there
was no Supreme Court authority expressly recognizing tribal immunity against a
state's suit to enforce its laws against a tribe's off-reservation commercial activities);
id. at 147 ("There is nothing in the factual record of Kiowa that would require the
holding be extended to suits by states seeking prospective relief against a tribe.").
118. The general common law rule, based on the public international law
doctrine of sovereign immunity, is that a sovereign's immunity is extraterritorial and
absolute (i.e., governmental and commercial) in scope. See infra notes 135-140 and
accompanying text. When federal, state, or foreign sovereign immunity is at issue,
courts look at whether the sovereign has waived its immunity (or otherwise
consented to suit) or Congress has abrogated it; if not, then sovereign immunity bars
the suit. See infra Part II.D. This is the same rule Kiowa applies for tribal sovereign
immunity, but these courts read around Kiowa's language stating that tribes can be
sued "only where" the tribe consents or Congress abrogates immunity.
119. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).
120. See, e.g., California Tribe Drops Campaign Contribution Lawsuit, INDIANZ.COM,
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given tribal interests' record before the Supreme Court in recent
decades. 121 But there is always the possibility that a tribe that loses an
immunity case could petition the Court for review, or that the Court
could grant certiorari where a party who could not sue because of
tribal immunity asks the Court to revisit the doctrine.
As noted above, a case almost identical to the one in which the
Court granted certiorari in 2010 (but never decided) is currently
making its way through the courts. 1 22 Some have speculated that the
next "perfect storm" case 23 to reach the Court might be one of the
several cases in state courts involving tribally-owned online lending
state agencies trying to
operations' assertions of immunity against
124
laws.
protection
enforce their consumer
We can't know if or when the Court may hear another tribal
immunity case, just as we can't know why some lower court judges
limit immunity but others do not. Certainly Kiowa's discrediting of
the doctrine makes it easier for these judges to do so. But Kiowa and
the courts that have followed it got things wrong.
The history of the tribal immunity doctrine shows that its
development was not accidental. This history also highlights three
related points: that the reasoning and analysis used for tribal
(Jul. 16, 2007), http://www.indianz.com/News/2007/003920.asp (suggesting that a
negative Supreme Court ruling could impact other tribes). The only case in which
the tribe petitioned for certiorari was Comstock, where the Supreme Court denied
certiorari and thus passed on the opportunity to review the Fifth Circuit's ruling that
tribal immunity does not preclude actions for equitable relief. Comstock, 261 F.3d at
580 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 971 (2002).
121. See, e.g., Dave Palermo, Patchak Is the Latest in a Troublesome Trend,
PECHANGANET (Aug. 19, 2012), http://www.pechanga.net/content/patchak-latesttroublesome-trend ("Generally our advice is, 'Don't go there. We'll lose.' We have
no other choice but to attempt to resolve issues either through legislation or
administration action." (quoting John Echo-Hawk, the Executive Director of the
Native American Rights Fund, a leading legal advocacy organization representing
tribes)).
122. See Fletcher, supra note 18 (referring to Cayuga Indian Nation v. Seneca
Cnty., 890 F. Supp. 2d 240 (W.D.N.Y. 2012)).
123. See generally Carol McCrehan Parker, The Perfect Storm, the Perfect Culprit: How a
Metaphor of Fate Figures in Judicial Opinions, 43 McGEORGE L. REv.

323 (2012)

(discussing the use of the "perfect storm" metaphor in today's culture and its role in
judicial opinions).
124. See Nathalie Martin &Joshua Schwartz, The Alliance Between Payday Lenders and
Tribes: Are Both Tribal Sovereignty and Consumer Protection at Risk?, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 751, 778-84 (2012) (discussing various state court cases involving state
enforcement actions against tribal lending operations); see also Richard P. Eckman et
al., Update on Tribal Loans to State Residents, 68 Bus. LAw. 677, 677-685 (2013),
available at http://www.pepperlaw.com/pdfs/TBL_68-2_19_Eckman.pdf (surveying
state and federal enforcement actions against tribal lenders); David Lazarus, Tribes'
2013),
29,
(Apr.
TIMES,
L.A.
Scrutiny,
Under
Loans
Payday
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-lazarus-20130430,0,3504446,full.column
(noting that states are stepping up their attempts to regulate tribal lending
operations).
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immunity closely parallels that found in the Supreme Court's seminal
federal, state, and foreign sovereign immunity cases; that the historic
scope of all of these doctrines at common law was absolute and
extraterritorial; and that the doctrines' present scope assumes these
contours except where it has been limited by Congress or the
sovereign's consent. Normative considerations might call for limiting
immunity in some of these cases, or for eliminating governmental
immunity generally. Before reaching the normative, however, we
need to be clear about history. Understanding the history of the
doctrine requires putting the doctrine in its proper context, which in
turn requires understanding not only the path along which tribal
immunity developed but also the doctrinal context in which it arose.
II. A GENERAL AND COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY

At the risk of rehashing the substantial literature on the state,
federal, and foreign sovereign immunity doctrines, this section briefly
examines their histories and contours. This examination illustrates
three fundamental similarities across the doctrines:
They all
originate in the international public law doctrine of nation-state
sovereign immunity (which, historically, is extraterritorial and
commercial in scope); the foundational cases adopting those
doctrines are thin on analysis; and any limitations on these
immunities' scope have come from Congress or the sovereigns
themselves, not the courts. This background helps us understand the
general sovereign immunity doctrine in which tribal immunity is
rooted,12 5 as well as the early tribal immunity cases' reliance on these
precedents.
The origins of the common law sovereign immunity doctrine are
two-fold.' 2 6 On the one hand, English common law dating back to at
least the Fourteenth century recognized the King's immunity from
suit in his own courts. 12

7

As this monarchical immunity doctrine

125. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) ("Indian
tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.").
126. See Florey, Penumbras, supra note 21, at 771 (asserting that the various
sovereign immunity doctrines that have developed throughout the years are all based
on two basic principles, and noting the Supreme Court stated that "' [t]he doctrine of
sovereign immunity is an amalgam of two quite different concepts, one applicable to
suits in the sovereign's own courts and the other to suits in the courts of another
sovereign"' (footnote omitted)).
127. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARV. L. REv. 1, 1 (1963) (discussing the King's sovereign immunity in English
common law). This immunity was not absolute, however, as there were still remedies
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evolved, the notion of foreign sovereign immunity-the concept that
a sovereign should enjoy protections in other nations' courts similar
to those it receives at home-began to develop. 2 8
The origin of this foreign sovereign immunity is, however, not
entirely clear. 29 It arose in the post-Westphalian era and is rooted in
principles of sovereign independence, equality and dignity reflected
Legal scholars of the
in classical international law scholarship.'
time, including Emmerich de Vattel, wrote about these ideas of
sovereign independence and equality, but they did not address
nation-state immunity from courts of other states and instead focused
solely on the personal immunities of foreign leaders and
ambassadors.' 3
By the time the United States was founded, sovereign immunity
was, in the oft-quoted words of Alexander Hamilton, seen as
something "inherent in the nature of sovereignty" that was
recognized by the "general sense, and the general practice of
mankind."'3 2 The states that formed the new republic understood
both themselves and their newly-formed national government to have
sovereign immunity. 133 Foreign nations, of course, were already in

the group of entities recognized as having immunity.
As an inherent attribute of sovereignty, immunity also extended to

tribal nations, whom the federal government and European powers
included among the family of sovereigns.3 4 Although cases involving
for individuals who had claims against the Crown. Id.
128. Florey, Borders, supra note 20, at 616.
129. Julian Yap, State Sovereign Immunity and the Law of Nations: Incorporating a
Commercial Act Exception into Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity, 78 U. CIN. L. REv.
81, 93 (2009).
130. Id. at 94 (noting that the theory of foreign sovereign immunity is based on
the "ideas of sovereign independence, equality, and dignity" found in classical
scholars' writings). The first application of immunity principles in the tribal
government context was in a lawsuit against Principal Chief John Ross, the chief
executive of the Cherokee Nation, where the Supreme Court invoked this principle
of personal immunity for Principal Chief Ross as a public officer of the Cherokee
Nation. Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 374 (1850) (discussed infra, Part
III.D.1); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (relying on
Vattel's international law writings to describe the Cherokee Nation and other Indian
tribes as entities that did not lose their sovereignty by coming under the protection
of a more powerful sovereign), abrogationrecognized by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353
(2001).
131. Yap, supra note 129, at 94.
132. THE FEDERALIsTNo. 81, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
133. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821) (emphasizing
that the sovereign immunity of the United States is a "universally received opinion");
Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 1201, 1203 (explaining how the people and courts
have consistently acted as though sovereign immunity has always been a principle in
the United States).
134. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 61, at 38, 61 (noting that tribes, like foreign
nations, were recognized as sovereigns in the Constitution although they were not
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tribes and tribal officials' immunity from suit were quite rare until the
late twentieth century, the courts in the tribal immunity cases
(including the Supreme Court) applied the same principles and
reasoning that contemporaneous courts applied to foreign, the
federal, and the state governments and officials. The following
section examines those principles and reasons.
A. Foreign Sovereign Immunity
The origin and trajectory of nation-state immunity are "difficult to
trace,"' 35 but the concept long predates the United States. The
Supreme Court's early foreign immunity jurisprudence applied the
general common law principles of nation-state sovereign immunity
discussed above, and adopted them without much analysis or
reasoning. Chief Justice Marshall basically accepted the doctrine at
face value when the Supreme Court first recognized it in 1812, in The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.'36 Relying on principles of immunity
for foreign diplomats and national dignity to dismiss a U.S. citizen's
action asserting title to a French vessel docked in Philadelphia,
Marshall stated that "the whole civilized world concurred" in these
principles. 3 7 But he offered no explanation for these principles
beyond the "perfect equality and absolute independence of
sovereigns" and a "common interest impelling them to mutual
intercourse."138
Schooner Exchange was understood to mean that foreign sovereigns
enjoyed absolute immunity-i.e., immunity for both their
governmental and commercial acts-in U.S. courts."3 9 The Supreme
Court confirmed this absolute immunity rule in 1926 when it upheld
immunity in a case involving an Italian merchant ship.4 0 In the

involved in its drafting or ratification); see also Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559-60
("The very term 'nation,' ... applied to [Indigenous polities], means 'a people
distinct from others"' and that "treaty" and "nation" were applied to Indian nations
and "to the other nations of the earth.., all in the same sense.").
135. Yap, supra note 129, at 93.
136. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
137. Id. at 137-38; see also id. at 138 (discussing immunity extended to foreign
ministers and stating "[w]hatever may be the principle on which this immunity is
established").
138. Id. at 137.
139. See, e.g.,
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 148 P.3d
1126, 1134 (Cal. 2006) ("[W]hile the holding [in Schooner] was narrow, the opinion
was regarded as standing for the proposition that foreign sovereigns had absolute
immunity from United States jurisdiction." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
140. See Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 569-70, 574 (1926) (holding that
the decision in Schooner Exchange "cannot be taken as excluding merchant ships held
and used by a government"). But seeYap, supra note 129, at 96, 99 (arguing that the

20131

IT WASN'T AN ACCIDENT

1613

following decades, the Court began to defer to the State
Department's determinations regarding which defendants enjoyed
immunity.' 4 ' The Court sometimes gave reasons for deferring to the
Executive (or to Congress), but not for the doctrine itself.
After this practice proved unworkable, Congress adopted the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in 1976.14
It carves out
exceptions to the common law doctrine of nation-state immunity,
including an exception for foreign nations' commercial activities in
the United States.'43 This exception was created in part due to Cold
War politics and a concern that absolute immunity gave foreign
nations an unfair competitive advantage in business transactions.'
Outside of the exceptions in the FSIA, however, foreign nations enjoy
immunity in federal and state courts.
B. FederalSovereign Immunity
Like foreign nations'
sovereign immunity, the federal
government's immunity was simply taken as a given, or as a
"universally received opinion."'4 5 To the extent there was any, the
reasoning for the Supreme Court's holdings varied.'46 In 1882, the
Court stated in United States v. Lee that "[t]he principle has never
been discussed or the reasons for it given, but is has always been
treated as an established doctrine."'47 It cited ChiefJustice Marshall's
1821 opinion in Cohens v. Virginia as "[t]he first recognition of the
149
general doctrine,"14' but Cohens (like Lee) gave no reason for it.
absolute doctrine was not adopted by U.S. courts until Berizzi Bros., and that Schooner
Exchange is incorrectly cited as the source for the doctrine).
141. This move coincided with a general trend in international law away from
recognizing absolute immunity in the mid-twentieth century. SeeYap, supra note 129,
at 93.
142. See Agua Caliente, 148 P.3d at 1134 (explaining that Congress passed the FSIA
to create more predictable rules for foreign sovereign immunity (citing Kiowa Tribe
of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998))).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)(2006).
144. Seielstad, supra note 24, at 676; see also Yap, supra note 129, at 99-100 ("[T]he
absolute theory of immunity began to be perceived as undermining U.S. business
interests.").
145. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411 (1821).
146. See, e.g., Gellhorn & Schenck, supra note 41, at 722 (noting that the Supreme
Court's stated reasons for upholding the federal government's immunity varied and
that the courts "so consistently and insistently held that 'the [federal] government is
not liable to be sued, except with its own consent, given by law,' that citation of
supporting authorities soon became unnecessary" (citations omitted)).
147. 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882).
148. Id. (citing Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 412); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Suing
the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, andJudicialIndependence, 35 GEO.WASH.
INT'L L. REv. 521, 523 n.5 (calling Cohens the Supreme Court's "first clear reference
to the sovereign immunity of the United States" but noting an "earlier but more
ambiguous reference" in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335-36
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Nor did the Supreme Court identify a reason or source for the
doctrine in 1846 when it first held that the United States can be sued
only under legislation waiving its immunity. 150 That is still the rule
today, but over the past century and a half Congress has limited the
federal government's immunity in the Tucker Act, the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and other legislation,
The federal
including for some of its commercial activities."'
by
one
of these
government's immunity bars actions not covered
congressional waivers.
C. State Sovereign Immunity
State sovereign immunity's origin is also unclear,'52 but the
doctrine derives from states' existence as independent sovereigns
The big debate in the state immunity
before the Constitution.'
jurisprudence and scholarship is the degree to which states gave up,
or gave Congress the authority to abrogate, this immunity in the
Constitution.154 The focus of this Article, however, is on how the
doctrine was justified-and the reasoning used to support it-as it
(1816)).
149. See Lee, 106 U.S. at 207 (acknowledging that Marshall's opinion in Cohens gave
no force or reason for recognizing foreign sovereign immunity as a general
doctrine).
150. SeeJackson, supra note 148, at 523 n.5 (discussing United States v. McLemore,
45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846)); see also David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits
Against Government Officers, 1984 SuP. CT. REv. 149, 149 n.3 (noting that McLemore did
not identify the source for federal sovereign immunity).
151. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006) (imposing government liable for the
negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its employees made while acting within the
scope of their official duties); id. § 1491 (a)-(b) (1) (waiving sovereign immunity for
contract claims and for noncontractual claims where a plaintiff seeks the return of
money paid to, or asserts that she is entitled to payment from, the government).
152. See Seielstad, supra note 24, at 671 ( The source and justification for the
[state sovereign immunity] doctrine is the subject of much debate."); Yap, supra note
129, at 101 ("[T]he [state sovereign immunity] doctrine's source remains unclear.");
see alsoJackson, supra note 148 , at 528 (discussing confusion and uncertainty in early
U.S. law and explaining that "[t]he nature of the sovereignty created under the 1789
Constitution was something new and uncertain-it took the people and the
institutions time to work out their relationships").
153. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (explaining that the states'
immunity from suit does not derive from the Eleventh Amendment, but instead was
something they enjoyed before the Eleventh Amendment was adopted); see also
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 124-25 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that state immunity is based on a "pre-existing principle of sovereign
immunity, broader than the Eleventh Amendment itself'); Katherine H. Ku,
Comment, Reimagining the Eleventh Amendment, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1031, 1038-39
(2003) (noting that a majority of the Rehnquist Court agreed that state sovereign
immunity does not come from the text of the Constitution, but rather is an immunity
they enjoy under the U.S. system of "dual sovereignty").
154. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union,
123 HARv. L. REv. 1817, 1825-35 (2010) (examining the different arguments and
theories in scholarly literature and the Court's more recent state immunity cases).
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developed in U.S. law. A survey of the Supreme Court's foundational
state immunity cases yields three basic justifications for state
immunity: sovereign immunity was recognized in the common law,
sovereign immunity protected the states' treasuries, and it was above
states' dignity to be sued by private parties.
The first state sovereign immunity case was decided under the
Articles of Confederation, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
quashed a writ of attachment issued by a lower court against goods
belonging to Virginia in satisfaction of a debt Virginia allegedly
owed. 5' The Pennsylvania court apparently did not issue a written
decision, but the Pennsylvania attorney general argued for dismissal
on grounds that the writ was "void" and "a mere nullity" because "the
'
court had no jurisdiction." 156
Commentators believed that the court's
decision was based "[o]n the General principle of a suit ag[ains]t a
Sovereign State."157 The Supreme Court would invoke and adopt this
general principle, with little analysis, in its post-constitutional state
immunity jurisprudence.
The Justices in Chisholm v. Georgia,"'8 the Supreme Court's first state
immunity case and the case that led to the Eleventh Amendment,
simply cited English common law as the reason for the states'
immunity.15 9 In Cohens v. Virginia, one of the Supreme Court's early
post-Eleventh Amendment opinions, Chief Justice Marshall cited the
"general proposition" that "a sovereign independent State is not
suable, except by its own consent. "16' He also suggested that the
155. Nathan v. Virginia, as reprinted in M'Carty v. Nixon, 1 U.S, (1 Dall.) 77, 77 n.*
(Pa. C.P., Phila. Cnty. 1781); see Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of
PersonalJurisdiction,115 HARV. L. REv. 1559, 1579 n.94 (2002) (discussing Nathan).
156. Nathan, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 79.
157. Nelson, supra note 155, at 1579 (quoting a letter from Edmund Pendleton to
Nathaniel Pendleton); see also id. ("' [T]he principle of this adjudication[] met with
the approbation of all the judges' of the state's supreme court, although it did not
reach them in ajudicial capacity." (quoting Alexander Dallas, the court reporter)).
158. 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419 (1793).
159. See id. at 460 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (discussing English common law); see
also id. at 449 (opinion of Iredell, J.) ("[T]here are no principles of the old law, to
which, we must have recourse, that in any manner authorise the present suit, either
by precedent or by analogy."). The Chisolm Court found that the states had waived
their immunity, to a large degree, in ratifying the Constitution. The Justices wrote
their opinions seriatim at the time, and four of the five agreed that Georgia, by
ratifying the Constitution, ceded any sovereign immunity it may have had against
suits in United States federal court. Justice Iredell, the most senior Justice whose
dissenting opinion is often cited for the proposition that states did not broadly give
up their immunity against suit in federal courts, actually did not rule on this issue; his
opinion was premised on the wording of the 1789 Judiciary Act. See id. at 449 ("My
opinion being, that even if the Constitution would admit of the exercise of such a
power, a new law is necessary for the purpose. ..").
160. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 380 (1821) (holding, further, that
the states consented to suits in federal court on appeals from state courts).
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reason for states' immunity was to protect their treasuries, and that
the Eleventh Amendment was adopted in response to their concerns
about liabilities for their debts-not to protect "the dignity of a
State."1 61
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the principle that states
and other sovereigns were not suable was well-established. In 1857,
Chief Justice Taney drew on customary international law sovereign
immunity principles, but did not cite any authority, when he stated in
Beers v. Arkansas that "[i] t is an established principle ofjurisprudence
in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own
courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission."162 In
63 ruled, without giving
1883, the Court in Louisiana v. Jume11
any
explanation or authority, that a state could not be sued "in its
capacity as an organized political community."'"' Four years later, the
Court in In re Ayers' 65 cited Jumel and-for the first time-invoked
dignity in the state immunity context, claiming that the Eleventh
Amendment was adopted to avoid the "indignity" of subjecting states
to judicial processes at the request of private parties.'6 6 The Ayers
Court further opined that immunity bars not just contract damages

161. See id. at 406 ("[A]t the adoption of the constitution, all the States were
greatly indebted; and the apprehension that these debts might be prosecuted in the
federal Courts, formed a very serious objection to that instrument.'); id. (explaining
that the motive for the Eleventh Amendment "was not to maintain the sovereignty of
a State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before
the tribunal," or to protect States from being sued by other States or foreign States; it
was to protect states from being sued by individuals looking to collect debts from
them).
162. 61 (20 How.) U.S. 527, 529 (1857); see also Yap, supra note 129, at 107 (saying
Justice Taney "went out of his way" to rely on international law). The Beers Court
held that Arkansas was free to change or withdraw entirely its immunity waiver made
in connection with a bond issuance, explaining that the state's exercise of this power
would "violate[] no contract with the parties... [but would] merely regulatet] the
proceedings in its own courts, and limit[] jurisdiction it had before conferred in suits
when the state consented." Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 530.
163. 107 U.S. 711 (1883).
164. Id. at 720.
165. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
166. Id. at 505. According to Ayers.
It was thought to be neither becoming nor convenient that the several
states ... , invested with.., sovereignty which had not been delegated to
the United States, should be summoned as defendants to answer to
complaints of private persons ....
and the administration of their public
affairs should be subject to and controlled by the mandates of judicial
tribunals, without their consent, and in favor of individual interests.
Id. The Ayers Court thus put forth an explanation for state immunity, which reflects
not only that it was beneath states' dignity to be haled into court by private parties,
but also that allowing these suits would represent judicial interference with the states'
public policy and public affairs administration-in other words, their selfgovernment.

claims but also "all other actions and suits
equity."
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,

whether at law or in

Beers, Jumel, and Ayers are important not only because they were the
leading state sovereign immunity cases of their time,"
but also
because they were cited in the early tribal immunity cases decided in
the following decades that similarly barred suits on contracts or
sought injunctive relief based on a contract. 69 Up until this point,
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence simply relied on the general
principle that immunity inheres in the sovereign. And its more
specific reasoning was inconsistent: Chief Justice Marshall said in
Cohens that state immunity existed to protect states' finances, and that
state dignity had nothing to do with the Eleventh Amendment; 7 ° but
the Court in Ayers said the1 71amendment's "very object and purpose"

was to protect state dignity.

By the last decade of the nineteenth century, when the first
published immunity cases involving tribes were decided, state
immunity-according to the Court in Hans v. Louisiana172-had been
recognized so often that it was no longer necessary to formally assert
its existence.1 73 Hans, which over time has become perhaps the
Supreme Court's most-cited state immunity case, cites Jumel and Ayers
and quotes Beers' language about sovereign immunity being an
"established principle" of United States and international law. 174 The
167. Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
168. See Currie, supra note 150, at 152-53 (discussing Beers, Jumel, Ayers and other
contemporaneous sovereign immunity cases).
169. Compare Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (suit for injunctive relief against Virginia officials
who threatened to seize property in satisfaction of taxes that taxpayers had paid with
bonds which Virginia later revoked), Louisiana v.Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883) (lawsuit
by bondholders to force collection of taxes after Louisiana changed its law and
breached its obligation to collect the taxes), and Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.)
527 (1857) (breach of contract action brought under the Contracts Clause), with
Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304, 308-09 (8th Cir. 1908) (suit alleging breach of
contract by Creek Nation and seeking to compel performance under contract where
court cited Ayers and Jumel), Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372 (8th Cir.
1895) (suit alleging breach of and seeking to enforce contract between attorney and
Choctaw Nation where court cited Beers), and Chadick v. Duncan, No. 15,317, slip op.
at 77 (App. D.C. Mar. 3, 1894) (copy available at the Nat'l Archives & Records
Admin., Record Group No. 376, Case File No. 314) (suit alleging breach of and
seeking to enforce contract with Cherokee Nation for purchase of government
bonds where court cited Beers and Ayers).
170. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (20 How.) 264, 406 (1821).
171. Ayers, 123 U.S. at 505.
172. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
173. Id. at 16 ("The suability of a state, without its consent, was a thing unknown
to the law. This has been so often laid down and acknowledged by courts and jurists
that it is hardly necessary to be formally asserted.").
174. Id. at 10, 17 (citing Jumel, 107 U.S. 711; Ayers, 123 U.S. 443); see also id. at 17
("It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the
sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and
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Hans Court also quotes Hamilton's statement in The FederalistNo. 81
that immunity is "inherent in the nature of sovereignty"'17 5 and several
other founders' statements about the indignity of states being haled
for state
into court by individuals.1 7' But Hans offers no justification
77
pronouncements.1
vague
these
beyond
immunity
The Supreme Court continued to rely on generic reasoning to
uphold state immunity up through the early twentieth century, when
178
it first formally recognized the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine.
In 1921, the Court in In re New York called state sovereign immunity "a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence" that "ha[d] become established
by repeated decisions of this court"' 79 when it held that federal courts
lack jurisdiction over suits against states in admiralty. 8 ' When it
applied state immunity against a foreign nation in 1934, the Supreme
Court in Monaco v. Mississippi8 relied on the principles and
"postulates" reflected in Hans-namely the assertion that states are
immune from suit except to the extent they surrendered that
Like
immunity in the "plan of the [Constitutional] convention."'
Hans, Monaco cited only The Federalist, No. 81 and select statements
from the Virginia ratification debates as reasons to uphold the
doctrine.

183

The Supreme Court's reasoning is not the only unsophisticated
and inconsistent aspect of its sovereign immunity jurisprudence up
permission."' (quoting Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 529).
175. Id. at 12-13 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 132 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
176. See id. at 14 (citing statements of George Mason, Patrick Henry, James
Madison, andJohn Marshall at the Virginia ratification convention).
177. Though a concern about protecting the states' treasuries arguably influenced
Hans, Jumel, Ayers, and the Supreme Court's other Reconstruction-era immunity
decisions (all involving the debts of former Confederate states), the politics
surrounding them may have kept the Supreme Court from invoking this justification
to uphold immunity. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The ParticularlyDubious Case of
Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History, and "FederalCourts, "81 N.C. L. REV.
1927, 1946-47 (2003) (discussing Hans and other state immunity cases in the context
of post-Reconstruction politics).
178. After its 1850 decision in Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 374 (1850),
recognizing the immunity of the Cherokee Nation's chief executive official, the

Supreme Court decided its first case involving the immunity of an Indian tribe (and
not just tribal officials) in 1919 and its next tribal immunity case in 1940. See
USF&G., 309 U.S. 506 (1940) (upholding the immunity of the Choctaw Nation and
Chickasaw Nation); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919) (recognizing the
immunity of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation).
179. 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-17 (1890);
Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 529).

180. Id. at 497.
181.

292 U.S. 313 (1934).

182. Id. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted).
183. Id. at 322-25 (citing statements of James Madison and John Marshall and
quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 132 (Alexander Hamilton)).
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through this time. The Court's nomenclature was still developing
too. Before 1934, when it decided Monaco, the Court had used the
words "sovereign immunity" in only nine cases, seven of which were
18
in the preceding decade.

4

As the Court began using the phrase "sovereign immunity" more
consistently, it also articulated a (slightly) clearer justification for
state immunity-which shifted back to protecting states' treasuries.
In 1933, for example, the Court relied on Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion in Cohens to claim that the motive for the Eleventh
Amendment was to protect states against debt prosecutions in federal
courts.185 Justice Douglas explained in 1959 that the amendment was
designed to protect both the treasuries and dignities of states. 186 The
need to protect states' treasuries generally, and early states' concerns
over Revolutionary War debts particularly, remained the
predominant justification for state immunity up through the 1980s.8 7
In the 1990s, the Supreme Court returned to the dignity rationale
for state immunity, focusing on the states' "sovereign dignity" within
the federal system and not just the indignity of private suits.

8

The

Court entered the twenty-first century calling the protection of this
sovereign dignity the "preeminent purpose" and primary function of

184. These results are based on a search for "sovereign immunity" in Westlaw's
"sct" database.
185. Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1933) (citing Cohens for the proposition
that "the motive for the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment was to quiet grave
apprehensions that were extensively entertained with respect to the prosecution of
state debts in the federal courts").
186. See Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276 n.1 (1959)
(explaining that although Congress passed the Eleventh Amendment in response to
Chisholm v. Georgia and the perceived affront to states' dignity, more than just the
states' dignity was at stake because many of them had defaulted on their debts and
were experiencing financial difficulties (citing MARIAN D. IRISH &JAMES W. PROTHO,
THE POLITICS OFAMERICAN DEMOCRACY 123 (1959 ed.)).
187. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 151 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the general agreement that the Eleventh
Amendment was adopted because the states were concerned they would become
financially ruined if the courts forced them to repay their Revolutionary War debts
(citing Petty, 359 U.S. at 276 n.1; Fiske, 290 U.S. at 27; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821))).
188. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748-49 (1999) ("The founding
generation thought it 'neither becoming nor convenient that the several States ...
should be summoned as defendants to answer the complaints of private persons.'
The principle of sovereign immunity preserved by constitutional design 'thus accords
the States the respect owed them as members of the federation."' (citing In re Ayers,
123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887))); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506
U.S. 139, 146 (1993); see also Ku, supra note 153, at 1042 ("Articulated more precisely
then, the driving purpose of state sovereign immunity is not protecting the dignity of
states but rather protecting the sovereign dignity of states.").
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state immunity.'89 Protecting states' treasuries remains a secondary
justification. 9 0
Whichever justification is used, it does not change the reality that
little analysis undergirds the state immunity doctrine. Even today,
the Court is citing and relying on the same principles found in Ayers,
Jumel, and Hans, cases that are short on reasoning and offer after-thefact justifications for the doctrine.
Invoking the sovereign dignity concept, the Court in the 1990s
restricted Congress's power to abrogate state immunity, most notably
9
in Seminole Tribe v. Florida."'
Congress can now abrogate state
immunity only under the Reconstruction Amendments and certain
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.' 92
189. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760, (2002); see also
id. at 765 (stating that the "central purpose" of state immunity is to "accord the
respect owed them as joint sovereigns" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
190. See id. at 769 (arguing that sovereign immunity's primary purpose is to
protect states' respect and dignity, not their treasuries); Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517
F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that, in addition to protecting states' respect
and dignity, sovereign immunity also protects states' treasuries). The Supreme Court
also suggests a self-governance justification for state sovereign immunity that links
the sovereign dignity and fiscal protection justifications. For example, the Court in
Alden stated:
Today, as at the time of the founding, the allocation of scarce resources
among competing needs and interests lies at the heart of the political
process. While the judgment creditor of a State may have a legitimate claim
for compensation, other important needs and worthwhile ends compete for
access to the public fisc. Since all cannot be satisfied in full, it is inevitable
that difficult decisions involving the most sensitive and political ofjudgments
must be made. If the principle of representative government is to be
preserved to the States, the balance between competing interests must be
reached after deliberation by the political process established by the citizens
of the State, not by judicial decree mandated by the Federal Government
and invoked by the private citizen.
527 U.S. at 751; see also Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 765 (noting that state immunity
shields their treasuries "and thus preserv[es] the States' ability to govern in
accordance with the will of their citizens") (internal quotation marks omitted));
Ayers, 123 U.S. at 505 (arguing that allowing suits would be judicial interference with
states' public policy and public affairs administration).
191. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). The elevation of the state dignity rationale in the 1990s
is part (and parcel) of the Supreme Court's constitutionalization of state sovereign
immunity. See id. at 128 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing "post-Hans dicta
indicating that this immunity is constitutional"); T-rEA v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 181
F.3d 676, 680 (5th Cir. 1999) (referencing "the now-constitutionalized doctrine of
state sovereign immunity"); Vicki Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional
Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 953, 953 (2000) (noting that the Court's decisions have transformed the status
of state sovereign immunity into that of a first order constitutional principle).
192. See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004) (holding
that Congress has power under the Bankruptcy Clause to abrogate state immunity in
some instances); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (recognizing Congress's
power to abrogate state immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment and the other
Reconstruction Amendments); Seminole, 517 U.S. at 59, 66, 72 (holding that Congress
lacks power to abrogate state immunity under the Interstate Commerce Clause and
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Except where Congress has or the states themselves have limited
their immunity (including through waivers implied in the
constitutional structure and under their own laws for suits in their
own courts) 193 states enjoy the same common law nation-state
immunity they had before they joined the Union. The Court recently
reaffirmed the rule stated in Ayers that this immunity bars all suits, no
194
matter the relief sought, and is not just a defense against liability.
It also clarified that states' immunity extends to their commercial
95

1
activities as well.

D. The Reasonsfor and Scope of Other Immunity Doctrines
The reasons given for sovereign immunity have changed over
time,' 96 but its ubiquity has been constant. Basically, the Supreme
Court unquestioningly applied the sovereign immunity doctrine to
foreign, the federal, and the state governments based on already
established and commonly understood principles. To the extent the
Court's opinions employ analysis and reasoning, it is some
combination of the following: sovereign immunity inheres in the

overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), in which a plurality of
the Court held that Congress did have this power).
193. Under current Supreme Court doctrine, states can sue each other in federal
court or in state court, and be sued by the federal government in federal court, based
on the theory that the states impliedly waived immunity against these suits in the
Constitution. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979) (holding that states
impliedly consented, in the Constitution, to suits in other states' courts); see also
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 373 (1923) (holding that states impliedly
consented to suits by other states in federal courts). States likewise do not enjoy
immunity against suits brought under the Fourteenth Amendment and quasi in rem
Bankruptcy Clause actions, on the theory that they waived immunity from these
actions in the Constitution. See Hood, 541 U.S. at 445 (holding that the states "ceded
their immunity from private suits in bankruptcy in ...the Bankruptcy clause");
Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 453-56 (describing the Fourteenth Amendment as a restriction
on state power which allows for private suits against states).
194. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 765-66 ("[S]overeign immunity applies
regardless of whether a private plaintiffs suit is for monetary damages or some other
type of relief.... Sovereign immunity does not merely constitute a defense to
monetary liability or even to all types of liability. Rather, it provides an immunity
from suit."); Ayers, 123 U.S. at 502 ("[Ilmmunity includes ...

all ...

actions and

suits..., whether at law or in equity.").
195. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 685-86 (1999) (holding that state immunity applies to states' commercial and
noncommercial activities); see also Yap, supra note 129, at 84 (highlighting the
Court's refusal to apply a commercial act exception for state sovereign immunity,
thus granting states sovereign immunity "even though they... engage[] in
commercial activities otherwise indistinguishable from a private enterprise").
196. See Florey, Penumbras,supra note 21, at 765 (explaining how the doctrine "has
come to serve new purposes" over time and especially in recent years); see alsoJoseph
D. Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV.
L. REv. 1060, 1060-61 (1946) (noting the various reasons offered over time to justify
sovereign immunity).
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sovereign and was recognized in the common law; suits are offensive
to a sovereign's or state's dignity; and/or sovereign immunity
protects the states' treasuries (consistent with the idea that the
Eleventh Amendment was adopted because of states' fears about
Revolutionary War debts). Though this reasoning is less than lucid,
we can draw from it something about the reality of governance that
brings home immunity. Having governance responsibilities justifies
immunity, as does having assets (which belong to the citizenry or
community) to protect.
The first courts to decide tribal sovereign immunity cases invoked
the same "well-established principle" of sovereign immunity-and
reasoning to support it-found in contemporaneous cases involving
other sovereigns, and states in particular. The courts in the tribal
immunity cases also borrowed the contours of these other sovereigns'
immunity doctrines, really of the general sovereign immunity
doctrine. Consistent with this broad common law doctrine, they held
that tribal immunity applied to all types of suits-not just for contract
damages, but also for prospective relief and all other causes of
action.1 97 Also consistent with the common law doctrine applied to
other sovereigns, the courts in the tribal cases upheld immunity
except where it had been expressly abrogated by Congress or waived
by the tribes themselves. The following part discusses these cases and
their historical context.
III. THE TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STORY
The tribal sovereign immunity doctrine's origins lie in the general
common law sovereign immunity doctrine and in principles
underlying U.S. relations with Indian nations that are reflected in the
Constitution and the Supreme Court's earliest federal Indian law
opinions.'98 But the story of exactly how the tribal immunity doctrine
evolved from these principles in a series of eighteenth and early

197.

See Adams v. Murphy, 164 F. 304, 308-09 (8th Cir. 1908) (explaining that

immunity bars claims for damages, claims for injunctive relief, and all other types of

actions); Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe, 66 F. 372, 376 (8th Cir. 1895) (same); Chadick v.
Duncan, No. 15,317, slip op. at 90-91 (App. D.C. March 3, 1894) (copy available at
the Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., Record Group No. 376, Case File No. 314)
(same); cf Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 765 (noting that "sovereign immunity
applies regardless of whether a" plaintiff seeks monetary damages or another type of
relief); Ayers, 123 U.S. at 502 (recognizing that immunity bars all types of actions, not
just contract claims).

198. See generally Seielstad, supra note 24, at 683-86 (locating the doctrinal
foundation for tribal immunity in early colonial-tribal and federal-tribal relationships
and Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizing tribal sovereignty); Struve, supra note

21, at 138-42 (same).

20131

IT WASN'T AN ACCIDENT

1623

twentieth century cases involving the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw,
and Muscogee (Creek) Nations-and how these tribes' legal and
political histories figured into those cases-has not been fully told. 99
It shows that tribal immunity shares a common doctrinal origin with
other governments' immunity, that the tribal immunity doctrine did
not arise by accident, and that courts and others are wrong to suggest
or assume otherwise.
A. Fundamental(FederalIndian Law) Principles and Early U.S. Indian
Policy
Early relations between Indigenous Peoples in North America and
Europeans were based primarily in trade and diplomacy."° England
and other European nations recognized Indian tribes as independent
sovereigns existing within the boundaries of the various territories
claimed by the European crowns, and they entered into numerous
treaties with tribes. Of particular interest here are treaties negotiated
199. Others have discussed aspects of the tribal immunity doctrine's historical
development, but no one has yet synthesized the various cases and parts of the story.
See Florey, Borders, supra note 20, at 619-21 (examining the evolution of the tribal
sovereign immunity doctrine in twentieth century Supreme Court cases'); Martin
& Schwartz, supra note 124, at 770-73 (discussing the tribal sovereign immunity
doctrine in twentieth century Supreme Court jurisprudence); Seielstad, supra note
24, at 682-99 (tracing the historical underpinnings of tribal sovereign immunity
through early colonial contact and U.S. Indian policy, the Supreme Court's early
federal Indian law jurisprudence, turn-of-the-twentieth century federal circuit court
cases, and early twentieth century Supreme Court tribal immunity cases); Struve,
supra note 21, at 138-52 (tracing the development of the tribal immunity doctrine
through early federal Indian policy and nineteenth and early twentieth century
Supreme Court decisions); Wilson, supra note 75, at 111-28 (providing an overview
of twentieth century Supreme Court tribal sovereign immunity cases). Although
some scholars perhaps resist the notion that tribal immunity's development was
accidental, they do not take the claim head on. See Florey, Borders, supra note 20, at
619 (noting the Kiowa Court's "almost by accident" statement but referring to "the
murkiness of tribal sovereign immunity's origins"); Martin & Schwartz, supra note
124, at 770-71 (stating that "the U.S. Supreme Court claims that the doctrine
developed 'almost by accident'" and seemingly accepting the claim at face value)
(internal citation omitted); Seielstad, supra note 24, at 679-80 (stating that the
Court's decision in Kiowa Tribe is "solid in its endorsement of tribal immunity," but
ignoring Kiowa's statement about the doctrine's "accidental" development).
These accounts also devalue the significance of the Five Tribes' histories in the
doctrine's evolution. See Florey, Borders, supra note 20, at 619 (dedicating only two
sentences to the Five Tribes cases and not mentioning the particular tribes involved);
Seielstad, supra note 24, at 686-94 (discussing Five Tribes cases but not the tribes'
histories); Alvin J. Ziontz, In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of JudicialErrorin
Construction of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 20 S.D. L. REv. 1, 29-33 (1975) (discussing
some of the Five Tribes cases and their relation to the Supreme Court's later
jurisprudence, though not the histories of the tribes involved).
200. See, e.g., POMMERSHEIM, supra note 61, at 9 ("[E]arly Indian-colonial
encounters were largely related to four separate but overlapping streams of
engagement: trade and land acquisition, diplomacy and war, governance, and
cultural attitudes.").
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between England, France, and Spain-who were competing to
control the trade in the Southeast-and the tribal polities developing
among the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Muscogee peoples,
who were undergoing societal changes as they grew more involved in
the expanding fur trade and global political economy.20' It is these
polities whose sovereign immunity the courts would recognize years
later in the first tribal immunity cases.
After the United States declared its independence from Great
Britain, it followed England's and other European nations'
established policy of recognizing tribal sovereignty and associating
with tribes through treaties.2 2 Organized under the Articles of
Confederation, the United States signed their first treaty in 1778, with
the Delaware Nation. It invited the Delawares (separately or as part
of an Indian confederacy) to join the new republic. 20 3 Another early
treaty with the Cherokee Nation, the 1785 Treaty of Hopewell,
recognized the Cherokees' right to send a delegate to the U.S.
Congress.20 4
201. See DUANE CHAMPAGNE,
SOCIAL
ORDER
AND
CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENTS
AMONG
THE CHEROKEE,

POLITICAL
CHANGE:
THE
CHOCTAW,
THE

CHICKASAW, AND THE CREEK 50 (1992) [hereinafter CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE] (noting the

demands placed on the Southeastern tribes by "[i]ncorporation into the expanding
fur trade and competitive geopolitical relations"); ANGIE DEBO, THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE CHOCTAW REPUBLIC 27-36 (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter DEBO, CHOGrAW]

(discussing diplomatic relations and treaties between England, France, and Spain
and the Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks, and Cherokees); ARRELL M. GIBSON, THE
CHIcKASAwS 32-77 (1971) (examining Chickasaw and Choctaw relations and treaties
with the Spanish, French, and English); MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE POLITICS OF INDIAN
REMOVAL: CREEK GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY IN CRISIS 18-24, 30 (1982) (describing

Creek relationships and trade with the Spanish, French, and English, as well as trade
conferences and treaties between the British and Creeks and Cherokees).
Diplomatic and political relationships were in constant flux not only between the
European powers and tribes, but also among the tribes themselves. See CHAMPAGNE,
CHANGE, supra, at 56-67 (discussing intratribal and intertribal geopolitical relations);
J. LEITCH WRIGHTJR., CREEKS & SEMINOLES: THE DESTRUCTION AND REGENERATION OF
THE MUSCOGULGE PEOPLE 1-6 (1986) (examining changes within the Muscogee
confederacy and the origins of the Creek Nation and Seminole Nation); see also
GREEN, supra, at 12-14 (noting changes in the Muscogee confederacy from the
sixteenth to eighteenth centuries).
202. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understandingof the Political Status of
Indian Tribes, 82 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 153, 175-76 (2008) [hereinafter Fletcher, Political
Status] (noting that the Framers, Congress, and the Supreme Court all recognized
the political status of Indian tribes, "albeit in a manner limited by the Doctrine of
Discovery and through consent in various treaties").
203. See Fletcher, PoliticalStatus, supra note 202, at 172 (discussing the Treaty of
Fort Pitt); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, PreconstitutionalFederal Power, 82 TULANE L. REV.
509, 546-47 (2007) [hereinafter Fletcher, Preconstitutional] (same).
204. Anne H. Abel, Proposalsfor an Indian State, 1778-1878, reprinted in ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 87, 89 (1907) (citing the Treaty of
Hopewell). This right was reaffirmed in the 1835 Treaty of New Echota between the
Cherokee Nation and the United States. Treaty with the Cherokee, 1835, U.S.Cherokee, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478; see also POMMERSHEIM, supra note 61, at 82-83
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The states found the Articles of Confederation to be lacking, in
large part because of unresolved questions about relations among
tribes, states, and the federal government. 2 5 So they adopted the
Constitution, which centralized Indian affairs at the federal level and
gave Congress the authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign
20 6
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
The framers thus recognized tribes among the family of sovereigns
and gave the President the power to make treaties with them.0 7
During its first century, Congress exercised this Indian Commerce
Clause power only to regulate the states' and United States citizens'
interactions with tribes, most notably in the Indian Trade and
Nonintercourse Acts. 2 8 First passed in 1790, these laws (like laws
passed under the Articles of Confederation) refer to Indian "nations"
and "tribes. '2 9 Congress's early involvement in Indian affairs was
mostly limited to ratifying and appropriating funds to pay for
obligations assumed in treaties, which were the "primary form of legal
interaction" between tribes and the federal government until 1871
when treaty-making ended.2 10
Many of the United States' early treaties, including those first
negotiated after the Constitution, were with one or more of the tribal
nations in the Southeast-the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek,
and Seminole-who also continued diplomatic relations with the
British, French, and Spanish. 211 As these other countries' influence
(citing Treaty of New Echota provision, along with provision in Treaty of Fort Pitt
with Delawares, as "example[s] of unique political configurations contemplated by
treaties"); Ezra Rosser, The Nature of Representation: The Cherokee Right to a
CongressionalDelegate, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91, 91 (2005) (discussing Treaty of New
Echota provision).
205. See Fletcher, Preconstitutional,supra note 203, at 523-24 ("History shows with
certainty that one of the greater weakness of the national government under the
Articles of Confederation was the nonexclusive character of the Indian Affairs

Power.").
206. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
207. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see supra note 202 and accompanying text.
208. Pub. L. No. 1-33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177
(2006)).
209. Id.; see also Fletcher, Political Status, supra note 202, at 167 (discussing laws
passed by the Continental Congress that referred to Indian "nations" and "tribes").
210. POMMERSHEIM, supra note 61, at 63; Fletcher, PoliticalStatus, supra note 202, at
170-73; see also id. at 172 (noting that "[flederal-tribal relations all but exclusively
took the form of treaties during the first century of American history" (footnote
.omitted)).

211.

See, e.g.,

ANGIE DEBO,

A

HISTORY OF THE INDLANS OF THE UNITED STATES

88-89

(1st ed. 1970) [hereinafter DEBO, HISTORY] (noting 1785 and 1786 treaties between
the United States and the Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws); DEBO, CHOCTAW,
supra note 201, at 32-34 (discussing a 1784 Spanish treaty with the Choctaws,
Chickasaws, and Creeks; a 1792 Spanish treaty with the Choctaws, Chickasaws,
Creeks, and Cherokees; and early 1800s U.S.-Choctaw treaties); GIBSON, supra note
201, at 81, 99-105 (discussing early 1800s Chickasaw-U.S. treaties); WRIGHT, supra
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in the region waned, the United States extended its presence
geographically and otherwise.
By the end of the Nineteenth
Century's second decade, the United States had established itself as
the colonial power in the Southeast.212 It adopted a "civilization"
policy towards the Southeastern tribes,213 also reflected in its treaties
with them, 214 which encouraged the tribes' integration into the
growing Southern agricultural economy.
As plantation agriculture expanded, the tribes' economies changed
along with those around them. Tribal landholdings decreased
through successive treaty cessions, the fur trade declined, and the
tribes grew more reliant on agriculture. 2 5 The majority of tribal
citizens practiced subsistence farming, 216
but there was also
plantation-style agriculture among the Cherokees, Chickasaws,
Choctaws, Creeks, and Seminoles, particularly among the mixedblood families who constituted a majority of the emerging merchant
and planter classes and began to play more prominent roles in tribal
politics, at least externally. 217 To different degrees across and within
the tribes, the Five Tribes began to allow missionaries into and
establish schools in their nations, and to send their children to be
educated at outside schools.2 18
note 201, at 137-38, 141 (discussing late eighteenth century Creek-U.S. treaties,
including the United States' first Indian treaty signed after the Constitution).
212. See WRIGHT, supra note 201, at 101-27, 131 (examining the relationship
between trade and diplomacy among the Indians, British, French, and Spanish,
concluding in the "development of... first American colonial system" in the
Southeast).
213. See GREEN, supra note 201, at 47-48 (describing the 1819 Civilization Fund
Act and civilization program); WRIGHT, supra note 201, at 133, 143-46 (examining
U.S. civilization policy towards the Creeks); Duane Champagne, Renewing Tribal
Governments: Uniting Political Theory and Sacred Communities, 1 INDIGENOUS PEOPLES'
J.L. CULTURE & RESIST. 24, 25 (2004) [hereinafter Champagne, Renewing] (dating the
origins of civilization policy to 1790 legislation allocating funds "to promote farming
and American living patterns among the Indians").
214. See, e.g., RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM
CLAN TO COURT 206 (1975) [hereinafter STRICKLAND, FIRE AND SPIRITS] (listing
examples of treaties and policies enacted during 1786-1828 that reflected the United
States' civilization goals).
215. See CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at 89-92, 127-28 (discussing the
decline of the fur trade and the transition to agricultural economies in the
Cherokee, Choctaw, and Creek Nations).
216. See id. at 92, 128 (comparing subsistence farmers and plantation owners).
217. See id. at 127 (discussing the role of planters and merchants in Cherokee,
Chickasaw, and Creek politics); GIBSON, supra note 201, at 64-65 (describing
Chickasaw mixed bloods "tak[ing] over the management of ...
tribal affairs");
STRICKLAND, FIRE AND SPIRITS, supra note 214, at 50 (noting the "ascendancy of mixedblood leadership" in the Cherokee Nation).
218. See CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at 149, 166 (noting the different
positions regarding missions and schools in Choctaw, Creek, Cherokee, and
Chickasaw societies). The role of and reactions to missionaries and schools in the
Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Cherokee Nations are discussed, respectively, in
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The tribes also responded to their changing economic, diplomatic,
and political realities by adapting their governmental structures and
legal institutions.2 19 In the early nineteenth century, the Cherokees
formed a more centralized government with a national council,
passed their first written law in 1808, and established a national
judiciary in 1820.220 In 1827, the Cherokee government adopted a
written constitution that established a tripartite government with
executive, legislative, and judicial branches.2 2 1
The centralized Creek national council passed its first written laws
in the early 1800s and compiled and published the Laws of the Creek
Nation in 1818.222 The Choctaws passed their first written laws in the
1820's and adopted a constitution in 1826.223 The Chickasaw national
note 201, at 41-42, 45; GIBSON, supra note 201, at 106-21;
at 63-65; and Cullen Joe Holland, The Cherokee Indians
Newspapers, 1828-1906: The Tribal Voice of a People in Transition 17-21 (1956),
(unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Minnesota) (microfilm available at the
University of California Los Angeles Library, Record I.D. No. 1758160).
219. This adaptation served two purposes: it made it easier for the tribes to
protect their lands against cessions or sales by unauthorized persons, see STRICKLAND,
FIRE AND SPIRITS, supra note 214, at 77 (pointing to the "[d]esire to retain tribal lands
as a motivating force behind the adoption of new [Cherokee] laws"); Champagne,
Renewing, supra note 213, at 47 (noting that the Cherokees' adapted government
structure "strengthened their ability to resist U.S. land demands and treaty
enticements"), and it provided protection and security for the property interests of
the growing merchant/planter classes. See GIBSON, supra note 201, at 137 (noting
that the code of laws passed by the Chickasaws in 1829 "improved law and order
enforcement and gave special protection to private property, a concern of the
nation's business community"); STRICKLAND, FIRE AND SPIRITS, supra note 214, at 73
(describing the body of Cherokee law adopted in the early nineteenth century as "an
instrument designed to serve the needs of the small group of wealthy mixed-blood
Cherokees"). The tribes had already undergone governance, institutional, and social
change in previous decades, but these changes accelerated in the early nineteenth
century. See CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at 56-67 (outlining developments
in Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Creek societies in the eighteenth century).
220. See STRICKLAND, FIRE AND SPIRITS, supra note 214, at 56-64 (discussing the
centralization of the Cherokee government, the formation of a national council, and
DEBO, CHOCTAW, supra
GREEN, supra note 201,

the establishment of the judiciary); see also THOMAS LEE BALLENGER, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AMONG THE CHEROKEES 27-34 (2010)

(reprinting Ballenger's doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of
Oklahoma in 1937).
221. See CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at 134-40 (describing the formation
of the Cherokee constitutional government); STRICKLAND, FIRE AND SPRITS, supra note
214, at 65-66 (discussing the Cherokee constitution and government structure).
222. See CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at 113-17 (discussing Creek
government centralization in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries);
GREEN, supra note 201, at 37, 69-72, 150-51 (examining the Creek government's
centralization and adoption of written laws).
223.

See CLARA SUE KIDWELL, THE CHOCTAWS IN OKLAHOMA:

FROM TRIBE TO

NATION, 1855-1970, at xv (noting the promulgation of written laws and the
establishment of the Choctaw national council which adopted the constitution); see
also CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, su a note 201, at 149, 151-52 (discussing the Choctaws'
adoption of a written law code and constitution); DEBO, CHOCTAW, supra note 201, at
48-49 (same).
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council adopted a code of written laws in 1829, after redistricting the
nation to "accommodate an emerging public judicial system and to
improve administration." 2 4 These institutional and other changes
were made with the goal of protecting the tribes' land from
alienation and maintaining their cultural, social, and political
integrity. 225 But they also had the effect of raising even greater
consternation among those advocating for the removal of the
Southeastern tribes from their lands.226
Acting on this desire for Indian lands, the southern states passed
laws purporting to assert their jurisdiction within the Indian nations'
boundaries and forbid the tribes' governments to function.227 In
1830, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act. 228 Following the
tribes' unsuccessful attempts to protect their national boundaries, the
U.S. government forcibly removed the Cherokees, Chickasaws,
Choctaws, Creeks, and Seminoles from their Southeastern homelands
along the infamous Trails of Tears. After removal, the Five Tribes
reestablished their nations in the Indian Territory (what is now
Oklahoma) .229

224. GIBSON, supra note 201, at 137. The four districts were established in 1824.
Id.
225. See KIDWELL, supra note 223, at 6 (describing the Choctaw constitutional
government as "both a sign of civilization to U.S. officials and a measure of their
adaptation to the political forces that surrounded them"); Julia Coates, Foreword, in
BALLENGER, supra note 220, at i, vii-viii (stating that "the transition to and
elaboration of law more similar to that of the Americans probably was not, on the
part of the Cherokees, an attempt to assimilate" and describing the development of
the Cherokee legal and judicial systems as "a nationalistic response to US
colonization").
226. See CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at 126 (noting the southern states'
desire for land and describing the Cherokee Nation's adoption of a constitutional
government in 1827 as "a direct counterthreat to the southern states ... that...
raised the possibility of permanent and quasi-independent Indian nations within the
chartered limits of the states, and ... precipitated more direct and coercive action on
the part of Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee to pressure the southeastern Indians to
remove"); ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN 4 (1972)

[hereinafter DEBO,

WATERS RUN] (pointing out that the Cherokees' "advancement in civilization served
only to provoke the frontiersmen to increased hostility").
227. See, e.g., CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at 143-44 (noting actions by
Georgia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Alabama to extend their laws over the
Cherokee Nation); id. at 169 (noting the extension of Alabama laws over the Creek
Nation); DEBO, CHOCTAW, supra note 201, at 51 (discussing Mississippi legislation
extending state law over the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations and purporting to
abolish their tribal governments); GIBSON, supra note 201, at 140, 154 (describing
Mississippi and Alabama laws abolishing the Chickasaw government and asserting
state jurisdiction over tribal lands).
228. Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
229. See DEBO, HISTORY, supra note 211, at 117-26 (discussing the removal of the
Choctaws, Creeks, Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Seminoles to the Indian Territory).
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The Cherokee Cases

The first cases addressing the political status of Indian nations
arose from the Cherokees' resistance to Georgia's attempt to assert its
jurisdiction within the Cherokee Nation's boundaries and against the
Cherokee government and its citizens. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
and Worcester v. Georgia,23' both decided in the early 1830s, are part of
a trilogy of cases (known as the Marshall Trilogy because they were
authored by Chief Justice John Marshall) which laid much of the
jurisprudential foundation for federal Indian law."'2 Chief Justice
Marshall skirted the issue of Georgia's authority the first time around
in Cherokee Nation, by ruling that the Cherokee Nation did not qualify
as a "foreign state" and therefore lacked standing to sue under Article
Ill.233 A year later, the Court held that Georgia had no jurisdiction to
enforce its laws within the Cherokee Nation after Samuel Worcester,
a Vermont citizen imprisoned by Georgia for residing in the
Cherokee Nation, challenged his arrest." 4
The Court's decisions in the Cherokee cases set forth several of the
most often-cited propositions in federal Indian law, including that
states lack jurisdiction in Indian country,2" that tribes are "domestic
dependent nations" to whom the United States owes a fiduciary
obligation,2 3 6 and that Indian affairs are the exclusive province of the
federal government. 237 More important for purposes of this Article,
however, are the principles the Court invoked and the language it
used in setting forth these propositions. Although Chief Justice
Marshall held that the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign state under
Article 111,23 '8 he described the Cherokee Nation "as a state, as a
230. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
231. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), abrogationrecognized by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S.
353 (2001).
232. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 61, at 112-13 (listing the foundational Indian
law principles set forth in the Marshall Trilogy). The other case in the trilogy is
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), in which the Supreme Court

adopted the Doctrine of Discovery in a case involving the relationship among tribes,
the European sovereigns (and their successors), property rights, and sovereignty. Id.

at 604-05.
233. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20 ("[A] n Indian tribe or nation within the
United States is not a foreign state in the sense of the constitution, and cannot
maintain an action in the courts of the United States.").
234. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561-62. Mr. Worcester, a missionary, resided in
the Cherokee Nation at the invitation of the Cherokee government and with
approval of the United States. Id. at 515.
235. See id.
236. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
237. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
238. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20. The flip side of the Supreme
Court's holding, presumably, is that an action could not be maintained against an
Indian tribe or nation, as it would similarly fall outside of the scope ofjudicial power
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distinct political society," and noted that "[t]he acts of our
government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the
courts are bound by those acts. "239
Also interesting is the Justices' debate over where exactly they
would place the Cherokee Nation in the family of nations. They all
seemed to think that the Cherokee Nation was more qualified for
membership than other tribes, 24 ° and the majority was clear in
concluding that the Cherokee Nation was a "state," just not a
"foreign" one. 2' 1 By the time the Cherokee cases were decided, the
Cherokees had adopted a tripartite constitutional government and a
body of written laws. 42 The Cherokee government included a
bicameral legislature, a judicial system with various judicial districts
and appeals courts, and a national police force.243 The Cherokees
had also developed a written language based on Sequoyah's syllabary,
achieved a literacy rate above that in surrounding states, and been
publishing a national newspaper in both Cherokee and English that
was read throughout the United States and in Europe.2
Chief Justice Marshall reaffirmed the statehood of the Cherokee
Nation in Worcester, where he again referred to the Cherokees as a
"distinct community" 45 and emphasized the tribe's political status in
set forth in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
239. Id. at 16.
240. See id. at 21 qohnson, J., concurring) ("[T]here are strong reasons for
doubting the applicability of the epithet state, to a people so low in the grade of
organized society as our Indian tribes most generally are. I would not here be
understood as speaking of the Cherokees under their present form of government;
which certainly must be classed among the most approved forms of civil government.
Whether it can be yet said to have received the consistency which entitles that people
to admission into the family of nations is ... yet to be determined by the executive of
these states."); id. at 52-53 (Thompson, J., dissenting) ("The terms state and
nation... imply a body of men, united together, to procure their mutual safety and
advantage by means of their union .... Testing the character and condition of the
Cherokee Indians by these rules, it is not ... possible to escape the conclusion, that
they form a sovereign state."); see also POMMERSHEIM, supra note 61, at 107-08, 264-65
(discussing differences among the Justices regarding Cherokee Nation's status). But
see Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 49 (Baldwin, J., concurring) ("[T]he judicial
power cannot divest the states of rights of sovereignty, and transfer them to the
Indians, by decreeing them to be a nation, or foreign state, pre-existing and with
rightful jurisdiction and sovereignty over the territory they occupy.").
241. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 54 (Thompson, J., dissenting) ("I do not
understand it is denied by a majority of the court, that the Cherokee Indians form a
sovereign state according to the doctrine of the law of nations; but that, although a
sovereign state, they are not considered a foreign state within the meaning of the
constitution.").
242. See supra notes 219-221 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
244. GRANT FOREMAN, THE FIvE CIVILIZED TRIBES 371 (2d prtg. 1966) [hereinafter
FOREMAN, FIvE TRIBES] (discussing Cherokee syllabary, literacy, and newspaper);

Holland, supra note 218, at 1 (same).
245. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832), abrogation recognized by
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no uncertain terms. Discussing the United States' relationship with
the Cherokee Nation and other Indian tribes, Marshall wrote that
"[t]he very term 'nation,' so generally applied to them, means 'a
people distinct from others,'

24 6

and that the words "treaty" and

"nation" applied to Indian nations and "to the other nations of the
earth . . . all in the same sense." 247 He further noted that the
Cherokee Nation and other tribes were "capable of making
treaties." 248 And he asserted that the law of nations did not require
small states to forego their independence when seeking the
protection of a stronger state.249 Under this theory, a protectorate
nation would not surrender or lose its sovereign immunity by
associating with a stronger state.2' ° The courts recognized this
principle in the first tribal immunity cases, which involved the
immunity of the Cherokee Nation and the other Five Tribes.
These early tribal sovereign immunity cases were decided in the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, after the Cherokee
Nation and the rest of the Five Tribes had reestablished themselves in
the west. Before discussing these cases, a brief survey of the Five
Tribes' history in Indian Territory is necessary.
One cannot
understand the cases without it. Following this history, the Article
examines the earliest tribal sovereign immunity cases involving the
Cherokee Nation-one from the Supreme Court in 1850, the other
from a federal district court in 1894-and two Eighth Circuit cases
from 1895 and 1908 involving, respectively, the Choctaw and Creek
Nations. This piece then assesses the Supreme Court's reliance on
these cases in its early-twentieth century tribal immunity
jurisprudence, which also involves the Five Tribes.
C. The "Five Civilized Tribes" in Indian Territory
Before leaving their homelands in the Southeast, the Five Tribes
negotiated treaties that recognized their fee ownership of their new
lands in the Indian Territory.25 1 This arrangement was something
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).

246. Id. at 559 (noting that the "Indian nations had always been considered as
distinct, independent political communities").
247. Id. at 559-60.

248. Id. at 559.
249. Id. at 561 (quoting Emmerich de Vattel to assert that "[tlributary and
feudatory states... do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states, so
long as self government and sovereign and independent authority are left in the
administration of the state").
250. See USF&G, 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940) (holding that sovereign immunity
"exempted the dependent as well as the dominant sovereignties from suit without
consent" (footnote omitted)).
251.

See L. SUSAN WORK, THE SEMINOLE NATION OF OKLAHOMA: A LEGAL HISTORY 4
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The treaties also included unique
unique to these tribes.25 2
provisions that expressly recognized and protected the tribal
governments' powers and authority. 25 3 After arriving in the west, the
Five Tribes exercised these powers: the Chickasaws, Creeks, and
Seminoles by establishing constitutional governments; the Cherokees
and Choctaws by amending their pre-existing constitutions.2 4
Because of their republican governments and other institutions
(including schools, dress, use of English, and embrace of Christianity
to varying degrees), and relative economic prosperity,2 55 the
Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks, and Seminoles in Indian
Territory were grouped together-by the U.S. government and the
256
general public-as "[t] he Five Civilized Tribes."
(2010).
252. See id.
253. Id. at 10; see also GRANT FOREMAN, THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES: A BRIEF HISTORY
AND A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 7 (1966) [hereinafter FOREMAN, HISTORY] (discussing the
treaty provisions).
254. See CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at 241-54 (noting the adoption and
amendment of the Chickasaw, Creek, Cherokee, and Choctaw constitutions); see also
WORK, supra note 251, at 9 ("Unlike the other four nations, the Seminole Nation did

not have a written document identified as a constitution, although it may have
operated under written bylaws adopted in 1856 defining the general governmental
structure.").

255. See, e.g., Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1120 (D.D.C. 1976) (noting the
Creek Nation's economic prosperity during the late nineteenth century), affid sub
nom., Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See generally H. CRAIG
MINER, THE CORPORATION AND THE INDIAN: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INDUSTRIAL
CIVILIZATION IN INDIAN TERRITORY, 1865-1907 (1976) (discussing the Five Tribes'

economies). The Five Tribes' economies were based primarily on agriculture
(including ranching), but mining became increasingly important in the late 1800s,
especially for the Choctaw and Chickasaw. See, e.g., DEBO, CHOCTAW, supra note 201,
at 128-31; FOREMAN, FIVE TRIBES, supra note 244, at 91; R.W. MCADAM, CHICKASAWS
AND CHOcrAwS: A PAMPHLET OF INFORMATION CONCERNING THEIR HISTORY, TREATIES,
GOVERNMENT, COUNTRY, LAws, POLITICS, AND AFFAIRS 27 (1975 ed.).
256. See Haijo, 420 F. Supp. at 1119 (explaining that the Five Civilized Tribes were
so named due to their perceived cultural and political sophistication relative to
Plains Indians); DEBO, WATERS RUN, supra note 226, at 5 ("As soon as they were
settled in their new homes these Indians made such remarkable social and political
progress that they soon became known as the Five Civilized Tribes to distinguish
them from their wild neighbors of the plains."); WORK, supra note 251, at 7, 18-19
(noting that the United States viewed the Five Tribes "as a unique group of 'civilized'
Indians" and distinguished between them and "reservation or wild Indians"); see also
DEBO, WATERS RUN, supra note 226, at ix (stating that the Five Tribes "ruled
themselves and controlled th[eir] tribal property under constitutional governments
of their own choosing[] and... attained a degree of civilization that made them at
once the boast of the Indian Office and living examples of the benefits of travelling
in the white man's road"); FOREMAN, FIVE TRIBES, supra note 244, at preface
(explaining that "[b]ecause of their progress and achievements they became known
as the Five Civilized Tribes"); STRICKLAND, FIRE AND SPIRITS, supra note 214, at 209
(noting that "[i]n recognition of tribal achievements, missionaries propose [d] to use
the Cherokees and the Choctaws to 'educate and civilize' plains Indian tribes");
RENNARD STRICKLAND, THE INDIANS IN OKLA-IOMA 11-15 (1980)
[hereinafter
STRICKLAND, INDIANS] (discussing the Five Tribes' early history in Oklahoma and
contemporary accounts from the 1830s and 1840s).
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A brief overview of the histories of these Indian republics 217 serves
two purposes. On the one hand, it helps explain how the American
public, including the judges who decided the early tribal immunity
cases, viewed the Five Tribes.258 It also highlights how the Five Tribes'
legal, political, and social institutions shaped the tribal sovereign
immunity doctrine.
The author of an early twentieth century history of Cherokee laws
and legal institutions, for example, wrote that "this Indian group,
practically within the course of one century, or two at most, attained a
standard of perfection in legal organization and judicial procedure
equal to that of the average state of the American Union."259 In 1839,
the Cherokees adopted a new constitution that was patterned on the
U.S. Constitution, state constitutions, and tribal traditions.260 The
Cherokees also reestablished their judicial system, which included
district courts, appeals courts, a supreme court, a national solicitor
general, and prosecuting attorneys. 261 The Cherokee courts operated
under established rules of procedure and provided for trial by jury
and arbitration of civil cases.262 The Cherokee government collected
257. See Chad Smith, Introduction to BAIENGER, supra note 220, at iii ("[T]he
Cherokee Nation was a true republic in Indian Territory."); John R. Swanton,
IntroductoryNote, in FOREMAN, FIvE TRIBES, supra note 244 (describing "red republics"
in Indian Territory); Steve Russell, The Context and Content of Sovereignty, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY (July 24, 2012),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ictsbc/the-context-and-content-ofsovereignty (describing the Cherokee Nation as a "constitutional republic").
258. The use of the word "civilized" to describe the Five Tribes and distinguish
them from other Indian tribes of course, like other language used in judicial
opinions and the public discourse in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, reflects ideas about cultural and racial hierarchies that are contrary to
modern values and not generally espoused in public or from the bench. See, e.g.,
Carpenter & Halbritter, supra note 12, at 315 n.36 (noting descriptions of Indian
tribes in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Supreme Court jurisprudence
and the modern Court's continued reliance on these opinions). Others have
commented upon how such thinking continues to permeate federal Indian law, see,
e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS,JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN
RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA, at xix-xxv, 97-122, 135-60
(2005) (examining the Supreme Court's continued reliance on racist language and
stereotypes of Indian savagery and lawlessness found in its older Indian law
opinions), but what is important for purposes of this Article is how this thinking is
reflected in the sovereign immunity cases involving the Five Tribes.
259. BALLENGER, supranote 220, at 138.
260. See id. at 139. The Cherokee constitution declared that "[t]he Cherokee
people have existed as a distinct national community, in the possession and exercise
of the appropriate and essential attributes of sovereignty, for a period extending into
antiquity beyond the dates and records and memory of man." Id. at 8 (quoting the
Cherokee constitution).
261. Id. at 53, 112-13, 124-25.
262. See id. at 52-53, 58-59, 113, 123, 125 (providing details of the judicial system,
including the organization of judicial districts, rules for partial punishment and
pardon, arbitration options, qualifications for jury service, and the role of the
Supreme Court).
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taxes, operated a national police force, and administered a school
system that included the first school for women west of the
Mississippi. 6 The Cherokees also resumed printing their newspaper
with the purpose, in part, of educating outside readers "about the
Civilized Nations of the [Indian] Territory. "264
Angie Debo, one of the most well-regarded historians of the Five
Tribes, wrote in 1934 that the generation of Choctaws between 1833
and 1861 experienced an "almost unprecedented" level of
development26 and that "[w] hite visitors were invariably impressed"
Contemporaneous
by the Choctaws' governance practices. 66
accounts are in accord. A traveler in 1858, for example, reported
that many Choctaws were "quite wealthy. '267 An observer writing in
the late 1800s described the Choctaw educational system, which
employed teachers from Ivy League and Little Ivy colleges and
helped the Choctaw Nation achieve a literacy rate higher than in
surrounding states, as "excellent.""
The Choctaw government, which functioned under a constitution
modeled after the Mississippi state constitution, included an
executive branch, bicameral legislature with committees, and an
independent judiciary. 69 Political parties competed for control of
the government, and lobbyists worked the nation's capital. 2 " The
Choctaw government structure included a police force 27' and a

263. Id. at 59; FOREMAN, FIVE TRIBES, supra note 244, at 408-11; FOREMAN, HISTORY,
supra note 253, at 31, 45.
264. Holland, supra note 218, at 397-98 (quoting the newspaper); see also
FOREMAN, FIvE TRIBES, supra note 244, at 367-68.
265. DEBO, CHOCTAW, supra note 201, at 78.
266. Id. at 158.
267. KIDWELL, supra note 223, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
268. MCADAM, supra note 255, at 24 ("The educational system of the [Choctaw and
Chickasaw] nations... should be surpassed by that of no people on earth, and
indeed it is excellent."); DEBO, CHOCTAw, supra note 201, at 242 ("As a result of its
excellent public-school system the Choctaw Nation had a much higher proportion of
educated people than any of the neighboring states. ... "); FOREMAN, FIvE TRIBES,
supa note 244, at 85 (noting that the teachers in the Choctaw Nation included
graduates of Mount Holyoke, Dartmouth, and Williams); KIDWELL, supra note 223, at
9 (discussing the Choctaw Nation's "elaborate system of schools").
269. See CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at 185-87 (describing the national
legislative council, judiciary, and executive established under the 1834 constitution,
and noting that a bicameral legislature established under the 1842 constitution);
DEBO, CHOCTAW, supra note 201, at 74-76 (discussing the 1838, 1843, and 1860
amendments to the Choctaw constitution); KIDWELL, supra note 223, at 42-44, 55-56
(same).
270. See CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at 220-23 (describing the formation
of and competition between conservative and progressive political parties); DEBO,
CHOCTAW, supra note 201, at 158 (noting that the Choctaw capital "swarmed with
lobbyists").
271. See CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at 185.
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medical board that oversaw the nation's healthcare.272
The
government collected taxes, regulated grazing and land use,
administered an assistance program for Choctaw citizens, and
maintained a system of permits for non-citizens living and working in
the nation.2 73 The Choctaw Nation also published
various newspapers
274
citizens.
its
among
Christians
many
counted
and
Like the Choctaws, the Chickasaws earned praise for their school
system, 2 75 and "Chickasaw society had many of the characteristics of
Anglo frontier settlers." 276 Initially citizens of the Choctaw Nation
when they arrived in the west under the terms of an 1837 treaty, the
Chickasaws reestablished their own nation in 1855 after signing a
treaty with the Choctaws and United States recognizing Chickasaw
independence.2 77 Like the Cherokees and Choctaws, the Chickasaws
adopted a tripartite constitutional government with a bicameral
legislature,278
and political parties vied for control of the
20
government.2 7 9 The Chickasaws published a newspaper as well. 1
Less was written about the Creeks and Seminoles, who were
apparently perceived by some as being overall more traditional and
"behind" the Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Choctaws in terms of
272. See id. at 185; DEBO, CHOCTAW, supra note 201, at 233.
273. See DEBO, CHOCTAW, supra note 201, at 112-13, 144-45 (discussing
government-administered assistance programs following crop failures, land use and
grazing laws, taxes, and the permit system); see also KIDWELL, supra note 223, at 110
(noting that the U.S. Attorney General recognized the Choctaw government's
authority to pass the permit laws and impose taxes and fees on non-citizens).
274. See DEBO, CHOCTAW, supra note 201, at 59, 168, (noting the different
newspaperspublished in the Choctaw Nation); id. at 65, 231 (commenting on the
number of hoctaw citizens and officials who were Christians); KIDWELL, supra note
223, at 14 (noting the increase in church membership and the number of churches
in the 1850s and 1860s). Christians numbered such that the Choctaw Nation
described itself as a "Christian nation" in an 1875 memorial to Congress. KIDWELL,
supra,at 223 (quoting memorial).
275. See MCADAM, supra note 255, at 24, 26 (praising the educational system). But
see GIBSON, supra note 201, at 199 (suggesting that the Chickasaw school system
lagged behind those of other tribes).
276. GIBSON, supra note 201, at 198; see also id. (citing a Chickasaw Nation visitor
account noting that "many of [the Chickasaws] are indistinguishable, except in color,
language, and to some degree in costume, from the poorer classes of their white
neighbors. Even in dress and language the more civilized are fast conforming to the
latter.").
277. DEBO, CHOCTAW, supra note 201, at 71; GIBSON, supra note 201, at 208-16,
222-26; KIDWELL, supra note 223, at 19.
278. See Champagne, Renewing, supra note 213, at 48 (discussing the 1855
constitution and noting that "[m]arket enterprise was encouraged, and market
relations were supported by the constitution"); see also CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra
note 201, at 193, 195, 197-98; GIBSON, supra note 201, at 216-17; MCADAM, supra
note 255, at 25-26.
279. See CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supranote 201, at 223-28 (tracing the development
of political parties).
280. See FOREMAN, FIVE TRIBES, supra note 244, at 144 (noting various
publications).
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education and other accouterments of "civilization. '2 ' The Creek
and Seminole government structures reflected this traditionalism.
The 1867 Creek constitution preserved the nation's confederate
organization by providing a role for traditional villages in the central
government, which included a bicameral legislature and national
court system.8 2 Political parties competed for control over the
central government, 283 which administered the nation's laws,
including its tax regime, and managed market relations. 2 4 The
Seminole government similarly preserved a significant degree of
village autonomy, with each village sending representatives to a
central governing body that exercised authority over national
affairs.28 8
The U.S. Civil War had a major human, social, and economic
impact on the Five Tribes, 286 who sided and entered into treaties with
the Confederacy. 287 After the war, the Five Tribes signed treaties with
281. SeeANGIEDEBO, THE ROAD To DISAPPEARANCE, at ix (1941) [hereinafter DEBO,
DISAPPEARANCE] (explaining that agents and journalists of the time, as well as

historians since, largely ignored the history of the Creeks after the Civil War and
focused instead on "the more 'progressive' Indians"); FOREMAN, FIVE TRIBES, supra
note 244, at 169 (stating that the Creeks "were regarded as far behind" the
Cherokees and Choctaws in education); id. at 267 (describing Seminoles as being, in
the 1850s, "far behind the other... [Five] [T] ribes in the scale of progress"). But see
WRIGHT, supra note 201, at 309, 311 (discussing "white culture" and "civilization"
among the Creeks and Seminoles in Oklahoma); see also FOREMAN, FIVE TRIBES, supra
note 244, at 185-86 (discussing differences between Creek Lower Towns and Upper
Towns, including regarding the use of English).
282. Champagne, Renewing, supra note 213, at 51-52 (stating also that this
constitution was "to a large extent imposed by U.S. demands at the end of the U.S.
Civil War"). The central government also managed market relations and collected
taxes. Id. at 52; CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at 202.
283. See CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at 230-37 (describing various
political contests).
284. Id. at 201, 230; FOREMAN, FIvE TRIBES, supra note 244, at 213-16; FOREMAN,
HISTORY, supra note 253, at 45; Champagne, Renewing, supra note 213, at 52.
285. Champagne, Renewing, supra note 213, at 52.
286. See, e.g., BALLENGER, supra note 220, at 73 (noting that "[t]he war 'broke' the
Cherokee Nation"); DEBO, HISTORY, supra note 211, at 169 (noting that the Creek
Nation lost one fourth of its population during the war); DEBO, CHOCTAW, supra note
201, at 82 (describing the food shortage in the Choctaw Nation following the war);
GIBSON, supra note 201, at 239 (explaining that the war "disturbed most aspects of
Chickasaw national life"). Internal tribal divisions and armed conflicts between tribal
factions exacerbated these impacts. See, e.g., CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at
183, 203 (discussing divisions within the Cherokee and Creek Nations).
287. CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at 183, 203; GIBSON, supra note 201, at
232; KIDWELL, supra note 223, at 60-61.
In joining with the Confederacy and
surrendering after the war, however, the Five Tribes continued to assert their
sovereignty and nationhood.
The Chickasaw Nation, for example, issued a
declaration of independence before siding with the Confederacy, stating that it was
absolved of its allegiance to the United States as a result of the "dissolution of the
Federal Union" and the United States' withdrawal of federal troops from the
Chickasaw Nation in contravention of its treaty obligation to protect the Chickasaw
people. See GIBSON, supra note 201, at 231-32 (quoting declaration). The Choctaw
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the United States in 1866 that included anti-tribe provisions designed
to punish them for allying with the confederate states.288 Like the
surrounding states, the Five Tribes began to rebuild their
infrastructures and economies.2 89 But the tribes did so within an
environment of increasing pressure to break up their lands and
replace their governments with a U.S. territorial or state
290
government.
A particular threat to the Five Tribes' autonomy came from the
railroads, as the 1866 treaties included provisions for railroad rightsof-way in the Indian Territory. 291 Relying on these treaty provisions,
Congress passed a series of laws in the 1880s and 1890s that
authorized railroad construction in Indian Territory.292 Congress also
Nation objected to the Confederacy's attempt to include it and the other four tribes
in the Confederacy's terms of surrender, and the Choctaw delegate to post-war treaty
negotiations with the United States explained that the Choctaw Nation entered into
its treaty with the Confederacy to "'preserve [Choctaw] 'independence and national
identity" and "considered itself 'a separate political organization."' KIDWELL, supra
note 223, at 77 (quoting delegate's statement). This delegate also said that the
Choctaw Nation allied with the Confederacy in order "to establish what we believed
to be the great cardinal principle of republican liberty-the right of selfgovernment" and because the Confederacy offered the Choctaws "the protection
that the United States... failed to give us." Id. at 78.
288. E.g., GIBSON, supra note 201, at 243-44; KIDWELL, supra note 223, at 79-82;
WORK, supra note 251, at 11; WRIGHT, supra note 201, at 307-08. Some of the tribes
adopted new constitutions in the wake of, or (in the case of the Creek Nation) in
compliance with, their 1866 treaties. CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at 20405, 223. Among these treaties' provisions were those requiring the tribes to agree to
"such legislation as Congress and the President... may deem necessary." KIDWELL,
supra note 223, at 81.
289. See BALLENGER, supra note 220, at 78; CHAMPAGNE, CHANGE, supra note 201, at
215; DEBO, HISTORY, supranote 211, at 169; GIBSON, supra note 201, at 255-56.
290. See MICHAEL W. LOVEGROVE, A NATION IN TRANSITION: DOUGLAS HENRY
JOHNSTON AND THE CHICKASAWS, 1898-1939 4 (2009) ("After the Civil War, several
bills were introduced in Congress requiring the Five ... Tribes... to abandon their
tribal governments and accept individual allotments of their land. Although these
bills failed to become law, Congress never forgot the idea of allotment.").
291. See WORK, supra note 251, at 14 (noting that the treaties signed by each of the
Five Tribes included language providing for railroad rights-of-way); see also DEBO,
CHOCTAW, supra note 201, at 117-18 (discussing the 1866 treaties and the building of
railroads across the Cherokee, Choctaw, and Creek Nations in the following
decades).
292. See, e.g., WORK, supra note 251, at 15 (discussing laws). Although these laws
have been (wrongly) cited as possibly abrogating the tribes' sovereign immunity, see,
e.g., Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372, 373-74 n.1 (8th Cir. 1895) (citing
various statutes as examples of acts authorizing "suits to be brought by or against
these Indian Nations ... to settle controversies between them and the United States
and between themselves"), they do not expressly abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.
See C&L Enters. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001);
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)
(both requiring that "Congress must 'unequivocally' express" its intent to abrogate
tribal immunity). Although these statutes authorized suits by the Five Tribes (and
their citizens), they say nothing about suits against tribes. The bills established
procedures for disinterested referees appointed by the U.S. President to decide on
the amount of compensation for the nations and/or their citizens, with right of
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enacted in the 1880s and 1890s other "special federal laws ... that...

appli[ed] to the Five Tribes as a group . . . to place increasing
pressure on them to deed their communal lands to tribal membersa prelude to 'legitimizing' the presence of thousands of non-Indians
who were pouring into Indian Territory. " "
Perhaps the most nefarious of these was the 1898 Curtis Act," 4
which followed other congressional legislation designed to break up
the Five Tribes' lands and usurp their governments. Land allotment
agreements ratified under the Curtis Act and subsequent legislation
contemplated March 4, 1906 as the date by which the Five Tribes'
governments would cease to exist.2 95 Despite the pressures on the
appeal to the U.S. courts, e.g., Act of July 4, 1884, ch. 179, §§ 3, 5, 23 Stat. 73, 73-75,
and provided (in language which is identical for relevant purposes)
[t]hat the United States circuit and district courts.., and such other courts
as may be authorized by Congress, shall have... con-current [sic]
jurisdiction over all controversies arising between said... [r]ailway
[clompany, and the nations and tribes through whose territory said railway
shall be constructed ... [and] over all controversies arising between the
inhabitants of said nations or tribes and said railway company; and the civil
jurisdiction of said courts is hereby extended within the limits of said Indian
Territory, without distinction as to citizenship of the parties, so far as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this act.
§ 8, 23 Stat. at 75. To the extent these statutes could be treated as annulments of the
tribes' immunity, they would also be an early recognition of tribal sovereign
immunity by Congress, since there would be no need to abrogate immunity that did
not exist.
293. WORK, supranote 251, at 4-5.
294. Ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495.
295. The Curtis Act set December 1, 1898, as the deadline for the Choctaw,
Chickasaw, and Muscogee (Creek) Nations to approve their allotment agreements,
see §§ 29-30, 30 Stat. at 495; LOVEGROVE, supra note 290, at 19 (discussing Curtis Act
and ratification of Choctaw and Chickasaw allotment agreements); see also KIDWELL,
supra note 223, at 149-50 (same), but did not set deadlines for the Cherokee Nation
(which refused to enter into negotiations for an allotment agreement) or the
Seminole Nation (which already had approved an allotment agreement with no
mention of the continuance or dissolution of the Seminole government). See WORK,
supranote 251, at 36, 40 (discussing Seminole allotment agreement's approval before
passage of the Curtis Act and Congress's ratification of the agreement). The
Cherokee and Creek allotment agreements subsequently ratified by those two
nations and Congress provided that their governments would "not continue longer
than" March 4, 1906. Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1375, § 63, 32 Stat. 716, 725 (1902)
(Cherokee allotment agreement); Act of March 1, 1901, ch. 676, § 46, 31 Stat. 861,
872 (1901) (Creek allotment agreement).
Allotment had begun elsewhere in 1887, but implementation of the policy against
the Five Tribes was delayed, in part because of their unique fee ownership of their
lands. In 1893, the President appointed three commissioners (known as the Dawes
Commission) to negotiate the allotment of the Five Tribes' lands. See WORK, supra
note 251, at 29-31. The United States Geological Service began surveying the tribes'
lands in 1895, LOVEGROVE, supra note 290, at 4-7, 10, and in 1896, Congress
authorized the commission to create rolls of the Five Tribes' citizens. LOVEGROVE,
supra note 290, at 14. Negotiations between the Five Tribes and the Dawes
Commission ensued.
The Five Tribes allotment legislation was related to other legislation from the
1880s and 1890s establishing federal courts and extending their jurisdiction in the
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Five Tribes' governments and efforts in Congress to abolish them,
they continued to function.29 6
Meanwhile, Congress received numerous statehood proposals and
debated whether the Indian Territory should enter the Union as a
single state or two states, and the possibility of an Indian state. 297 On
June 6, 1906, President Roosevelt signed the Oklahoma Enabling Act,
authorizing the establishment of a single state that included the
Oklahoma and Indian Territories. 8 In 1907, Oklahoma ratified its
constitution and joined the Union as the forty-seventh state.29
After realizing the impossibility of concluding the Five Tribes'
affairs by the March 4, 1906 date set forth in their respective
allotment agreements, Congress passed ajoint resolution on March 2
to temporarily extend the Five Tribes' governments. 00 Congress then
amended the Curtis Act by passing the Five Tribes Act on April 26,
1906.3°1 This law extended the existence of the Five Tribes'
Their governments continued to
governments indefinitely.30 2
function (albeit in a limited capacity) up through the late twentieth

Indian Territory. See WORK, supra note 251, at 21-28 (discussing federal courts
legislation); id., at 33-36 (suggesting laws, including the Curtis Act, were designed to
pressure the Five Tribes to sign allotment agreements). After Henry Dawes, the head
of the commission established to negotiate allotment agreements with the Five
Tribes, grew frustrated with the tribes' opposition, he suggested that Congress
extend a territorial government and legal jurisdiction over the Indian territory
immediately. See KIDWELL, supra note 223, at 145; see also LOVEGROVE, supranote 290,
at 11 (discussing proposed legislation in Congress in 1895 and 1896 to create a new
territory).
296. See, e.g., WORK, supra note 251, at 48 (noting that the Seminole Council
continued to meet despite the threat of allotment).
297. See KIDWELL, supra note 223, at 188 (discussing several proposed options for
statehood); LOVEGROVE, supra note 290, at 93-94 (discussing the various statehood
proposals). For a discussion of the Indian statehood movement, which can be traced
back to the General Council of the Indian Territory that convened after the Civil
War and gained significant momentum in the early 1900s, see DEBO, CHOCTAW, supra
note 201, at 214-15; FOREMAN, HISTORY, supra note 253, at 58; GIBSON, supra note
201, at 263-64; LOVEGROVE, supra note 290, at 94, 113-14; KIDWELL, supra note 223, at
83, 85, 186-88; WORK, supra note 251, at 12; Leeds, supranote 2, at 5-9.
298. LOVEGROVE, supra note 290, at 114; see also WORK, supra note 251, at 55-56
(discussing the merging of the Oklahoma and Indian Territories into a single state).
299. GIBSON, supra note 201, at 277; LOVEGROVE, supra note 290, at 122.
300. LOVEGROVE, supra note 290, at 120; WORK, supra note 251, at 49-50.
301. WORK, supranote 251, at 50.
302. See, e.g., Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 (D.D.C. 1976) ("[D]espite
the general intentions of the Congress... to ultimately terminate the tribal
government of the Creeks, and.., an elaborate statutory scheme... toward that
end, the final dissolution of the.., government... was never statutorily
accomplished, and that government was instead explicitly perpetuated."), aff"d sub
nom., Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Leeds, supra note 2, at 9
(discussing the Five Tribes Act); see also WORK, supra note 251, at 5, 50-51 (discussing
twentieth century treatment of the Five Tribes and misinterpretations of the Five
Tribes Act that were cleared up in the 1970s by Harjoand other litigation).
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century, when they reorganized under their present constitutions. 3
Having at least a rudimentary understanding of the histories of the
Five Tribes, it is now appropriate to analyze the early sovereign
immunity cases involving them.
D. The Five Tribes Immunity Cases
Decided in the second-half of the nineteenth century by the U.S.
Supreme Court and three different federal district courts, the first
tribal immunity cases involved the Cherokee Nation. They were
followed by two turn-of-the-twentieth century Eighth Circuit cases
involving the Choctaw Nation and Creek Nation, respectively. The
Eighth Circuit, like the courts in the Cherokee cases, cited and
followed the Supreme Court's leading sovereign immunity
jurisprudence on states and foreign nations. In the early twentieth
century, the Supreme Court cited these Eighth Circuit cases and the
principles in the Cherokee cases to uphold the immunity of the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, and later, the Choctaw and Chickasaw
Nations. Taken as a whole, these cases comprise a body of Five Tribes
immunity jurisprudence and adopt a tribal immunity doctrine that
bars suits on contracts, suits for injunctive relief, and all other types of
actions except for those authorized by Congress or agreed to by the
tribes themselves. In this fundamental regard, tribal immunity is no
different than federal, state, or foreign sovereign immunity.
1.

The Cherokee sovereign immunity cases
The Supreme Court decided the first case of record involving tribal
immunity, Parks v. Ross,30 4 in 1850.305 Mr. Parks, the executor of a
Cherokee citizen's estate, sued John Ross, the Principal Chief of the
Cherokee Nation, for debts allegedly owed in conjunction with the
Cherokee removal in the late 1830s.30 6 Parks complained that the
lower court erred when it treated Ross like the head of an
independent nation and thus found he could not be held personally
liable. 0 7 Although the Supreme Court "could have relied solely on
303. See Leeds, supra note 2, at 12 (noting the reorganization of the Five Tribes'
governments in the modern era).
304. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362 (1850).
305. See Struve, supra note 21, at 148 ("Although judicial acknowledgment of tribal
sovereignty dates back at least to the Marshall Trilogy, commentators (and the Court
itself) have assumed that the Supreme Court did not specifically recognize tribal
sovereign immunity until 1919 at the earliest. However, the Court's 1850 decision in
Parks v. Ross displays reasoning strikingly similar to that found in sovereign immunity
doctrine." (footnotes omitted)).
306. Parks, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 374.
307. Id. at 368-69.
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it chose to invoke

3 °8
stating that
broader concepts of governmental obligations as well,"

"an agent who contracts in the name of his principal is not liable to a
suit on such contract; much less a public officer, acting for his
government." 30 9

This reasoning is similar to that used in sovereign

immunity jurisprudence and is consistent with David Currie's
synthesis of Nineteenth Century Supreme Court case law involving
suits against state and federal officials. 1 0
The Court concluded its opinion by emphasizing, as it had in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgiaand Worcester v. Georgia less than twenty years
earlier, that "[t]he Cherokees are in many respects a foreign and
independent

nation."311

Invoking a concept of tribal official

diplomatic immunity, it said that U.S. courts lacked the "power... to
arrest the public representatives or agents of Indians nations ... [or]
compel them to pay the debts of their nation."312 This reference to
the courts' "lack of 'power... to arrest the public representatives or
agents of Indian nations' suggests a lack of jurisdiction, and it echoes
language traditionally used to describe state sovereign immunity."313
It also comports with principles applied to foreign sovereigns'
diplomats in the 1789 Judiciary Act, which prohibited federal court
jurisdiction over foreign diplomats even though this jurisdiction
seemingly exists under Article III of the Constitution.3 14
In 1894, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, which
then served as the federal district court for the District of Columbia,
recognized the sovereign immunity of the Cherokee Nation in
3 15
Although it is apparently the first case of record
Chadick v. Duncan.
308. Struve, supra note 21, at 149-50.
309. Id. at 149 (quoting Parks,52 U.S. (11 How.) at 374).
310. Id. at 150, 150 n.85 (citing Currie, supra note 150, at 153) (discussing
Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887)), and
remarking that "federal government liability in the early nineteenth century and
noting that '[c]ontracts claims were generally subject to the rule that an agent who
signed for a disclosed principal had not liability to perform the contract"' (quoting
Jackson, Suing, supranote 148, at 525-26)).
311. Parks,52 U.S. (11 How.) at 374.
312. Id.
313. Struve, supra note 21, at 150 n.84 (citing Nelson, supra note 155, at 1568).
314. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend... to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls .. "); see also
Nelson, supra note 155, at 1590 (explaining that although the Constitution gave the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over lawsuits against foreign diplomats,
Congress restricted it in the Judiciary Act).
315. No. 15,317, slip op. at 77 (App. D.C. Mar. 3, 1894) (copy available at the Nat'l
Archives & Records Admin., Record Group No. 376, Case File No. 314); see History of
the Federal Judiciary: Federal Courts of the District of Columbia, FED. JUD. CENTER,

http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts~special-dc.html (last visited Aug.
22, 2013) (explaining that Congress established the Supreme Court for the District
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to formally recognize the tribal immunity doctrine, 16 Chadick is not
discussed in any of the prior tribal immunity literature. But its facts,
reasoning, and holding make it a significant chapter in the tribal
sovereign immunity doctrine's story.
Chadick v. Duncan arose out of the Cherokee Nation's issuance of
government bonds, secured by payments from the United States, for
lands the Cherokees sold to the U.S. following the Civil War. 17 Mr.
Chadick alleged that the Cherokee Nation entered into a contract
with him to sell the bonds but then negotiated a deal with other
parties. 18 He sought an injunction to compel the Cherokee Nation,
its Principal Chief and Treasurer, and its delegates in Washington,
D.C., to deliver him these bonds." 9
After the federal district court dismissed his lawsuit based on the
Cherokee Nation's immunity, Chadick appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, which functioned as the federal
appeals court.3"
A few days later, legislation to abrogate the
Cherokee Nation's immunity was introduced in the House of
Representatives.3 1 This legislation never became law, however, and
Chadick's appeal was dismissed on procedural grounds for failure to

of Columbia in 1863, the Supreme Court in 1927 and 1933 "declared that the Court
of Appeals [created in 1893] and the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
were comparable to the U.S. circuit courts and ... district courts, respectively," and
that Congress changed the name of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
to the District Court for the District of Columbia in 1936, and then to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia in 1948). Congress established the
Supreme Court for the District of Columbia in 1863. Id. (citing 12 Star. 762).
Congress changed the name of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to the
District Court for the District of Columbia in 1936, and then to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia in 1948. Id. (citing 49 Stat. 1921).
316. The oral argument before Justice Cox in Chadick references three prior,
unreported federal district court cases that recognize the Cherokee Nation's
sovereign immunity: one from the U.S. district court in Muscogee, Oklahoma, and
two from the U.S. district court in Fort Smith, Arkansas. See Perry Argument, supra
note 37, at 70-71.
317. Chadick, No. 15,317, slip op. at 73-74. The lands were in the Cherokee Strip,
along what is now the northern border of Oklahoma. BALLENGER, supra note 220, at
15.
318. Chadick, No. 15,317, slip op. at 73-74.
319. Id. at 73-74.
320. See Mandate, Chadick, No. 15,317 (mandate dated Oct. 10, 1894) (copy
available at the Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., Record Group No. 376, Case File
No. 314); see also supra note 315 (discussing the court's history).
321. 26 Cong. Rec. 2662 (March 6, 1894). It reads:
By Mr. HOLMAN: Ajoint resolution (H. Res. 134) authorizing the Court of
Claims to determine the rights of Edwin D. Chadick and R.T. Wilson & Co.
in the loan of $6,640,000 loaned by the Cherokee Nation to the United
States under the provision of the act of March 3, 1893, in relation to the
Cherokee Outlet-to the Committee on the Judiciary.
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print the transcript of records. 2 But the case garnered a good deal
of media attention, with the Washington Post writing about it at least
four times in February and March of 1894 and describing the
case itself
decision as being "of considerable interest outside of the 323
on account of the legal rights of Indian tribes... involved.
Like in Parks v. Ross and the Supreme Court's earlier Cherokee
cases, the D.C. court's recognition of the Cherokees' national
character figures prominently in its opinion. The D.C. court,
however, is much clearer in relying on the Supreme Court's state
(and foreign) sovereign immunity jurisprudence, which had
developed substantially in the years following Parks v. Ross.32 4 These
cases hold that sovereign immunity applies to claims for injunctive

relief as well as those seeking damages, and Chadick cites and quotes
them at length in denying the request for an injunction based on
tribal sovereign immunity.
The Chadick court began by noting the United States' various
treaties with the Cherokees and that all of them "described [the
Cherokees] as the Cherokee Nation. 3

25

The court then cited the

Supreme Court's language in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, explaining
that these treaties and other U.S. government acts "plainly
recognized the Cherokee Nation as a State" and that "[t]hey have
been uniformly treated as a State from the settlement of our
country. ' 126 Chadick also quoted the Supreme Court's language in
322. See Mandate, supra note 320 ("[T]his cause having been called for hearing in
its regular order, and it appearing to the Court that the Parties have failed to print
the transcript of record, it is, therefore in pursuance of the 18th rule of This Court,
now here ordered, adjudged and decreed by This Court that this appeal be, and the
same is hereby, dismissed with costs ...").
323. Legal Rights of Indians: Arguments Concluded in a Case Affecting Their Status as
Liable to Suit, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1894, at 3; see also Cherokee Bond Case: Wilson's
Petition Asking for the Dissolution of the Injunction, WASH. PosT, Feb. 22, 1894, at 4;
Cherokee Bonds Suit: North Carolina Cherokees Ask to Be Made Parties to the Case, WASH.
POST, Feb. 25, 1894, at 7 (noting that counsel for the Cherokee Nation cited
Hamilton's FederalistNo. 81 and analogized between the Cherokees' rights and "the
sovereign rights of a State, which prevented it from being dragged into court at the
instance [sic] of any person who felt himself aggrieved"); News of the Departments: The
Cherokee Bond Question, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1894, at 2 ("So far as the Interior
Department is concerned, the question of the assignment of the bonds of the
Cherokee Nation was settled yesterday when the Secretary approved an opinion...
which.., held that the Cherokee Nation is the proper body to say to whom the
bonds shall be given.... Mr. Chadick appealed to the Interior Department for its
approval of his contract with the Cherokees and insisted that a prior contract should
have recognition."); Trouble About the Cherokee Bonds: Their Issue to R, T. Wilson & Co.,
New York, to be Contested, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4, 1894, at 1 (discussing Chadick's lawsuit).
324. See supra Part II.A, C.
325. Chadick, No. 15,317, slip op. at 74.
326. Id. at 75 (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831));
see also id. at 76 (citing Justices Thompson's and Story's dissent which noted that "a
majority of the court [agreed] that the Cherokee Indians form a sovereign state
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Worcesternoting that "the Indian nations had always been considered.
• . distinct independent communities" and that "[t]he very term

'nation,' so generally applied to them, means 'a people distinct from
others. "327
Relying on Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Worcester, and four other
Supreme Court cases that recognized the national character and
'state'hood of the Cherokee Nation and other tribes,3 28 Chadick held
that "[a] ccording to the general principles of internationallaw, ...they
are not amenable to suit anywhere at the instance of any private
individual." 29 The court acknowledged that the United States had
formally ended treaty making with Indian nations in 1871, but stated
that the status of Indian tribes
ha[d] not been changed thereby.

They still . . .preserve their

autonomy. They have their political organization; their legislature;
their congress; and exclusive domain over their own land, so far as
the States are concerned; in fact they330are a tribe or sovereign
nation with one exception, or limitation.
This limitation was that the federal government also exercised
jurisdiction in Indian territory and other areas of Indian country. 3 '
The Chadick court was also the first to find a congressional power to
abrogate tribal immunity, though it was unsure of the source of this
power. 332 The court noted two instances of "express legislation" that
"provid[ed] for the entertainment of suits by the Federal courts to
which the [Cherokee] nation may be a party," 333 neither of which
applied, and said that "[a] part from that legislation there is no law in
according to the doctrine of the law of nations." (quoting Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) at 54 (Thompson,J., dissenting))).
327. Id. at 76 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832), abrogation
recognized by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001)).
328. Id. at 76-78, 82-83 (citing Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641,
655-57 (1890); Cherokee Trust Fund, 117 U.S. 288, 295 (1886); Elk v. Wilkins, 112
U.S. 94, 102 (1884); Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 103 (1855)).
329.

Id.at 78.

330. Id. at 77.
331. See id. at 78 ("[T]he only qualification of the status of this people as an
independent public state is its dependence upon the United States and its
subordination to their authority, which is necessary, first, for the protection of
themselves, and next for protecting the surrounding people from them.").
332. See id. at 81. The court first said that such abrogation "would have to be
under the treaty-making power" of the Treaty Clause, but later suggested that it
might be done "under the power that international law would confer upon a
dominant nation over a dependent one." Id. Though suggesting a congressional
power to abrogate tribes' sovereign immunity, the court found that Article III of the
Constitution did not confer judicial power on the federal courts to hear suits against
the Cherokee Nation. See id. at 80-81 ("[T]here is no head of the judicial power,
conferred by the Constitution upon the Government of the United States, under
which a suit can be maintained in the Federal courts against the Cherokee Nation.").
333. Id. at 81.
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existence by . . .which this nation can be sued in any court in this
country. 3' 34 The court thus applied to tribes the same presumption

that the Supreme Court made for other sovereigns: unless Congress

33
has expressly abrogated it, sovereign immunity bars the suit.

5

Moreover, Chadick cited the Supreme Court's contemporaneous
immunity cases regarding breach of contract actions and claims for
injunctive relief against states and their officials arising out of bond
defaults. Foremost among these cases was In re Ayers, in which the
Court first invoked the dignity rationale for state immunity and
clarified that immunity bars not just contract claims but all suits,
whether in law or in equity.336 Finding that the case before it fell
squarely within the definition of Ayers, the Chadick court refused to
grant an injunction against the Cherokee Nation,
its officials, or its
3 37
delegates because of their sovereign immunity.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also cited Ayers (alongside
Beers v. Arkansas and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia) in the next tribal
sovereign immunity cases, involving the Choctaw and Creek Nations.
Like Chadick, Beers, and Ayers, these Eighth Circuit opinions barred
both suits for breach of contract and actions for injunctive relief.
The Supreme Court cited these Eighth Circuit cases and Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia when it first explicitly articulated the tribal immunity
doctrine a few decades later.
2.

The other Five Tribes cases
The Eighth Circuit exercised jurisdiction over the territory
belonging to the Five Tribes and heard appeals from the U.S. district
334. Id. at 82. The two instances the court cited were a law allowing the Eastern
Cherokees to bring suit in the U.S. Court of Claims against the Cherokee Nation and
an 1884 statute establishing the Kansas Railway Company, which gave the federal
district court in Arkansas jurisdiction over disputes between the tribes in Indian
Territory and the railroad. Id.; see also E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. United States,
117 U.S. 288, 293 (1886) (discussing Congressional act authorizing suit against the
Cherokee Nation and the United States).
As noted supra note 292 and
accompanying text, the 1884 railroad statute did not expressly abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity. Instead, it provided federal courts as a forum to hear disputes
between the Cherokee Nation and/or its citizens and the railroad.
335. Chadick, No. 15,317, slip op. at 80-81. The court also noted an 1855 case
where the Supreme Court analogized "between the Territories of the United States
and the Territorial governments and the Cherokee Nation," id. at 83 (citing Mackey
v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 103-04 (1855)), and examined whether "any suit
had ever been sustained against a Territorial government." Id. It found none. Id.
336. Id. at 90-91 (quoting In reAyers, 123 U.S. 443, 502 (1887)).
337. Id. at 100. The court also rejected the argument that the Cherokee Nation
waived its immunity by voluntarily appearing solely to challenge the court's
jurisdiction. Id. at 83-84 (explaining that a sovereign does not submit to a court's
jurisdiction by specially appearing to challenge it (citing Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S.
(20 How.) 527, 529 (1857)).
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court in the Indian Territory. In 1895, it decided Thebo v. Choctaw
Tribe of Indians,338 the first published federal court opinion that
explicitly invoked the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine.
Mr.
Thebo sued the Choctaw Nation and its Principal Chief and
Treasurer to recover attorney's fees allegedly owed him. The court
upheld the dismissal of Thebo's claim, citing the Supreme Court's
decision in Beers v. Arkansas for the "well-established" principle that a
34
sovereign nation cannot be sued without its consent. 1
Before citing Beers for this principle, the court noted that
[i] t has been the policy of the United States to place and maintain
the Choctaw Nation and the other civilized Indian Nations in the
Indian Territory, so far as relates to suits against them, on the plane
of independent states. A state, without its consent, cannot be sued
by an individual.3 4 '
The court also described the U.S. policy as placing these tribes
"substantially, on the plane occupied by the states under the eleventh
34 The court's language thus reflects both the Supreme
amendment.""
Court's application of (international) nation-state immunity
principles in its late-nineteenth
century
state immunity
jurisprudence, 4' and the Court's treatment of tribes as domestic
sovereigns with characteristics of national statehood.
The federal policy of recognizing the Five Tribes' sovereign
immunity, according to the Eighth Circuit, had two aspects. On the
one hand, the Thebo court-citing the Supreme Court's cases
involving the Cherokee Nation, which it said was "identical in all
respects, so far as relates to its independence and form of
government, with the Choctaw Nation" 3"-explained:
The political departments of the United States government, by
treaties, by acts of congress, and by executive action, have always
recognized the Choctaw Nation "as a state, and as a distinct
political society.

.

." and the courts are bound by these acts of the

345
political departments of the [U.S.] government.

338. 66 F. 372, 374-76 (8th Cir. 1895).
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Id. at 375.
Id. (citing Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 529).
Id.
Id. at 376.
See supra Part II.C.
Thebo, 66 F. at 374 (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,

16 (1831)).
345. Id. (quoting Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16). The court also quoted
the Supreme Court's various descriptions of the Cherokee Nation as

"a domestic dependent nation"; "as a state, in a certain sense, although not a

foreign state or a state of the Union"; "as a distinct community, with

boundaries, accurately described"; "an alien, though dependent, power";
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The court pointed to the Choctaw Nation's treaties with the United
States and its "written constitution, and laws modeled after those of
the states of the Union, and differing from them in no essential
respect." 46 This aspect is what I call the fundamental or primary policy
reason for the tribal immunity doctrine-i.e., immunity is inherent in
the sovereign, and the Five Tribes had sovereign immunity because of
their national character, treaties with the United States, and
constitutional governments. The Thebo court also relied on a
second(ay), public policy reason for the doctrine:
protecting the
government fisc. It noted the strain on the Choctaw Nation's
finances, and depletion of government assets, that could result from
exposure to lawsuits.347
For these reasons, explained the court, Congress had "sparingly
exercised" this power, reflecting "the settled policy of the United States
not to authorize . . .suits [against tribes] except in a few cases. 348

Moreover, this "settled policy"-and therefore tribal immunityextended not just to suits on contracts but to other causes of action as
well. 349 Because Congress had not authorized suits against the
Choctaw Nation or its officials in the legislation establishing the U.S.

"not a foreign, but a domestic, territory; a territory which originated under
our constitution and laws."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884); Holden v.
Joy, 84 U.S. 241, 242 (1872); Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 103 (1855);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832), abrogationrecognized by Nevada
v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 2); see also id. at 375
("While the [Choctaw] Nation has many of the attributes of the political unit which
constitutes the civil and self-governing community called a 'State or a 'Nation,' it is
not a sovereign state, but it is domestic and dependent state, subject to the
jurisdiction and authority of the United States.").
346. Id. at 375.
347. Id. at 376 ("As rich as the Choctaw Nation is said to be in lands and money, it
would soon be impoverished if it was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts, and
required to respond to all the demands which private parties chose to prefer against
it."). Though it is not mentioned in the opinion, the Choctaw government had run
short of funds in 1894, in large part due to debts and expenses arising out of the Civil
War. See DEBO, CHOCTAW, supra note 201, at 91-98, 149 (describing the Choctaws
Nation's financial hardship). This may have been in the minds of the judges, who
presumably were familiar with contemporary events in the Indian Territory.
348. Thebo, 66 F. at 375 (emphasis added); see also id. at 376 ("The intention of
congress to confer such a jurisdiction upon any court would have to be expressed in
plain and unambiguous terms."). The court said this power had been sparingly
exercised "for obvious reasons" (which were apparently too obvious to state) and
only "in a few cases, where the subject matter of the controversy was particularly
specified, and was of such a nature that the public interests, as well as the interests of
the [Indian] Nation, seemed to require the exercise of the jurisdiction." Id. at 375.
349. See also id. at 376 ("It has been the settled policy of congress not to sanction
suits generally against these Indian Nations, or subject them to suits upon contracts
or other causes of action at the instance of private parties.") (emphasis added).
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court in Indian Territory or otherwise, the Choctaw Nation had
immunity against Mr. Thebo's lawsuit.35 °
Several things stand out from the Thebo opinion. First, the court
focused on the Choctaw Nation's (and the other Five Tribes')
treaties, government structure, and "civilized" character. 351 Second,
the court equated the Five Tribes with both states and foreign nations
in terms of their sovereign immunity and employed the same
secondary justification (protecting the government treasury) for
tribal immunity that was used for state immunity. Third, the court
recognized that tribal immunity extends not just to suits on contracts
but to all types of actions, including those seeking injunctive relief.
The Eighth Circuit applied these same principles over a decade
later in Adams v. Murphy, 2 when it held that the Creek Nation and its
Principal Chief were exempt from being compelled to perform on or
pay damages for violating a contract. 353 Citing In re Ayers, the court
explained that tribal immunity, like state immunity, bars both actions
for damages and actions seeking prospective relief.354 The court also
cited its earlier decision in Thebo and the public policy considerations
that exempt Indian tribes from suit, noting that this exemption "has
been the settled doctrine of the government from the beginning."55 Like
it had in Thebo, the Eighth Circuit in Adams drew upon both this
fundamental policy reason and the secondary policy reason
(protecting the government treasury) for tribal immunity, arguing
that without immunity, the tribes would be "overwhelmed" by
litigation, with "disastrous consequences.""'
In the following decade, the Supreme Court decided Turner v.
United States, another case involving the Creek Nation and the next
350. Id. at 373-74 (citing legislation providing jurisdiction over cases between the
Five Tribes and/or their citizens and the railroads, cases between the United States
and the Five Tribes, and cases between the Five Tribes). According to the court,
The constitutional competency of congress to pass such acts has never been
questioned, but no court has ever presumed to take jurisdiction of a cause
against any of the five civilized Nations in the Indian Territory in the absence
of an act of congress expressly conferring the jurisdiction in the particular
case.
Id. at 374.
351. The phrase "civilized Indian nations," "these Indian nations," or another
phrase referring to the Five Tribes appears no fewer than eight times in the court's
opinion, which is not even four pages long. Id. at 372-76.

352. 165 F. 304 (8th Cir. 1908).
353. Id. at 308.
354. Id. at 310-11 (citing In reAyers, 123 U.S. 443, 502, 504 (1887)).
355. Id. at 308-09 (emphases added); see also id. at 309 (describing these as these
as "considerations of sound public policy"). The court also referred to a "settled
policy which has hitherto been deemed essential for the protection of these
dependent tribes against the schemes of the unscrupulous." Id. at 312.
356. Id. at 308-09.
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case in the line of early tribal sovereign immunity jurisprudence.
Twenty years after that, the Court cited Thebo and Adams to uphold
the immunity of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations in USF&G.3 57
Before turning to those cases, however, note the pattern established
in the cases discussed so far: Adams relied on the opinion in Thebo,
which Adams says involved "the same fundamental rights";. 8 Thebo
relied on principles and language the Supreme Court applied to the
Cherokee Nation, which the Eighth Circuit said was indistinguishable
from the Choctaw Nation in its sovereignty and governance; and
Chadick and Parks v. Ross, both involving the Cherokee Nation,
applied the same principles and used the same language. Together,
these early federal court cases establish a tribal sovereign immunity
doctrine-based on long-established and commonly-accepted
principles of nation-state and U.S. state immunity-that extends to
suits seeking retrospective or prospective relief, suits on contracts,
and all other types of actions." 9
E.

The Five Tribes' Sovereign Immunity (Back) in the Supreme Court

Ten years after the Eighth Circuit decided Adams v. Murphy, the
Supreme Court heard Turner v. United States,"60 a suit by Clarence
Turner against the Creek Nation and the United States as trustee of
the nation's funds for damages resulting from an 1890 mob violence
incident in which a group of Creek citizens destroyed his personal
property. 361 Congress passed legislation in 1908 authorizing the U.S.
Court of Claims to adjudicate Mr. Turner's claim against the Creek
Nation. 6 2

357. 309 U.S. 506, 512 n.l1 (1940).
358. Adams, 165 F. at 308.
359. See id. at 309-10 (relying on Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882)); id. at
310 (citing Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, for the proposition that immunity bars breach of
contract actions and all other actions and suits, whether at law or in equity); Thebo v.
Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372, 375 (1895) (relying on Beers v. Arkansas, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1857)); id. at 375-76 (citing Ayers, 123 U.S. at 505, for the
principle that immunity bars actions for injunctive relief); Chadick v. Duncan, No.
15,317, slip op. at 91 (App. D.C. Mar. 3, 1894) (copy available at the Nat'l Archives &
Records Admin., Record Group No. 376, Case File No. 314) (also citing Ayers for the
proposition that immunity bars breach of contract actions and all other suits at law
or in equity).
360. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
361. See DEBO, DISAPPEARANCE, supra note 281, at 337-40 (discussing history
around the incident and the litigation).
362. Turner, 248 U.S. at 356-57 (citing Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216 § 26, 35 Stat.
444, 457 (1908)). The provision allowing suit against the Creek Nation was included
in legislation that also authorized suits against the Menominee Indian Tribe section
2), the Choctaw Nation (section 5), the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations (section
16), and the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians (section 27).
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The Court of Claims, like the Eighth Circuit, noted the Creek
Nation's constitution and laws, treaties with the United States, and
existence as "a distinct political community," and likened it to the
Cherokee Nation in these regards.3 63 Treating the tribe as a
sovereign government that could not be held responsible for mob
violence, the court held that the Creek Nation was not liable to Mr.
Turner.3" The court also found that the act authorizing Turner's suit
was defective, as it did not prescribe a method for service of process
upon the Creek Nation (like it did for the other tribes against which
it authorized suits in the Court of Claims) .365 Turner appealed to the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court began its opinion by noting that at the time of
the incident, the Creek Nation "exercised . . . the powers of a

sovereign people; having a tribal organization, their own system of
laws, and a government with the usual branches, executive, legislative,
and judicial." 366 Using language similar to its earlier decision in Parks
v. Ross, the federal district court's decision in Chadick v. Duncan, the
Eighth Circuit's decisions in Thebo and Adams, and the Court of
Claims' decision below, the Supreme Court called the Creek Nation
"a distinct political community, with which [the United States] made
treaties and which ...

administered its internal affairs."367 It upheld

the Court of Claims' finding that the tribe was not liable to Mr.
Turner.S68
The Supreme Court gave three reasons for dismissing the lawsuit.
First, applying general governmental immunity principles, the Court
held that the Creek Nation, like state and city governments, was
immune from liability for mob violence.369 Second, the Court noted
that although the 1908 legislation authorized Mr. Turner's suit and
363. Turner v. United States, 51 Ct. CI. 125, 152-53 (1916) (quoting Del. Indians
v. Cherokee Nation, 193 U.S. 127, 144 (1904)).
364. Id. at 153; see also id. at 146 ("The jurisdictional act does not create or declare

any liability against the Creek Nation in favor of the plaintiff. Its purport is to furnish
a forum where the question of liability may be determined." (citing Green v.
Menominee Tribe, 233 U.S. 558, 568 (1914))).
365. Id. at 144-45 (citing Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216 §§ 2, 5, 16, 27, 35 Stat. 444,
445, 451, 457 (authorizing suits against the Menominee Indian Tribe, the Choctaw
Nation, and the Chickasaw Nation)).

366. Turner, 248 U.S. at 355.
367. Id. at 357. Turner uses the language from, although it does not cite, Worcester
and Thebo.
368. Id. at 358.
369. Id. at 357-58.

Thus, the Court explained, "The fundamental obstacle to

recovery is not the immunity of a sovereign to suit, but the lack of a substantive right
to recover the damages resulting from failure of a government or its officers to keep
the peace." Id. at 358; see also id. ("Authority to sue the Creek Nation is implied; but
there is nothing in the act which even tends to indicate a purpose to create a new
substantive right.").
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thus abrogated the Creek Nation's immunity, it did not create any
right for him to recover damages for the mob violence since "[n]o
such liability existed by the general law."3 ' Turner thus failed to state
a valid cause of action. Third, the United States, an indispensable
party, had not waived its immunity and objected to the Court's
jurisdiction. 71
In discussing the 1908 statute, the Court stated that it "did not
impose any liability upon the Creek Nation. The tribal government
had been dissolved. Without authorization from Congress, the
Nation could not then have been sued in any court; at least without
its consent."3 72 Seventy years later, the Kiowa Court would seize upon
this language to claim that Turner,which Kiowa mistakenly suggested
was the source of the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine (and from
where it "developed almost by accident"), makes "an assumption of
immunity for the sake of argument, not a reasoned statement of
doctrine." ' According to Kiowa, "[t] he fact of tribal dissolution, not
[the tribe']s sovereign status, was the predicate for the legislation
authorizing suit [in Turner]. Turner, then, is but a slender
reed for
' 74
supporting the principle of tribal sovereign immunity.
But Kiowa was wrong to suggest that the 1908 legislation was
predicated on the Creek Nation's "dissolution," just as it was wrong to
point to Turner as the basis for the tribal immunity doctrine3 7 5 There
simply is no support for the argument that tribal dissolution was the
predicate for the 1908 legislation.7 6 The argument is faulty in at least
three respects.
370. Id. at 357.
371. Id. at 359.
372. Id. at 358.
373. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757, 761 (1998).
374. Id. at 757.
375. As Andrea Seielstad explains,
Turner was not the exclusive basis for the Supreme Court's first articulation
of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity as something separate and
distinct from subject matter jurisdiction. In United States v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the Court hearkened back to a "public policy which
exempted the dependent as well as the dominant sovereignties from suit
without consent" recorded in a number of previous decisions of the federal
courts.
Seielstad, supra note 24, at 693 (citing USF&G, 309 U.S. 506, 512 nn.10-11 (1940));
see also Struve, supra note 21, at 154 ("The Kiowa Court was inaccurate in assuming
that Turner provides the earliest Supreme Court reference to principles of tribal
sovereign immunity."); id. at 150 ("[T] he Turner Court arguably placed less reliance
on notions of sovereign immunity than the Parks [v. Ross] Court had.").
376. See Struve, supra note 21, at 152 n.98 ("It might be argued that the Court's
language suggests that the impediment to suit (absent congressional authorization)
arose from the dissolution of the tribal government. Such an argument, however,
seems unpersuasive, because it is not clear why dissolution would augment a tribe's
immunity from suit.").
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First, nothing in the act or its legislative history even mentions the
Indeed, the Creek
Creek government's supposed dissolution.
government had not been dissolved but "was instead explicitly
perpetuated13

77

and, like

the

other Five

Tribes

governments,

continued to function in a limited capacity under the 1906 Five
Tribes Act.17' The Creek national legislature met up through at least
the early 1950s,1 79 although the 1906
Act required federal approval
38 0
for all of the Creek legislature's acts.

Thus the Creek and the other Five Tribes governments were never
dissolved; they just functioned subject to federal oversight.3 ' Justice
Brandeis presumably was aware of this situation when he authored
Turner in 1919, and it explains his statement about needing
congressional authorization for any suit against the Creek Nation
because of its dissolution.3 2 Under the Five Tribes Act, the Creek
government could not consent to suit without federal approval. 83
The 1908 legislation authorizing Turner's suit was necessary
because of the tribe's immunity, not its dissolution. If the
Creek
Nation did not have immunity, there would have been no need for
the legislation: Turner could have just filed suit against the tribe
without it. By authorizing his suit and abrogating the tribe's
immunity, however, Congress recognized that immunity (otherwise)
existed. And the Turner Court recognized the same.
A second consideration undermining the Kiowa Court's argument
is that the legislation authorizing Turner's suit also authorized
384
lawsuits against tribes that were not subject to "dissolution,"
illustrating that Congress (and the courts) understood legislation was
377. Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 (D.D.C. 1976), affd sub nom., Harjo
v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
378. See id. at 1124 (noting that the tribal governments retained authority for
some legal matters and for the tribe's finances); id. at 1130 (discussing the

congressional decision to maintain highly regulated tribal governments for an
indefinite period of time). See also STRICKLAND, INDIANS, supra note 256, at 75
(discussing continuation of the Five Tribes' governments); WoRK,supra note 251, at

50-51 (same).

379. See Harjo, 420 F. Supp. at 1138 (describing meetings of the Creek General

Convention).
380. See id. at 1129 (reciting statutory provisions).
381. See id. at 1126 (explaining that during this period of time, federal authorities
"dominated the lives of the Five Civilized Tribes"); id. at 1130 (discussing federal
officials' attitude of "bureaucratic imperialism" and "deliberate attempts to frustrate,
debilitate, and generally prevent from functioning the tribal governments expressly
preserved by ...the [1906 Five Tribes] Act.").

382. Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919).
383. See Harjo,420 F. Supp. at 1129 (quoting the 1906 Five Tribes Act).
384. See Act of May 29, 1908, § 2, 35 Stat. 444 (authorizing suit against the
Menominee Indian Tribe); id. § 27, 35 Stat. 457 (authorizing suit against the
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians).
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necessary to authorize suits against Indian tribes, regardless of
'
Moreover, the
whether their governments were "dissolved."3 85
was the
dissolution
supposed
argument that the Creek government's
predicate for the legislation in Turner fails to explain Adams v.
Murphy, similarly decided after the Creek government was supposedly
dissolved, but for which there was no predicate legislation. Nor does
it account for USF&G, the Supreme Court's next tribal immunity case
involving the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations, which also functioned
under the 1906 Five Tribes Act. The Court in USF&G cited Turneralong with the Eighth Circuit's opinions in Adams v. Murphy and
Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe--for the proposition that the Five Tribes were
exempt from suit without congressional authorization and held that
tribal immunity "continues .
government[s]."'386

.

.

even after dissolution of the tribal

USF&G arose out of a dispute involving the United States' leasing
of land belonging to the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations to a coal
company.38 v USF&G was the surety on a bond guaranteeing payment
of the lease royalties by the company. 18" 8 The assignee of the coal
company's lease went into receivership, the United States filed a
claim for the royalties on the tribes' behalf, and USF&G crossclaimed. 8 9 The federal bankruptcy court issued a credit against the
tribes' royalties in the coal company's favor, but the Supreme Court
voided the bankruptcy judgment, holding that the tribes were
exempt from lawsuits absent congressional authorization. 9 °
To support its holding, the Court cited its earlier opinions in
Turner and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, as well as the Eighth Circuit's
Thebo and Adams opinions. 9 1 Relying on the same "public policy" as
the Eighth Circuit, the Court recognized that both the United States
and its "dependent sovereigns" were exempt from suit absent their
consent."' The Court reinforced the principle-already recognized
385. Congress's recognition of tribal sovereign immunity-and the need to
expressly rescind it through legislation in order for tribes to be sued-is further
evidenced by legislation introduced to authorize suit against the Cherokee Nation in
the wake of the Chadick decision. See 26 CONG. REc. 2662 (1894) (introducing
legislation to authorize a lawsuit to settle a dispute over bonds issued by the
Cherokee Nation); see also supra note 321 and accompanying text.
386. USF&G, 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940) (emphasis added).
387. Id. at 510.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 510-11.
390. Id. at 513 (positing that if the parties were immune from direct suits, a similar
immunity existed against cross claims).
391. Id. at 512 nn.10 & 11. The Kiowa Court, when discussing USF&G, notes
USF&G's citation to Turner, but not the citations to Cherokee Nation, Thebo, or Adams.
See infra note 417 and accompanying text.
392. USF&G, 309 U.S. at 512-13 (pointing to "[t]he public policy which exempted

1654

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1587

in Chadick, Thebo, Adams, and Turner-that "affirmative statutory
authority" was required to subject tribes to suit.393 And it said that the
idea that a sovereign "should not be compelled to defend against
cross-actions away from its own territory or in courts[] not of its own
choosing . ..is particularly applicable to Indian Nations with their

unusual governmental organization and peculiar problems." 94
The Court's "broad affirmation of tribal immunity" '95 in USF&G
was its last word on the subject for almost four decades. It was also
the last of the Supreme Court's immunity cases involving one of the
Five Tribes. But the Court continued to apply the same public policy
and well-established, widely accepted principles apparent in USF&G
and the other Five Tribes cases.
F

The Modern Era

The Supreme Court's next tribal immunity cases were decided
during the "modem era" of federal Indian law.396 In 1977, the Court
in Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game9 7 cited USF&G for the
proposition that "[a] bsent an effective waiver or consent, it is settled

the dependent as well as the dominant sovereignties from suit without consent" and
"the public policy which protects a quasi-sovereignty from judicial attack").
393. See id. at 514 (reaffirming that statutory authorization is required to bring suit
against either the United States or an Indian nation).
394. Id. at 513. The Supreme Court did not explain what it thought was "unusual"
about tribal governmental organization, or what "peculiar problems" it thought
tribes had.
395. Florey, Borders, supra note 20, at 620 (stating also that USF&G was the
Supreme Court's "first extensive discussion of the [tribal immunity] doctrine" and
that it "explicitly held that tribes shared fully in ordinary principles of sovereign
immunity").
396. See David H. Getches, Conquering the CulturalFrontier: The New Subjectivism of
the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 1573, 1574 n.3 (1996) [hereinafter,
Getcbes, Cultural Frontier] (describing the modern era of Indian law as beginning
with Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (citing CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN
INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 1 (1987)). By 1977, when it decided its first modern era

tribal immunity case, the United States had adopted an official policy of Indian selfdetermination, with the twin goals of supporting tribal self-governance and
promoting tribal economic development. Id. at 1592. The late twentieth century
also saw a resurgence of tribal institutional and legal development, with many tribes
adopting constitutional governments that resembled those of the state and local
governments surrounding them, with judiciaries, administrative agencies, and other
components of modern governmental apparatuses. See, e.g., CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET
AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 382-403 (6th ed.

2010) (discussing modern tribal constitutions, government structures, and court
systems). That the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine was reinforced in this era is
thus in some ways less remarkable than its being recognized in 1940, not even a
decade after the United States had officially ended its policy of breaking up tribal
lands and begun to encourage the rebuilding of tribal governments, albeit on a
model largely imposed by the federal government. Id. at 30-33, 386-91 (describing
New Deal era federal Indian policy).
397. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
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that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a [n] . . . Indian
tribe." 9 8 A year later, the Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez"
stated that "Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the
common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign
powers." 40 0 It held that the tribe had immunity against an action for

declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce the Indian Civil Rights
Act in federal court.4 1 And it noted that exposing them to suit in
outside courts could undermine tribal sovereignty and "impose
serious financial burdens on already 'financially disadvantaged'
tribes."

42

In 1986, the Court in Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering,
P.C.403 reiterated the rule from USF&G that tribal immunity extends
to cross-actions and held that North Dakota could not require tribes
to waive immunity as a condition to accessing state courts. 4 It cited
Santa Clara Pueblo and USF&G for the proposition that "[t]he
common law sovereign immunity possessed by . . . [t]ribe[s] is a

398. Id. at 172-73 (emphasis added) (citing USF&G, 309 U.S. 506; Adams v.
Superior Court, 356 P.2d 985, 987-88 (Wash. 1960); U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW (1958)). The Supreme Court held that tribal immunity barred any suit
against the tribe by the state, but that individual tribal members did not have
immunity against Washington's efforts to enforce state fishing laws against them
outside of the reservation. Id. at 171-72.
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion, however, expressed doubts about the
tribal immunity doctrine and his view that the "doctrine may well merit reexamination in an appropriate case." Id. at 178-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Apparently he thought such a case never arose during his time on the bench, or
perhaps Justice Blackmun changed his mind. See Memorandum from Justice
Blackmun to Justice Marshall regarding Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (March 28,
1978), in PAULJ. WHALBECK, JAMES F. SPRIGGS, II, & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE BURGER
at
available
(2011),
DATABASE
WRITING
OPINION
COURT
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/index.php?rt=pdfarchive/details/ 1612
(stating thatJustice Blackmun took no part in the decision or opinion); see also Okla.
Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991); Three
Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 476 U.S. 877 (1986) (Justice Blackmunjoining
in the respective majority opinions upholding tribal sovereign immunity).
399. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
400. Id. at 58 (citing Puyallup, 433 U.S. at 172-73; USF&G, 309 U.S. at 512-13;
Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919)).
401. Id. at 59. The Court also held that the Pueblo's governor did not enjoy
immunity against the petitioner's action for declaratory and injunctive relief. Id.
(citing Puyallup, 433 U.S. at 171-72; Ex ParteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). However,
the Court found that Congress did not, in the Indian Civil Rights Act, authorize
actions for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce the statute (other than habeas
corpus petitions), and therefore that there was no cause of action. Id.
402. Id. at 64. (quoting SUBCOMMrrrEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SENATE
JUDICIARY COMM., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN: SUMMARY REPORT

OF HEARINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS PURSUANT TO S. RES. 194, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS., 12

(Comm. Print 1966)).
403. 476 U.S. 877 (1986).
404. See id. at 891 (noting that waiver requirement could lead to counterclaims
against tribes in state court).

1656

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1587

necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance ....
[and], like all aspects of tribal sovereignty . . . privileged from
40 5
diminution by the States.

In its final tribal immunity case before Kiowa, the Court in
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,40 6
recognizing that tribal sovereign immunity bars actions for injunctive
and prospective relief, held that Oklahoma could not sue the tribe to
collect state cigarette, fuel, and sales taxes owed by non-members for
purchases at the tribe's gas station, or to make the tribe pay the state
the amount of those taxes.407 Noting that it had previously reaffirmed
the doctrine on several occasions 4 8 and that Congress had
"consistently reiterated its approval" of the doctrine consistent with
its "desire to promote the 'goal of Indian self-government, including
its 'overriding goal' of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and
economic development[,] ' "'49 the Court stated that it was "not
disposed to modify the long-established principle of tribal sovereign
immunity."410 Justice Stevens, however, wrote a concurring opinion
calling sovereign immunity an "anachronistic fiction" and questioned
whether tribal immunity "extends to cases arising from a tribe's
conduct of commercial activity outside its own territory ... or that it
applies to claims for prospective equitable relief against a tribe. '41'
Seven years later, he authored the dissent in Kiowa expressing the
view that tribal immunity should not extend to tribes' off-reservation
commercial conduct.
IV. KIOWA REVISITED

The Court in Kiowa upheld the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine
and recognized that it extends to both off-reservation and
commercial activities. 412 However, it did so reluctantly and only after
"disparag[ing] the precedent,"4"
misconstruing the doctrine's
origins, attacking its legitimacy, and inviting Congress to limit or
405. Id.
406. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
407. Id. at 507.
408. Id. at 510 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); Turner
v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 359 (1919)).
409. Id. (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216
(1987)).
410. Id.
411. Id. at 514-15 (Stevens,J., concurring).
412. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998); see also
supra notes 12, 46 and accompanying text.
413. Tweedy, supra note 13, at 177 ('justice Kennedy disparaged the precedent,
which constrained him, and then proceeded to list several policy reasons why
sovereign immunity for Indian tribes should be abolished or limited.").
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abrogate it.414 But the Court's characterizations of the doctrine, and
especially its history, are incorrect.

The above analysis makes it

abundantly clear that the doctrine did not develop by accident.
The Kiowa Court attributed tribal immunity's supposed accidental
origin to Turner,41 but Turner is not the sole basis for the tribal
sovereign immunity doctrine or the first tribal immunity case. Nor is
Turner itself a "slender reed for supporting . . . tribal sovereign

immunity."4'16 Understood in context, Turner is a rather sturdy reed
since but for the Creek Nation's immunity the legislation authorizing
suit against it would have been unnecessary. And Turner is just one
reed in the fabric supporting the tribal immunity doctrine.
The Kiowa Court overlooked (or conveniently ignored) the fact
that the Court in USF&G, when it first expressly recognized the tribal
sovereign immunity doctrine in 1940, cited not just Turner, but also
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and the Eighth Circuit's decisions in Thebo v.
Choctaw Tribe and Adams v. Murphy.417 These cases do not discuss an
accidental doctrine. They talk about a "settled policy" and "settled
418
doctrine" based on "well-established principle [s] ofjurisprudence."
They also cite the Supreme Court's contemporaneous state immunity
414. See supra Part I.
415. The Court in Kiowa said that "[t]he doctrine is said by some of our own
opinions to rest on the Court's opinion in Turner," Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756 (citing
Citizen Band, 498 U.S. at 510), although the exact language in Citizen Band states: "A
doctrine of Indian tribal sovereign immunity was originally enunciated by this Court
and has been reaffirmed in a number of cases." Citizen Band, 498 U.S. at 510 (citing
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); Turner v. United States, 248
U.S. 354, 358 (1919)). Thus the Kiowa Court does not directly attribute the tribal
immunity doctrine's origin to Turner, though it suggests as much. But see Kiowa, 523
U.S. at 761 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (attributing the doctrine's origins to Turner and
USF&G). But the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine dates back further than Turner,
even in the Supreme Court. See supra Part III.D.
416. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757. The Supreme Court's "slender reed" characterization
is based on its argument that the Creek government's dissolution (and not its
sovereign immunity) was the predicate for the legislation authorizing suit against the
tribe in Turner,and that Turner's "assumption of immunity for the sake of argument

[was therefore] ... not a reasoned statement of doctrine." Id.; see also id. at 756
("Though Turner is indeed cited as authority for the immunity, examination shows it
simply does not stand for that proposition."). But this argument is based on a
misunderstanding of the Creek government's history, and thus TurneT's holding. See
supra notes 374-386 and accompanying text.
417. The Kiowa Court notes USF&G's citation of Turner but says nothing about
Thebo or Adams or the "public policy" they rely on to uphold tribal immunity-which
is the same "public policy" relied on in USF&G. Compare USF&G, 309 U.S. 506, 512
n.10 (1940) (invoking the "public policy which exempted the dependent as well as
the dominant sovereign[]s from suit" (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1 (1831))), with Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe, 66 F. 372, 374-75 (8th Cir. 1895)
(citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and other cases involving the Cherokee Nation to
support the "settled policy" of recognizing tribal immunity from suit).
418. Thebo, 66 F. at 375-76 (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527
(1857)).
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jurisprudence.4" 9 And they rely on the same principles and reasoning
the Court used there and in its foreign and federal immunity
jurisprudence-as well as basic federal Indian law principles from the
Marshall Trilogy, Parks v. Ross, and other cases that predate Turner by
at least a half century-to uphold tribal immunity.4 2' But the Kiowa
Court does not mention USF&G's citation of these foundational
cases, even though they are cited along with Turner in the same
4 21
part-indeed in the same footnotes-of USF&G that Kiowa cited.
The Kiowa Court also mischaracterized the policy justifications
underlying the tribal immunity doctrine. This happens on multiple
levels.
On the one hand, the Court ignored the historical
justifications for the doctrine articulated in the foundational tribal
immunity cases. As noted above, these cases used the same reasoning
and language as other immunity cases of their time,4 22 which
themselves offer little analysis or reasoning. 423 Any criticism of the
tribal immunity doctrine for being light on analysis applies equally
for state, federal, and foreign immunity. On the other hand, the
Kiowa Court suggested for the first time that the tribal immunity

419. See Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304, 308 (8th Cir. 1908) (citing the Supreme
Court's state sovereign immunity decisions in Ayers and Jumel)); Thebo, 66 F. at 375
(quoting the Supreme Court's decision in Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 529); see also
supranote 359 and accompanying text.
420. See supraPart III.D.2.
421. The dissent noted that USF&G cited Turnerand "two Eighth Circuit decisions
addressing the immunity of two of the Five Civilized Tribes" and emphasized the
USF&G Supreme Court's singular statement that "[tihese Indian Nations are exempt
from suit without Congressional authorization." Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 761-62 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Stevens argued that "[a]t
most, the holding [in USF&G] extends only to federal cases in which the United
States is litigating on behalf of a tribe," id. at 762, but he did not address the fact that
neither Thebo nor Adams involved the United States' litigating on a tribe's behalf.
Nor did he provide any basis for limiting USF&G's holding to cases brought by the
United States.
One might argue, and the dissent perhaps suggests, that the doctrine recognized
in Thebo, Adams, and USF&G applied only to the Five Tribes (or that there's
something accidental or happenstance about the doctrine as developed in those
cases being applied to other tribes). But USF&G used the phrase "these Indian
Nations" only once; it used "the Indian Nations" elsewhere in its opinion. Moreover,
two of the three opinions in the Marshall Trilogy describe and develop rules based
on the Cherokee Nation and its relationship with the United States. Like tribal
sovereign immunity, these rules are (and always have been) applied across-the-board
to all tribes under the Court's one-size-fits-all federal Indian law jurisprudence. And
to the extent the holdings in the Five Tribes cases might be construed as relying on
their particular forms of government and institutions, most of the 566 federallyrecognized Indian tribes are more similar to the Five Tribes today, in terms of
governmental structures, apparatuses, and responsibilities, than at the turn of the
twentieth century when the Five Tribes immunity cases were decided.
422. See supra Parts II.D, III.D.
423. See supra Part II.A-C.
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doctrine's purpose was and is to protect against encroachment by the
states.424
The early tribal immunity cases, however, did not mention
protecting tribal governments from state encroachment as a reason
for the doctrine.425 They upheld tribal immunity for two basic
reasons: primarily, because the courts equated the tribes with states
and foreign nations that enjoyed immunity as part of their inherent
sovereignty; and secondarily, because subjecting the tribes to suit
would have threatened the tribal governments' treasuries.4 26 These
are the same reasons set forth in the Court's contemporaneous cases
involving other sovereigns' (and particularly states') immunity. They
are also the same reasons most often cited today for state sovereign
immunity4 27 and are arguably stronger for tribes than 4 29other
governments. 42 8 But they are conspicuously absent from Kiowa.
424. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758. When suggesting that there are "reasons to doubt the
wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine," the Court said that "[a]t one time, the
doctrine of tribal immunity.., might have been thought necessary to protect
nascent tribal governments from encroachments by States. In our interdependent
and mobile society, however, tribal immunity extends beyond what is needed to
safeguard tribal self-governance." Id. It is interesting to compare the Supreme
Court's suggestion that the justification for tribal sovereign immunity based on
preserving self-governance is only to protect tribes from state encroachment with the
Court's invoking a self-governance justification for state immunity that argues
sovereign immunity is necessary to preserve the rights of the citizens of those
governments (acting through their elected officials), to administer their own public
affairs and decide how to allocate limited resources, as opposed to having outside
judges interfere with or make these decisions. See supra note 166 and accompanying
text (discussing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887), which described judicial
interference with states' public policy and public affairs administration); supra note
190 and accompanying text (discussing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751-52 (1999),
which warned against judicial interference with the states' self-governance and use of
the political process to allocate resources among competing interests); see also
Tweedy, supra note 13, at 179 (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court's conception of
tribal sovereign immunity and, by extension tribal sovereignty itself, as a special right
which should be accorded only to the weak and defenseless stands in sharp contrast
to its usual conception of sovereign immunity as an esteemed and necessary
component of governmental status").
425. Indeed, the early tribal immunity cases and their context make clear that
protecting tribes against state (or white settler and would-be state) encroachment was
Protecting the tribes against state
not the immunity doctrine's purpose.
encroachment was the federal government's obligation, assumed explicitly through
treaties and as part of the federal government's fiduciary duties towards Indian tribes
generally. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (noting the
federal government's obligation to protect tribes from states and their citizens).
426. See supra Part III.D.
427. See supra notes 189-190 and accompanying text.
428. See Florey, Penumbras, supra note 21, at 825-26 (suggesting there are strong
and unique policy justifications for tribal immunity); see also Riley, supra note 21, at
1109 (noting that because of tribes' historical and present financial struggles,
sovereign immunity takes on an added importance in protecting tribal
communities); Struve, supra note 21, at 166 ("Standard policy arguments for
sovereign immunity-such as fiscal concerns or governmental 'dignity'-are more
likely to ring true with respect to tribal than nontribal governments.").
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An understanding of tribal sovereign immunity's historical and
doctrinal contexts also shows that the doctrine is not as anomalous as
Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg try to make it seem in their
dissent.4 ° They argue that tribal immunity is anomalous based on a
cross-sovereign comparison: the federal government has waived its
immunity for certain tort claims and claims arising out of its
commercial activities; Congress abrogated foreign nations'
extraterritorial immunity for their commercial activities; and a state
can be sued in the courts of another state.43 ' Like the arguments that
tribal immunity is accidental or lacks sufficient justification, however,
this argument is deflated by a proper historical and doctrinal
perspective."
429. SeeStruve, supra note 21, at 154 ("[T]he Court gave unduly short shrift to the
policies that weigh in favor of tribal sovereign immunity."). The Kiowa Court did
mention promoting economic development and tribal self-sufficiency as reasons for
the doctrine, but it said that this rationale "can be challenged as inapposite to
modern, wide-ranging tribal enterprises extending well beyond traditional tribal
customs and activities." Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757-58. For a critique of the Justices'
limited conception of tribal customary activities and failure to consider tribal views,
including perspectives that favor maintaining attributes of sovereignty tribes have not
freely given up and promoting self-determination and economic, cultural, and social
development, see Carpenter & Halbritter, supra note 12, at 315-16, 321.
430. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 765 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling the tribal sovereign
immunity rule "strikingly anomalous" and asking: "Why should an Indian tribe enjoy
broader immunity than the States, the Federal Government, and foreign nations?").
431. Id. at 765; see also supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
432. An understanding of tribal sovereign immunity's historical and doctrinal
contexts also suggests that the Kiowa Court was not performing a legislative function
by extending tribal immunity to off-reservation commercial activities, as the dissent
claims. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 764 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court, by
extending tribal sovereign immunity to off-reservation conduct, was engaging in
judicial lawmaking and encroaching on Congress's authority). The courts in the
early tribal immunity cases that applied the same principles found in the Supreme
Court's other sovereign immunity jurisprudence-and based on the same common
law immunity doctrine-presumably recognized a doctrine with the same common
law scope. See Greene v. Mt. Adams Furniture (In re Greene), 980 F.2d 590, 595 (9th
Cir. 1992) (arguing that "the scope of tribal immunity has to be measured at the
common law as it existed at some earlier time, rather than adopting present limits on
sovereign

immunity accepted by the states for their own

purposes" (footnote

omitted)); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) ("Indian
tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers." (emphasis added)); Florey, Borders, supra
note 20, at 620 (stating that USF&G "explicitly held that tribes shared fully in
ordinary principles of sovereign immunity" and describing USF&G as "a broad
affirmation of tribal immunity, closely tying the doctrine to a robust view of tribal
sovereignty").
Justice Stevens' argument does, however, raise interesting questions regarding not
only tribal sovereign immunity but sovereign immunity generally: namely, the extent
to which Congress is following Supreme Court precedent (or making new law) when
it recognizes immunity, and the extent to which the Court is making new law or
simply upholding a doctrine that Congress and others have always recognized as
existing. In one sense, Congress is neither creating nor expanding the doctrine, but
simply legislating against the backdrop of something that is already there. One
could similarly argue that the Court is not making new law or expanding the
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Tribal sovereign immunity, like the other sovereign immunity
doctrines alongside which it developed, is at common law
extraterritorial and absolute in scope and applies to all types of
actions, except as abrogated by Congress.4 3 The noted anomalies
between tribes' and the other governments' immunities result from
congressional action (in the case of federal and foreign immunity) or
the consent of the sovereign (for states). Congress has abrogated
tribal immunity in only a few limited circumstances, 434 and tribes did
not (like states) consent to suits by (other) states by joining the
Union. 5
When deciding whether to recognize sovereign immunity in the
state, federal, and foreign government contexts, the Supreme Court
deferred to Congress and the sovereigns themselves. It has done the
same for tribal immunity to date. But the Justices have done so
reluctantly and expressed their normative angst with tribal sovereign
immunity.
Normative questions about the desirability of sovereign immunity,
including tribal immunity, are beyond the scope of this Article. To
the extent they are influenced by or relate to the doctrine's history,
we need to be clear about the facts. It is quite obvious that Kiowa's
questioning tribal immunity's legitimacy strengthened its pitch to
immunity doctrine when it recognizes governmental immunity-even for
commercial and extraterritorial activities-because the doctrine has always existed,
with those broad default common law contours.
433. See Greene, 980 F.2d at 594 ("Since only Congress can limit the scope of tribal
immunity, and it has not done so, the tribes retain the immunity sovereigns enjoyed
at common law, including its extra-territorial component."); see also Seielstad, supra
note 24, at 712 (discussing the federal government's position in the Kiowa oral
argument that "the common law default rule with respect to tribes is also absolute
immunity unless Congress articulates a different standard").
434. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing legislation in which
Congress granted only limited authorization for certain lawsuits).
435. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. The Kiowa dissent also argued that
"[t]he fact that the States surrendered aspects of their sovereignty when they joined
the Union does not even arguably present a legitimate basis for concluding that the
Indian tribes retained-or, indeed, ever had-any sovereign immunity for offreservation commercial conduct." Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 765 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
But if the states have immunity for their commercial activities as part of the common
law immunity they enjoyed but did not surrender in the Constitution, see Coll. Say.
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 685-86 (1999)
(upholding state immunity for commercial activities and suggesting that states did
not give Congress the power to abrogate it), and tribes enjoyed that same common
law immunity-which was both absolute and extraterritorial in scope-and likewise
did not surrender this immunity (in the Constitution or otherwise), see Blatchford v.
Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (explaining that tribes and foreign
nations, unlike states, did not surrender any of their sovereign immunity in the
Constitution); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58 (noting that tribes possess the same
common law immunity as other sovereigns), logic suggests that Indian tribes also had
and retained immunity for their off-reservation commercial activities.
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Congress to limit it-and has made it easier for other courts to carve
out exceptions to the doctrine and justify departures from Kiowa's
holding that tribes can be sued "only where Congress has authorized
'
the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity."436
Congress's history of recognizing tribal sovereign immunity may be
what has so far kept the Supreme Court from limiting tribal immunity
on its own. That situation is tenuous, however, with four newJustices
having joined the Court since Kiowa was decided, lower courts asking
the Court to change the law, petitions for certiorari in tribal
immunity cases being filed every term, a case currently making its way
through the courts that presents the same issue the Court granted
cert on two years ago (but did not decide because the case was
remanded),"' and the Court's having granted certiorari in a case that
presents a tribal sovereign immunity question during its October
2013 term.4" 8 And longstanding Congressional recognition of tribal
immunity has not stopped some lower courts from placing limitations
on tribal immunity, despite Kiowa's reaffirming that such decisions
are solely the province of Congress and the tribes themselves.439
A.

The Role of Congress

Pretty much all of the tribal sovereign immunity cases have
recognized, at least since the late nineteenth century, a congressional
power to abrogate tribal immunity. But Congress has exercised this
power only sparingly. One of the earliest exercises of this power was
the 1908 legislation authorizing the suit against the Creek Nation
which gave rise to the Supreme Court's decision in Turer.440 But this

law, like other legislation abrogating tribal immunity, was specific and
narrow in scope, and it shows that Congress understood such
immunity existed absent Congressional abrogation.
Outside of these specific and narrow circumstances, Congress has
not abrogated or limited tribal immunity. In 1991, the Supreme
Court noted that Congress has "consistently reiterated its approval of
the immunity doctrine" and gave the Indian Financing Act of 1974
and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
1975 as examples.4 41 Seven years later, the Kiowa Court referred to
436. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 754.
437. See supra note 99-105 and accompanying text.
438. See supra note 19, 106 and accompanying text.
439. See supra Part I.A.
440. Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, § 26, 35 Stat. 444, 457; see also supra note 362
and accompanying text (discussing legislation).
441. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S.
505, 510 (1991) (discussing Pub. L. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1451
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these examples as evidence of Congress's "intention not to alter" (as
442
opposed to approval of) the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine.
Whether the Supreme Court considers certain legislation to reflect
an endorsement of tribal immunity or simply an intent not to change
it, Congress's longstanding recognition of the doctrine has continued
from the nineteenth century up through the present, including in
legislation Congress considered around the time of and passed after
(and perhaps because of) Kiowa.
Although Congress has never expressly stated a reason for its
affirmation of tribal sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court has
suggested it is because Congress wants to promote tribal selfdevelopment. 44
government, self-sufficiency, and economic
Whatever Congress's motive is for preserving the doctrine, its history
of recognizing tribal immunity has figured significantly in the
Supreme Court's repeatedly upholding the doctrine.
Indeed,
Congress's recognition of tribal immunity across three centuries is
perhaps the only thing that has kept the majority of Justices from
limiting the doctrine themselves and kept the Court from

(2006), and Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450).
442. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758-59.
443. See Seielstad, supra note 24, at 722-30 (discussing the Indian Tribal Economic
Development and Contracts Encouragement Act of 2000, the Tribal Court Claims
and Risk Management Act of 2000, and the late 1990s legislative history and hearings
leading up to them); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Greatest Indian Cases Round 2
Results,
TURTLE
TALK
(Sept.
2,
2012),
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2012/09/02/greatest-indian-cases-round-2-resultshappy-early-labor-day (stating that "Kiowa... fueled its own Congressional hearings
on tribal immunity").
444. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757 (stating that the Court in Citizen Band "retained the
doctrine, however, on the theory that Congress had failed to abrogate it in order to
promote economic development and tribal self-sufficiency"); Citizen Band, 498 U.S. at
510 (citing the Indian Financing Act and Indian Self-Determination Act as examples
of Congressional approval of tribal immunity and stating that they "reflect Congress's
desire to promote the goal of Indian self-government, including its overriding goal of
encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development) (internal quotations
and citations omitted). The Kiowa Court, however, stated that this rationale "can be
challenged as inapposite to modern, wide-ranging tribal enterprises extending well
beyond traditional tribal customs and activities." Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757-58. But see
Carpenter & Halbritter, supra note 12, at 314-15, 321 (criticizing the Justices for
tying tribes' immunity and sovereign rights to ethnocentric conceptions of customary
tribal activities, and discussing tribes' commercial activities as an exercise of their
inherent sovereignty, and of their rights of self-determination and free pursuit of
their economic, cultural, and social development under international law). To the
extent the Kiowa suggests that promoting economic development and self-sufficiency
is a justification for tribal immunity, it seems to attribute that purpose to Congress
and not to any of its precedent. In any case, the extent to which this justification has
a historical basis is questionable, since the doctrine developed at a time (in the late
nineteenth century) when the United States was trying to bring an end to tribes'
economic self-sufficiency and political independence. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra
note 396, at 24-30 (describing late nineteenth century federal Indian policy).
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diminishing tribal immunity like it has other aspects of tribal
sovereignty.4 45 The question is whether the Court will stay this course.
B.

The Big(ger) Picture

It is clear that many judges, including most of the Justices on the
Supreme Court, do not like tribal sovereign immunity and think the
doctrine is too broad. Their dislike of sovereign immunity generally,
and of tribal immunity to the extent its scope seems anomalous when
compared to other sovereigns', is understandable. Concerns and
criticisms about fairness and notice to, and a potential lack of
recourse for, tort victims and others on the plaintiff side of immunity
exist with respect to all sovereign immunity doctrines.4 46 But these
445. While the Supreme Court has limited other aspects of tribal sovereignty in
recent decades, those limitations-primarily of tribes' exercise of and adjudicatory
jurisdiction over non-members in Indian country-are based on the Supreme
Court's finding that tribes were implicitly divested of such authority upon European
"discovery" of North America and tribes' "incorporation into [what would become]
the territory of the United States." Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191, 209 (1978) (arguing that "inherent limitations" and constraints on tribal powers
resulted from their "incorporation into the United States"); see also Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) ("[E]xercise of tribal power beyond what is
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without
express congressional delegation."). But the implicit divestiture theory holds that
this supposed inconsistency magically arose upon discovery. The argument that
tribes were somehow divested of their sovereign immunity upon their "incorporation
into" the United States is much harder to make, given Congress's centuries-long
recognition of the doctrine and the Supreme Court's statement in USF&G in 1940
that sovereign immunity "exempted the dependent as well as the dominant
sovereign[]s from suit without consent." USF&G, 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940).
Andrea Seielstad has suggested that because Congress was "actively considering
changes in the law of tribal immunity" at the time Kiowa was decided and the Justices
were aware of this fact, they may have been hesitant to alter the tribal immunity
doctrine until after waiting to see what Congress would do. Seielstad, supra note 24,
at 711. Katherine Florey has linked the Court's hesitancy to abrogate tribal immunity
to its broader sovereign immunity and New Federalism jurisprudence, suggesting
that
a principal reason the Court has been reluctant to restrict [tribal] sovereign
immunity... is that to do so might undermine the foundations of its
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence .... Indeed, the Court's Eleventh
Amendment cases might be said to depend on a notion of sovereignty and
immunity as inextricable, because only by equating the two has the Court
been able to explain how the Constitution preserves and enshrines a general
principle of state sovereignty despite its lack of explicit mention of the
doctrine.
Florey, Borders,supra note 20, at 625-26 (footnote omitted).
446. See Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 1216-23 (offering criticisms of the
conventional justifications for state sovereign immunity); Florey, Borders, supra note
19, at 600 ("Tribal immunity, though exceptional in certain ways, is, at least to some
extent, subject to many criticisms that have been leveled against sovereign immunity
in other contexts."); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 1202 (criticizing
sovereign immunity for preventing persons who have suffered harm from getting
redress for their injuries).
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concerns get expressed differently in the tribal immunity context.
For the Supreme Court in particular, the dislike of tribal immunity
seems to come as much (if not more) from a discomfort with tribal
sovereignty than from any discomfort with sovereign immunity.4 47
The Court's general unease with and negative reactions to tribal
sovereignty over the past four decades have been widely noted and
commented upon.'
Its recent Indian law jurisprudence reflects an
apprehension tribal sovereignty and a distrust of tribal courts and
institutions.449 This discomfort is also evident in the tribal immunity
cases.
Kiowa reflects what Professor Frank Pommersheim calls "a freefloating normative angst within the Court about what tribes should be
permitted to do, especially in regards to non-Indians."45° This angst
becomes more palpable when one considers that, in some locales,
tribal immunity is today "perhaps the central [feature of tribal
sovereignty] when it comes to tribal relationships with
nonmembers." 411 Yet tribal sovereign immunity stands out as the one

area where the Court has not become the arbiter of tribal sovereignty
and "assum[ed] a prerogative that it formerly conceded to the
'
political branches of government."452

447. Ann Tweedy has suggested that "[t]he Court's discomfort with tribal
immunity appears to extend not from its discomfort with the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in general, but rather from the continued recognition of tribal sovereign
immunity." Tweedy, supra note 13, at 179-80; see also id. at 180 (arguing "[t) hat the
Court actually entreated Congress to abrogate tribal immunity indicates the extent of
its interest in effecting a wholesale divestment of tribal sovereignty").
448. Some of the most cited examples of this commentary are Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, The Supreme Court andFederalIndian Policy, 85 NEB. L. REv. 121 (2006); Philip
P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The JudicialDivestiture of Indian
Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Frickey,
Colonialism]; Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law,
119 HARV. L. REV. 431 (2005); David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist
Court'sPursuit of States'Rights, Color-BlindJustice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L REv.
267 (2001); Getches, CulturalFrontier,supra note 396; Joseph William Singer, Canons
of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REv. 641
(2003); and Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions:
Deviationsfrom ConstitutionalPrinciplesand the CraftingofJudicialSmallpox Blankets, 5 U.
PA.J. CONST. L. 405 (2003). There is a spectrum of theories as to why the Supreme
Court has been adverse to Indian interests, ranging from the Justices' acting upon a
"long-established racial stereotype of Indians as unsophisticated savages," WILLIAMS,
supra note 258, at xv, to their using Indian law cases as vessels to decide larger
constitutional issues that may have little to do with federal Indian law. See Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court'sIndian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 580 (2008).
449. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 61, at 232 (describing the Supreme Court's
Indian law cases as reflecting a "fear" of "offensive," in the defense versus offense
sense, tribal sovereignty in the form of adjudicatory and regulatory jurisdiction).
450. Id. at 298.
451. Florey, Borders, supra note 20, at 598.
452. Getches, Cultural Frontier, supra note 396, at 1575; see also POMMERSHEIM,
supranote 61, at 297 (arguing that the Court has "arrogated to itself ajudicial version
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The arguments made by the Justices in Kiowa and the plaintiffs and
judges in its progeny will continue to find a sympathetic audience.
Many others no doubt share the courts' unease with applying
immunity given the facts of some the cases, and perhaps the courts'
general discomfort with extending immunity to torts or to tribal
economic enterprises (and to tribes' casinos and off-reservation
activities in particular). These are claims that many governments
would recognize as being outside sovereign immunity, either because
they have adopted laws providing recourse for their torts and
commercial and other acts in their own forums, or because of
changes in customary international law.4"'
Understood in its proper historical and doctrinal context, however,
tribal immunity is not as anomalous as the Kiowa dissent and other
courts make it out to be.454 Tribal immunity is in certain respects
broader than other governments' immunities, but that is because
either the governments consented to suit (generally in their own
courts) or Congress limited their immunity. While the federal
government and states have in recent decades made remedies more
available against government defendants, those remedies are still
incomplete.45 5 Similarly, many (though not all) Indian tribes make
tribal court remedies available for claims against their
governments. 4 6 Various legislative provisions and other mechanisms

of plenary power" and "creat[ed] . . . a colonialist-like common law regime" for
federal Indian policy); Frickey, Colonialism, supra note 448, at 58 (arguing that the
Court has "engaged in federal common-lawmaking that divests tribes of inherent
sovereignty" and "embraced a common law for our age of colonialism").
453. The federal government, for example, is subject to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2006), and many states have adopted counterpart
legislation. A "restrictive" doctrine of immunity-under which nation-states do not
enjoy immunity for their extraterritorial activities-is now part of customary
international law" and was codified into U.S. law in the 1976 Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act." Yap, supranote 129, at 93, 99-100.
454. See supra notes 50-54, 433-435 and accompanying text.
455. See Struve, supra note 21, at 137-38 (noting that the remedies against the
federal and state governments are "far from complete"); see also Seielstad, supra note
24, at 742-73 (discussing Congressional testimony regarding liability, including for
torts, against state and local governments). Another reality often ignored in the
(tribal) sovereign immunity discussion is that federal and state sovereign immunity
have historically barred and continue to pose a barrier to Indian tribes seeking
redress for the wrongful actions of these governments. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (holding that state immunity barred the tribe's claim to
land, water, and jurisdiction over it); see also Paiute-Shoshone Indians v. City of Los
Angeles, No. 1:06-cv-00736 OWW LJO, 2007 WL 521403 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2007)
(finding that federal immunity barred the tribe's claim for land and water rights).
456. Strnve, supra note 21, at 137 (noting that many tribes "provide significant
remedies, in tribal court, for claims alleging misconduct by tribal governments" but
that "[n]ot all tribes provide a full array of remedies for government action").
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also address tribal sovereign immunity and provide remedies against
tribes.457
The Supreme Court did not abrogate sovereign immunity for the
federal government, states, or foreign nations. It waited (quite a long
time in many instances) for Congress or those governments'
legislatures or courts to do so. The difficult questions raised by
debates about whether to limit tribal immunity suggest these
questions are similarly best left for tribes and Congress. So do more
general concerns about lawmaking and regulation through
lawsuits.45
However, the Court's deference to Congress and Congress's
sparing use of its abrogation power can make tribal immunity seem
anomalous, which can in turn put pressure on tribes to waive
immunity.45 9 But if the concern is really about the scope of tribal
sovereign immunity, then why not just make the argument that
Congress should similarly limit tribal immunity and leave it at that?
Why do the courts also find it necessary to undermine the doctrine's
legitimacy by attacking its origins?
Kiowa and the other tribal sovereign immunity cases illustrate well
David Getches' admonition that "old Indian rights... can be viewed
as anomalous or inequitable when viewed without the full benefit of
their historical basis."46 This piece aims to provide enough of the
historical basis for tribal immunity and its development relative to
other governments' immunity so that it does not seem so anomalous
(or inequitable) in comparison.
Whatever one thinks of the
normative arguments judges and others make about tribal sovereign
immunity,461 tribal immunity should not be limited based on an
inaccurate history.
And though a discussion the normative arguments regarding
sovereign immunity-tribal or otherwise-is beyond the scope of this
Article, it is worth at least highlighting a few of the policy questions
457. See infra notes 474-477 and accompanying text.
458. See Frederick Schauer & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Trouble With Cases, 2, in
REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAw 45 (Daniel
P. Kesller ed. 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1446897## (discussing potential drawbacks of regulation by litigation, including
that general policy may be made on the basis of unwarranted assumptions about the
typicality of one or a few high-salience cases or events).
459. See Struve, supra note 21, at 138 (noting that even though Congress might not
abrogate immunity, tribes will face pressure to waive it).
460. Getches, CulturalFrontier,supra note 396, at 1637.
461. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757-58 (1998)
(arguing that the scope of tribal sovereign immunity is broader than necessary);
Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe, 685 F.3d 1224, 1237 (11th Cir. 2012) (suggesting that
tribal immunity is "anachronistic and overbroad in its application").
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that arise in the debate over limiting tribal immunity, whether in the
judiciary or the legislature.4 62 The complexity of the issues involved
counsels for judicial caution, as the Kiowa Court recognized when it
said Congress is better positioned to weigh and accommodate the
competing concerns and interests. 463 The Supreme Court has noted
that the interests at stake include a desire to promote tribal selfgovernment and encourage tribal self-sufficiency and economic
development.46

But there are other interests and questions to

consider, as the hypotheticals below illustrate.
Suppose the Supreme Court were to adopt the "what is needed to
safeguard tribal self-governance" standard for tribal sovereign
immunity advocated by the Kiowa majority, 465 or limit tribal immunity
to on-reservation activities with a "meaningful nexus to [a] tribe's...
sovereign functions," as urged by the Kiowa dissent. 46 6 Determining
what activities are governmental (or, in the KiowaJustices' parlance,
are necessary for or have a meaningful nexus to tribal selfgovernance) is not as simple as it may seem. Tribes, with the federal
government's support, perform a vast array of sovereign functions,
including operating businesses to generate revenues for their
governments.4 67 Indeed, Congress and the Executive Branch have
462. See, e.g., Florey, Penumbras, supra note 21, at 826 ("[A]n argument can be
made that strong and unique policy justifications exist for a vigorous doctrine of
tribal immunity, and that courts should keep such policy issues in mind when
considering how far tribes' sovereign prerogatives extend."); Seielstad, supra note 24,
at 773 ("It might be argued that the distinctive nature of Congressional plenary
power with respect to tribal sovereignty and federal-tribal-state relations may warrant
greaterjudicial adherence to common law principles protective of tribal sovereignty,
including thejudiciary's longstanding recognition of tribal immunity.").
463. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 759 (leaving the decision on whether to limit tribal
sovereign immunity to Congress, whom the Court said "is in a position to weigh and
accommodate the competing policy concerns and reliance interests" and could
address the issue with comprehensive legislation); see also Agua Caliente Indians v.
Superior Court, 148 P.3d 1126, 1145 (Cal. 2006) (Moreno, J., dissenting) ("If the
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity needs to be modified... , federal law teaches
that it is Congress ... that is constitutionally delegated and historically assigned the
task of making that modification, and it is in a unique position 'to weigh and
accommodate the competing policy concerns and reliance interests."' (quoting
Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 759)).
464. See supra notes 409, 444 and accompanying text.
465. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.
466. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 764 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
467. See Fletcher, Pursuit,supra note 12, at 775-76 (examining tribal governments'
use of tribal business entities to generate revenues for government services); Robert
J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or Socialism Succeed?,
80 OR. L. REv. 757, 759-60 (2001) (discussing tribal and federal programs for
economic development, including tribal governments' commercial activities). Given
the realities on most reservations, including a relative dearth of economic activity
and lack of a tax base, economic development through tribally-owned and operated
enterprises-some of which operate in off-reservation markets where opportunities
are greater-is for many tribes the only viable option for generating governmental
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adopted a policy of endorsing and promoting economic development
through tribal entities as a means to fund tribal governments. 4"
These and other considerations complicate questions about what is
"governmental" and what is "commercial,"46 9 and the highlight the
potential for judicial limitations on tribal immunity to undermine
legislative and executive policy and impact tribal government
treasuries and services.47
Thorny questions also arise regarding the territorial scope of tribal
sovereign immunity, given the history of colonization and occupation
revenues. See Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. State, 242 P.3d 1099, 1107
(Colo. 2010) (citing Fletcher, Pursuit, supra note 12; Robert A. Williams, Jr., Small
Steps on the Long Road to Self-Sufficiency for Indian Nations: The Indian Tribal
Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335, 335-36 (1985)); see also
Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Hodel, 663 F. Supp. 1300, 1315 n.21 (D.D.C. 1987) (" [T]he
Indians have no viable tax base and a weak economic infrastructure. Therefore they,
even more than the states, need to develop creative ways to generate revenue.");
Fletcher, Pursuit,supra note 12, at 771-74 (discussing tribal governments' difficulties
in raising revenues, which include having "virtually no tax base").
468. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Tribal Businesses and the Off-Reservation
Market, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1047, 1049 (2008) (pointing to a Congressional
policy "support[ing] tribal economic development" that dates back to the 1970s);
Miller, supra note 467, at 762 (noting that "federal policy has allowed and actively
encouraged tribes to organize and operate businesses").
469. Another consideration is that the Court's refusal to adopt a commercial
exception for state sovereign immunity, on the theory that the states' common law
immunity was absolute (and extended to their commercial activities) and they did
not surrender this immunity, or give Congress the power to abrogate it, in the
Constitution). See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 685-86 (1999) (holding that states' sovereign immunity extends to
their commercial activities and suggesting the states did not, in the Constitution or
otherwise, give Congress authority to limit this aspect of their common law sovereign
immunity). This consideration also should push judges and scholars to reevaluate
the Court's reasons for determining that Congress can exercise unbridled authority
to limit the sovereign immunity of tribes (who did not surrender any of their
immunity in the Constitution) but cannot abrogate states' immunity outside of the
Reconstruction Amendments and certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Clause. This
inquiry is the subject of a future project.
470. For example, casinos have provided revenues for many tribal governments in
recent years, and though misperceptions abound, see JEFF CORNTASSEL AND RICHARD
C. WITMER,

FORCED FEDERALISM:

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

TO INDIGENOUS

NATIONHOOD 24-26 (2008) (discussing "rich Indian" stereotype and racism), gaming
revenues have helped some tribes return to economic self-sufficiency and enabled
many tribes to provide essential government services previously unavailable to their
citizens. Indeed, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) expressly encourages
tribal governmental gaming with the intent of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and
governance. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2006) (stating purpose "to provide a statutory
basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal
economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments").
If
Congress intended to limit sovereign immunity for tribes' casino operations, it
presumably would have said so.

Instead, Congress established a framework that

allows tribes and states to negotiate tort and other remedies for casino patrons as
part of the tribal-state gaming compacts IGRA requires for Vegas-style gambling, id. §
2710(d)(3) (setting forth tribal-state compact process), and abrogated tribes'
sovereign immunity only for actions seeking to enjoin unlawful gaming on Indian
lands. Id. § 2710(d) (7) (A) (ii).
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of Indian lands. A policy of restricting sovereign immunity to
currently recognized tribal jurisdictional boundaries (or reservation
borders) necessarily raises questions about the extent to which that
policy reproduces that history.4 71 These questions about drawing
lines around what is extraterritorial and commercial are tied to other
questions, including who-among tribes, the federal government,
and states, and among their different branches of government and
institutions-is best qualified (and where they get the prerogative) to
determine whether something is commercial or governmental, is
necessary for tribal self-governance, or has a meaningful enough
nexus to a tribe's lands or sovereign functions. There are also more
mundane technical questions, such as who should determine whether
72
to cap liability and at what (if any) amount.
Also important in this conservation, but often overlooked in the
tribal immunity jurisprudence, are alternatives for addressing judges'
and others' concerns outside of abrogating tribal immunity in federal
or state court. Foremost among these alternatives are remedies in
tribal forums, discussed above.17' These remedies include those
tribes have made available to casino patrons and employees in
fulfillment of their obligations under tribal-state gaming compacts,
which provide a mechanism to address the courts' concerns in the
tribal casino cases.474
471. These questions become more complicated when issues of aboriginal title or
treaties are involved. See, e.g., Greene v. Mt. Adams Furniture (In re Greene), 980
F.2d 590, 599 (9th Cir. 1992) (Rymer,J., concurring) (discussing the extent to which

tribal sovereign immunity was reserved in the Yakama Nation's treaty with the United
States and noting that "both parties assume [d] that the scope of tribal immunity was
locked in at the time the treaty [at issue] ...was ratified and can only be changed by
Congressional action"); see also United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 379 (1905)
(case involving the same treaty where the Supreme Court held that ambiguous treaty
language must be interpreted in tribes' favor).
472. See, e.g., Dan Weikel, Metrolink Crash Vctims Want Congress to Raise Ceilingon Damages,
L.A. TIMES (July 27, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/27/local/la-memetrolink-victims-20120728 (discussing legislation capping damages for injuries
and deaths from a 2008 train crash in Chatsworth, California, and victims' and
families' complaints that "Congress' failure to increase a railroad liability
cap ... left them inadequately compensated for their injuries and financial
losses").
473. See supra note 456 and accompanying text (discussing tribal court remedies);
see also Seielstad, supra note 24, at 743-48 (discussing tribal laws and forums that
provide redress against tribal governments); Struve, supra note 21, at 155-61
(examining remedies available against tribes in tribal forums for civil rights, tort, and
contract claims). Tribes, however, still have to fight against the perception that their
laws and institutions, and the remedies provided under them, are not as fair as or
otherwise inadequate compared to those of other governments. See Struve, supra
note 21, at 160, 160 n.146 (comparing perceptions of fairness in tribal courts and
statistical realities).
474. Judge Gould, concurring in Cook v. Avi Casino Enters., Inc., suggested that
Congress pass legislation limiting the immunity of "tribal entities involved in...
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Congress has also passed legislation addressing some of the
concerns expressed by these and other judges about tribal immunity.
Adopted in the wake of Kiowa, these laws require that tribes
negotiating contracts under certain federal programs provide notice
of immunity to opposite contracting parties47 and apply federal tort
claims procedures to claims against tribes administering certain
government programs.4 76 The federal government has also acted
through its agencies to provide remedies against tribal entities that
could otherwise enjoy immunity.4

77

And courts have suggested, and

gaming" or that the tribe waive its immunity against actions for casino employee
negligence. 548 F.3d 718, 728 (9th Cir. 2008) (Gould, J., concurring). Under the
terms of its compact with Arizona, however, the tribe established its own procedures
for asserting claims, maintained commercial general liability insurance of at least $2
million per occurrence, and agreed not to assert immunity for claims within those
insurance limits. See ARIZ. MODEL TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT §§ 13(c),(d) (2003),
available at http://www.gm.state.az.us/pdf.compacts/compact.final.pdf (explaining
the terms of the compact the tribe had with Arizona); see also Klint Cowan, Tribal
Sovereignty vs. State Court Jurisdiction: Whatever Happened to Federal Indian Law?, 81
OKLA. BARJ. 351, 351 (2010) (discussing casino tort claims and the uniform tribalstate gaming compacts in Oklahoma).
475. Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contracts Encouragement Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-179, 114 Stat. 46 (amending 25 U.S.C. § 81, which requires
Department of the Interior approval for certain contracts with tribes); see also
Seielstad, supranote 24, at 722-25 (discussing the legislation).
476. Indian Tribal Tort Claims and Risk Management Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-277, § 702(a)(3), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-335 (amending the Indian SelfDetermination and Educational Assistance Act (ISDEA), 25 U.S.C. § 450f); see also
Seielstad, supra note 24, at 725-26 (discussing the legislation). Professor Seielstad
argues that the same Congress's considering but failing to pass other legislation that
would have imposed greater restrictions on tribal immunity "is consistent with a
Congressional tradition-indicated by the paucity of exceptions to the general rule
of tribal immunity-that is generally protective of tribal sovereignty and its inherent
attributes." Id. at 752.
477. The Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
Department of Justice, and Congress have recently taken separate measures to
address concerns about tribally-owned and other online lending outfits operating
outside the reach of state law, whether because of sovereign immunity or other
reasons.
See, e.g., Proposed Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and
Judgment, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. AMG Servs., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00536 (D. Nev. July
18, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1123024/130722amgstip.pdf
(stipulated settlement of a lawsuit by the Federal Trade Commission against an
economic enterprise of the Miami Nation of Oklahoma and other defendants
alleging violations of consumer protection laws); Carter Doherty, Payday Lenders and
Indians Evading Laws Draws Scrutiny, BLOOMBERG Bus. WK. (June 5, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-04/payday-lenders-and-indian-tribesevading-laws-draw-scrutiny (discussing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's
review of tribal online lending operations and noting Colorado's call for federal
government action after its state supreme court dismissed the state's lawsuit against
tribal online lenders on sovereign immunity grounds); Carter Doherty, U.S.
Regulators Squeeze Banks to Cut Ties to Some Online Lenders, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 8, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-08/u-s-regulators-squeeze-online-lendersvia-bank-transfer-system.html (noting the Department of Justice's and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation's audits of banks regarding their work with online
lenders, including some operated by Indian tribes, and some banks' ceasing business
with these lenders after receiving subpoenas from the Department of Justice
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states have pursued, other non-judicial remedies against tribal
entities.4 78
The debates on limiting tribal sovereign immunity raise
complicated issues. But the normative and policy concerns raised by
judges and others also suggest that tribal governments may want to
consider expanding their waivers in some circumstances and
providing more notice of the remedies available in tribal forums.
Doing so might help head off a broader abrogation by Congress or
the Court. It could also strengthen tribal court systems and other
tribal institutions.4 79
Tribes will no doubt continue to face political and market
pressures to waive their immunity. And tribes themselves are
arguably in the best position to respond to these pressures (on a
480
tribe-by-tribe basis), especially compared to the Supreme Court.
The Court has always deferred to Congress regarding limitations on
federal, state, and foreign immunity, and the considerations

ordering them to do so); U.S. Senate Bill Aims at Online Payday Lending, CHEROKEE
PHOENIX (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Article/Index/6506
(discussing the Stopping Abuse and Fraud in Electronic (SAFE) Lending Act, S. 172,
113th Cong. (2013), a proposal to strengthen the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau's enforcement ability against online lending operations and give the agency
the authority to close online lending payment processors).
478. These remedies include seizing goods in transit outside of reservation
boundaries, see Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,
514 (1991) (discussing alternative remedies to suit against the tribe to force tax
collection, including seizing cigarettes off-reservation); Muscogee (Creek) Nation v.
Okla. Tax Comm'n, 611 F.3d 1222, 1126 (11th Cir. 2010) (describing state officials'
off-reservation seizure of cigarettes), and freezing tribes' off-reservation bank
accounts, see Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 757 F.2d
1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing Bank of America's acting on the state's
request to restrict the release of money from the tribe's accounts during a dispute
over cigarette taxes), rev'dpercuriam,474 U.S. 9 (1985).
479. See Florey, Borders, supra note 20, at 649 (discussing the relationship between
tribal waivers of immunity and tribal autonomy); Riley, supra note 21, at 1112-13
(noting spillover benefits of providing adequate tribal forums and limited waivers of
immunity); see also Vicki J. Limas, Employment Suits Against Indian Tribes: Balancing
Sovereign Rights and Civil Rights, 70 DENV. U. L. REv. 359, 362 (1993) (arguing that
"[flairness in tribal employment actions . . . will actually reinforce sovereignty by
strengthening tribal workforces and hence tribal economies").
480. See Seielstad, supra note 24, at 739 (citing Congressional testimony of Philip
S. Deloria, director of the American Indiana Law Center in Albuquerque, New
Mexico, "urg[ing] Congress to defer to the natural processes of the marketplace,
which would put economic and political pressure on tribes to limit their reliance on
sovereign immunity rather than on federal regulation"). An example of these
market pressures at work can be seen in tribal government financing, where lenders
typically require tribes to enact limited waivers of their immunity as a condition of
the transaction. See, e.g., TOWNSEND HYATT ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN TRIBAL
FINANCE 32 (2005), available at http://www.orrick.com/Events-and-Publications
/Documents/246.pdf (noting lenders' unwillingness to provide money without a way
to enforce a repayment obligation, and that "[t] ribes typically understand and accept
this commercial reality and are willing to grant limited waivers of their immunity").
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discussed above suggest that it should continue with the same
approach for tribal sovereign immunity. In any case, the Supreme
Court and others should not limit tribal immunity based on the
mistaken idea that it is accidental.
CONCLUSION

Questions about whether and how to, and who should, limit tribal
sovereign immunity are not easy. Policy and other considerations
suggest that Indian tribes themselves are best positioned to address
these questions, including through negotiations with the federal and
surrounding state and local governments. And some historical and
doctrinal context shows that tribal sovereign immunity is not as
anomalous as it may seem upon first glance and that (at least some
of) the concerns about a lack of remedies against Indian tribes are
Together, these considerations also suggest that,
exaggerated.
consistent with Congress's repeated approval of the doctrine and the
Court's deference to Congress regarding federal, state, and foreign
immunity, the Supreme Court should continue to defer to Congress
on tribal sovereign immunity issues. However, tribal governments
may want to consider expanding the availability of and awareness of
remedies in tribal forums.
Whatever normative concerns judges may have about tribal
sovereign immunity, they do not justify courts' undermining tribal
immunity's historical and doctrinal pedigree, whether to tip the
balance against upholding it or otherwise. And whatever the
normative aspects of the debate over tribal immunity, that debate

should be based on a proper history. We at least need to be clear
about how we wound up with the doctrine that exists today. It was
not by accident.

